

Fighting talk

What goes on before the bomb goes off? - A study of the causal factors that influence propensity to violent behaviour in a socio-political context, specifically terrorism

Rob Wray

Submitted for a PhD, University of London, August 2012

33028921

Table of contents

Declaration.....	4
Abstract.....	5
Acknowledgements.....	6
Quotes.....	8
A note of propensity to violence.....	9
Thesis Road Map.....	10
List of figures.....	12
List of tables.....	13
List of charts.....	14
List of hypothesis.....	15
Chapter One – Introduction.....	16
Chapter Two – The literature on terrorism.....	23
2.0 Definitional issues around terrorism.....	23
2.1 Motivational factors, radicalisation and engagement.....	31
2.2 Role of group association vs. personal motivation.....	34
2.3 Transition to violence.....	42
2.4 Future research requirements.....	49
2.5 Group Cohesion.....	44
<i>The Antinomian, the CEO and the Marlboro Man</i>	
2.6 Moral Disengagement.....	90
<i>Jihad Joe – Double-speaking the language of non-responsibility...?</i>	
2.7 Authoritarian Conformity.....	112
<i>The ‘Participant 5’ project</i>	
Chapter Three – The Pilot (Phase One)	
3.0 Introduction.....	129
3.1 Methodology.....	135
3.2 Results.....	148

Chapter Four - The Simulations (Phase Two)	
4.0 Introduction.....	166
<i>The Antinomian, the Entrepreneur...and the Marlboro Man</i>	
4.1 Methodology.....	162
4.1.9 Results	
4.1.10 Group cohesion.....	185
4.1.11 Moral disengagement.....	209
4.1.12 Authoritarian conformity.....	213
Chapter Five – General Discussion and conclusions.....	218
References.....	257
Appendices – <i>Full data outputs, interview extracts and recordings</i>	270

Declaration

I, Rob Wray declare that this draft thesis has been composed by me and that this is my own work except where specified. I further declare that this work has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.

Rob Wray_____ Date_____

Abstract

This multiple study thesis considered the findings of research around the factors that influence individual and group propensity to violence in a socio-political context and tested key variables to establish their relative contribution in driving this process. An initial pilot study, using a sample of 30 UK participants, recorded perceptions about violent behaviour and its causes using a 27 item parcel: five factor model including variables: environmental, belief systems, social identity, demographic, experience of violence (Wray, 2007), a 10 item measure of the big-five personality inventory (Gosling, S.D; et al. 1992), an 8 item measure of authoritarian conformity (Couch A.S. and Bales, 1960 and a 7 item measure of aggression (Couch A.S. and Bales, 1960). The pilot identified key variables affecting propensity to violence from both existing literature and research and real life perceptions about violence. The findings identified three variables: group cohesion, transnational support for violence and conformity to authority. The main simulation study, based on 159 UK participants, then tested the impact of group cohesion and authoritarian conformity, plus an additional variable, moral disengagement, on the dependent variable, Propensity to violence (PTV). Participants were asked to consider how they might respond collectively in a hypothetical pressurised artificial politically violent scenario, measuring the degree of violence in their chosen options on a 7-point scale. Statistical analysis supported the three main hypotheses showing that propensity to violence was shown to increase in groups with higher levels of cohesion in the presence of an authority figure and in response to visual and written stimulus. There was effect overtime for the all conditions with some variance between group types. In addition, Integrative Complexity scoring was applied to

each group discourse confirming a positive correlation between differentiation, integration and propensity to violence. Specifically, that group discourse was seen to be least differential or lateral in authority groups irrespective of whether violence or non-violence was encouraged. Overall the findings confirmed that in a simulated environment, propensity to violence in a UK sample was affected in the context of the variables tested. The resulting model helps to describe the relative and combined relationship between key components of the radicalisation process and the violence of terrorism that can result.

Acknowledgements

Dr. Herbert Blumberg

Quotes

The war against terrorism, is terrorism

--Woody Harleson

While nothing is easier than to demonise the evildoer, nothing is more difficult than to understand him...

--Dostoevsky

"Omar was a normal British teenager who loved his little brother and Man Utd. So why at 24 did he decide to blow up a nightclub in central London?"

--Jason Burke

A note on Propensity to Violence

This research thesis explores, reviews and tests several variables that may or may not increase the likelihood of individuals or groups to engage in violent behaviour for political purposes. ‘Propensity to violence’, although not a new concept *per se* has been defined and developed throughout this study to represent the key dependent variable tested, creating a standard metric against which the potential drivers of political violence might be measured and satisfy any burdens of empirical proof, that this type of research rightly demands. There is a deliberate focus on “violence” as opposed to terrorism both because it potentially offers a cleaner definition (see definition of terrorism sections in Chapter One) and because the simulations described later are designed to test the transition to violent behaviour in practical terms rather than according to individual perceptions about what terrorism is or is not. In other words, the terrorist label is applied as an outcome rather than a pre-requisite. It is important to note that Propensity to Violence (PTV) is defined differently in the two Phases of this study. The Phase One pilot study defines PTV according to coded responses about violence in a single questionnaire (see Phase One methodology). An revised and final definition of PTV is used in Phase Two based on a 7-point inventory scale developed specifically for the simulations in this main section. The intended meaning of PTV score is identical throughout the thesis however it is measured using a more sophisticated inventory in the main phase of simulated experiments which corresponds with standardised inventory scoring and integrative complexity scales.

Thesis Road Map

The aim of this thesis is to explore the relative contribution of three key variables in shaping individual or group behaviour to behave violently. The following chapters are structured to help reflect how this research has developed over time to identify these variables. The first section introduces the research concept and the aspects of terrorism and political violence on which this research focuses. Following this, a literature review details relevant work in the field to date. The first part of the literature review presents general information about research and theories on terrorism before focussing more specifically on the three key areas of focus in this research; namely the role played by group cohesion, authoritarian conformity and mechanisms of moral disengagement on the process of radicalisation and as a catalyst for violent behaviour.

The literature review is followed by section reporting the findings from a pilot study designed to identify individuals' perceptions about the factors that drive violent behaviour. Based on the responses of 30 participants, the findings of this pilot study helped to determine the areas for focus for the main study. There is then a methodology chapter outlining the three main simulations based on the responses of 159 participants and the methodologies used testing the variables group cohesion, authoritarian conformity and moral disengagement. Findings and discussions of each of these are then presented in turn.

The final chapter of the thesis is a general discussion, reviewing the findings, identifying links between them, outlining the shortcomings of the study, recommendations for future research and any possible policy implications of this work.

Full SPSS data tables and details of participants are presented in the appendices (p. 270).

List of Figures

2.5.1 – An impression of the general research framework (p. 62)

2.5.3 – Terrorist Matrix, Washington Post 2001 (p. 70)

2.5.4 – Trusted prior contacts matrix 9/11 bombers (p. 72)

3.0 – Pilot Study Survey extract (p. 13)

3.1 – Variables Matrix (p.146)

3.2 – Transition to Violence Process Map Variables (A-D) (p.147)

4.1.1 – Participant online recruitment advert extract (p. 165)

List of Tables

- 2.5.1 – Mechanisms of Radicalisation (p. 78)
- 3.0 – Pilot phase participants demographic summary (p. 139)
- 3.1 – Pilot study descriptives output (p. 150)
- 3.2 – Correlation Matrix summary of variables tested against PTV score (p.152)
- 3.3 – Model Summary SPSS output (p. 154)
- 3.4 - ANOVA data output (Pilot Phase One) (p. 155)
- 3.5 – Coefficients output table (Pilot data – Phase One) 4.0 – Participants (p.167)
- 4.0 – Summary Participants’ Demographics Extract (p. 210)
- 4.1 – Group type and characteristics (p. 167)
- 4.1.11 – Post-Hoc Multiple Comparison Data (Low Cohesion Group) (p.210)
- 4.2 – Coding for scenario options (p. 173)
- 4.2.4 – Full Participants’ Demographics Extract (p. 313)
- 4.3 – Integrative Complexity scoring guide (p. 177)
- 4.4 – Inter-judge Integrative Complexity Scoring Agreement (p. 177)
- 4.5 – Descriptive Outputs Mean Score by Group Type (SPSS) (p. 186)
- 4.6 – Test of Homogeneity of Variance (p.189)
- 4.7 –Analysis of Variance Output Table (p. 190)
- 4.8 – Multiple Comparison Outputs by Group Type and PTV Score (p. 192)
- 4.9 – Post-hoc Tukey Output by Group Type (during simulation) (p. 196)
- 4.10 – Post simulation subset for alpha output (p. 198)
- 4.11 – Welch and Browne-Forsyth output (p. 199)
- 4.12 – ANOVA output across simulation stage (p. 202)
- 4.13 – Multiple comparison post-hoc (cohesion sample only) (p. 204)

List of Charts

- 3.1 – Partial Regression Scatterplot Group Association (p. 318)
- 3.2 - Partial Regression Scatterplot Authoritarian Conformity (p. 319)
- 3.3 - Partial Regression Scatterplot Transnational (p. 320)
- 4.1 – Mean scores by condition and group type (p. 186)
- 4.2 - Error bar chart identifying statistical outliers (p.188)
- 4.3 – Error bar of during simulation mean PTV score (p.199)
- 4.4 – Means of group type PTV score (p.214)
- 4.2.0 – Plot of Simulation PTV Score appendices) (p. 288)

List of Hypotheses

1. Null hypothesis (Ho): The strength of group cohesion has no effect on the propensity to violence (PTV) score.
2. Hypothesis 1 / alternative hypothesis (H1): An increase in the strength of group cohesion causes an increase in the propensity to violence score.
3. Null hypothesis (Ho): The application of moral disengagement stimulus has no effect on the propensity to violence (PTV) score.
4. Hypothesis 1 / alternative hypothesis (H1): The application of moral disengagement stimulus causes an increase in the propensity to violence score.
5. Hypothesis 2: Integrative complexity of group and individual discourse will be reduced by the application of moral disengagement stimulus.
6. Null hypothesis (Ho): The presence of authority figure has no influence on group decision making processes and collective outputs, increasing or reducing propensity to violence.
7. Hypothesis 1 / alternative hypothesis (H1): The presence of authority figure influences group decision making processes and collective outputs, increasing or reducing propensity to violence.
8. Null hypothesis (Ho): The loyalty (or attachment) of an individual to a group has no effect on their propensity to violence (PTV) score.
9. Hypothesis 1 / alternative hypothesis (H1): The loyalty (or attachment) of an individual to a group causes an increase in the propensity to violence score.

Chapter One - Introduction

While nothing is easier than to demonise the evildoer, nothing is more difficult than to understand him...

--Dostoevsky

This paradox helps highlight the obstacles in developing effective research capable of clearly distinguishing the actual triggers of political violence from the wider perceptions of individuals or groups that engage in this type of violence. Here, Dostoevsky refers to 'terrorism'. In a research context, to 'understand' and not to 'demonise' calls for uncontaminated, objective analysis of factors that drive this type of violent behaviour, immune from predetermined and subjective assumptions about those that exhibit or exact this violence. This study aims to investigate some of the factors that contribute to this phenomenon.

"No bad apples, only bad barrels"(Zimbardo, 2007, p.11). This, the central metaphor of Zimbardo's *The Lucifer Effect - How good people turn evil* (2007) implies that it is systems and situations rather than individuals themselves that transform personality and behaviour. Perhaps to understand the 'evildoer', it is first necessary to understand their environmental condition. In every instance, individual and environment are inextricably linked. This relationship needs careful and logical examination if these changes in behaviour are to be better understood

or explained. This type of examination is multifaceted and complex particularly when that change in question leads to political violence and terrorism.

The nature of the subject matter itself evokes a reactive approach to its interpretation and it is important that effective research in this field resists reactive judgment and maintain objectivity. A large proportion of research over the last ten years citing 11 September 2001 as a pivotal marker on the landscape of terrorism research has generated, on the one hand sound insightful findings, and on the other, broadly reactive attempts to explain and identify the causes of the attacks on the World Trade Centre. In many cases, this increased the tendency of some commentators to mould their accounts according to more subjective analysis. However meaningful a turning point in research terms, before Mohamed Atta al-Sayed boarded American Airlines Flight 11 with his accomplices on September 11, the landscape of terrorism research had looked very different.

The events of 9/11 are not the only example of a paradigm shift in the way political violence and terrorism are executed, but are seen very much as a kind of Rubicon, the other side of which has emerged a new perception of radicalisation, framing issues of transnational support for political and religious causes. The geographical containment of older forms of political violence was no more and radicalisation became a process operating within a global community. Research in the field must respond accordingly.

Critically, terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda, are not single organisational entities, but rather have become amorphous, representing what some have called 'Al Quedaism' (Sales, 2007, p.4) to which individuals can effectively recruit themselves. This is evidenced by two recent developments. Taking the example of Al Qaeda, there have been increasingly amateur attempts at terrorism reported (which have failed) and there has been a shift in the organisation's strategic directives to more general motivational and ideological messages as evidence of this increasing 'band-wagon' approach to terrorism. Almost a decade after this research study started life, Osama bin Laden was captured and killed and while the findings in this study incorporate the importance of his iconic leadership, it also reviews the ways in which terrorism has evolved to maintain its lifelines in several sources, with some modern commentators contending, the loss of bin Laden has done little to effect the efficiency of Al Qaeda.

Research today can most usefully examine this changing face of political violence and how it escalates. Issues of definition are discussed in the early part of the next chapter, but importantly, this research project attempts to interpret some of the factors that contribute to this evolving phenomenon guided by historical research findings and challenges facing terrorism research today.

The study opens with an analysis of the existing body of research relating to the factors that influence propensity to violence (PTV) in a socio-political context outlining the contribution of research to date and exploring the logical avenues to progress the wider understanding of terrorism and other forms of political violence.

The research community acknowledges that in aspects of this field, operationally useful empirical and qualitative research is scant. This study seeks to respond to this opportunity to further develop research in the area, mindful that it must be focussed on specific aspects of terrorism which can be regarded neither homogeneously, nor reductively.

Chapter Two's literature review forms a picture of the current research landscape and helps conclude that engagement in political violence and terrorism is now characterised as being rationally driven as distinct from previous assertions about association with mental illness. Its new form is regarded as having a 'strategic logic' (Crenshaw 2005, p. 11). Much of the existing research reaches conclusions about rational choice and logic in terrorist behaviour and implies a step process from non-violence to violence. This main part of the literature review and experimental section of this thesis focuses on specific stages of this process of transition and the factors that precede it.

Accordingly, pilot study Phase One of this research attempts to identify variables that are positively associated with increased propensity to violence (PTV) in a socio-political context including processes of radicalization based on individuals' own perceptions about the causes of this type of behavior. Findings will be modeled where certain predictor variables within these dimensions are most highly correlated with the criterion variable PTV. The instruments include a 27 item parcel, seven factor model including the variables: group association, transnational support for violence, authoritarian conformity, personal motivation, violence as power, religious association and historical significance (Wray 2007), a 10 item

measure of the big-five personality inventory (Gosling et al; 1992), a 8 item measure of authoritarian conformity (Couch and Bales; 1960), and a 7 item measure of aggression (Couch and Bales; 1960). The findings from this pilot are then considered in the context of other specific literature and research that focuses on authority, conformity and other variables identified below. Phase Two of the study then investigates in more detail the areas of high correlation identified during the pilot with the aim of modeling the combination of variables associated with the highest measure of propensity to violent behavior. This will focus on specific types of behaviour and characteristics that generate high propensity to violence (PTV) scores during the pilot combined with additional variables identified in the literature. This secondary phase will further examine relevant avenues of research using simulated scenarios, paragraph completion tests, group manipulation exercises and integrative complexity analysis.

The instruments used in the pilot cover a wide scope of variables. However, the intended focus is more specific. This study takes heed of the advice of experts in the field that warn against combining the range of characteristics and activities of this phenomenon into one analysis. Accordingly, there is a process of refinement throughout the project which makes, provisions for the design of a model which is capable of capturing information and can be further refined to assess particular behavioural types and circumstances. The output from the initial analysis will therefore determine the basis for second phase simulations outlined in more detail in the Methodology chapter. Analysis in Phase Two will assess whether these

combinations of variables are exhibited in examples of group behaviour, specifically looking at the type of behaviour that precedes transition to violence.

The context for both these phases will initially focus on the views and opinions of a sample of UK residents. In the case of Britain's experiences of radicalisation and terrorism, it is thought to be the so called "normal" members of society that are subject to the machinery of radicalisation. This study seeks to identify these behavioural patterns among a UK population sample. The intention of this approach is to allow the findings to dictate the direction of the later phases of research and avoid reductivism. As outlined above, the changing process of radicalisation and transition to violence is clearly reflected in the increased potential for conflict within Britain today. It is within this context that this study will first focus.

It is well documented that access to established members of radicalised political groups is practically limited and therefore future contact and analysis is most usefully targeted at groups and individuals identified in the first stages of research to test, in effect, how the mechanisms of radicalization drive the behavior of groups and individuals that have no remarkable violent prerequisite characteristics in an attempt to isolate the role of the environment rather than the individual. The limitations of this approach are also discussed later.

The practical benefit of modelling in this way can be found in the way it helps inform, where possible, triggers for transition to violence, made up of combinations of correlated variables that can be identified based by the characteristics they

exhibit. This in turn helps guide the policy development process and research in the field charged with understanding and interrupting possible escalation of violence and determining its origin.

The following chapters outline how this project has been refined identifying factors that influence propensity to violence and terrorist behaviour. To ensure consistency throughout the study, issues around problems of the definition of terrorism and associated violence are carefully considered from the outset. A review of relevant literature then charts the development of research in the field to date, highlighting the areas of relevance for this project. This review forms the basis of a simulated study testing three main variables, group cohesion, moral disengagement and authoritarian conformity to establish what effect, if any they have on the likelihood of a group to act violently.

Chapter 2 – The Literature on Terrorism

The following sections review the relevant literature that helps inform this research project. This is not an attempt to list all the material published on the subject, but to synthesize and evaluate it according to the guiding concept of the research question. The review therefore considers some of the key findings of research in this field, directions for future research and critically an increasingly refined focus on which factors contribute to the increase in propensity to violence modeled in Chapter 3 of this thesis. The review opens with a short discussion around definitional issues and obstacles in terrorism research to identify the parameters of this study. There is then a review of literature more widely before this chapter focuses on the literature relevant to the three main variables tested in Phase Two of this study. They are reviewed in turn.

2.0 Definitional issues around terrorism

<p>Terrorism n. the systematic use of violence and intimidation to achieve political ends - 'terrorist' n., adj.</p>

A central concern of all research around terrorism is the problem of how it can be adequately defined. The following section explores some of these issues and offers suggestions about which elements of the debate can be utilised to usefully examine the phenomenon of terrorism and political violence without hampering research progress. As Woody Harleson suggests at the beginning of this thesis, "The war

against terror is terrorism". This reflects the well rehearsed acceptance by many in the field that 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter' or words to that effect. This problem of perception is yet another complication in the analysis of terrorism and one that has stopped some research endeavours in their tracks. This is in part a bi-product of attempts to develop an all encompassing understanding of the phenomenon.

The earliest recorded use of the term 'terrorist' and 'terrorism' was in 1795 and described the Reign of Terror of the French government. These Jacobins were revolutionaries and the term became synonymous with any revolutionary activity. It was only used as a term in anti-government context in 1866 in Ireland and 1883 in Russia. Today, its use has increased dramatically. Part of this review also explores some of the earlier thinking and research on this topic prior to the 1960s to help chart the development of the discipline.

A definition of the modern concept of terrorism, as the following sections outline is difficult to pin down. It is clear that however loud the call for terrorism to be subjected to the rigours of empirical enquiry, there are certain caveats that must be clarified before this is possible. As Coady (2001) explains: "Mathematical exactitude is not indeed to be expected in the clarification of political concepts. They will always have fuzzy edges and will be subject to contentious interpretations generated by concepts used in the clarification" (Coady, 2001, p. 1696). However, Coady goes into great detail to refine his own definition giving the rationale behind each component. He argues that across the board there is general consensus that

'terrorism' involves political violence and that this is distinct from "mere...mundane criminal violence" (Coady, 2001, pp. 1698). In addition, Coady highlights five main characteristics that are variously regarded as the main components of terrorism: The effect of extreme fear, attack on the state from within, strategic purpose, the nature of the targets and secrecy (Coady, 2001, pp. 1699). These characteristics, or combinations thereof, Coady argues are utilised within the field to progress a useful definition of terrorism. The fluid nature of this definition therefore creates issues in some areas of research which seek to catalogue incidences and are perhaps heavily reliant on the clarity of definition. For the purposes of this research project, the potential outcomes are not strictly reliant on recognised definition. The focus here is on transition to violence and the behavioural typology that precedes it. An open definition therefore, that incorporates violence driven by political motive which is in part directed at non-combatants may well be adequate to examine these processes of transition and engagement without compromising the meaningfulness of any findings. In essence, the aim is to unpick the drivers behind violence with these characteristics. This may in addition involve comparisons with how violence can be justified in differently defined settings, military, criminal or otherwise. Analysis of these different contexts will still help identify the variables that increase propensity to violence score and what makes it distinct from other forms of violence but are in places blurred by the range of definitional issues which are shaped by the different perspectives about how violence should be labelled 'terrorism' or 'foreign policy' for example. This study will regard violence with these characteristics as the focus of its enquiry regardless of whether they are labelled terrorist or otherwise. In other words, terrorist or freedom fighter, the

focus here is to gain scientific understanding of the contributors to violence not inform the moral debate around whether violence is just or unjust. This position, rather than an attempt to circumvent the responsibilities and complications of definitional adherence, does receive support from the wider literature. Coady's asserts that:

“there are reasons of theoretical utility favouring a definition that is relatively uncommitted on the specific or ultimate purposes of terrorist violence. If we treat terrorism as the political tactic of directing violent attacks against non-combatants, we can leave it an open empirical question for which broader purposes it is used” (Coady, 2001, pp. 1699).

The issues that research faces in the wake of the definition debate, as Crenshaw highlights, results from the focus of inquiry on causes of terrorism and not the outcomes it generates. Crenshaw believes that research in the field is bound by tradition and is further hampered by what she terms the “persistent and often distracting obsession with definition” (Crenshaw, 2007, p.12)

Chomsky (1991) offers examples from a US army manual which apparently describes terrorism as “the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to attain goals that are political, religious or ideological in nature. This is done through intimidation, coercion and instilling fear” (Chomsky, 1991, p.1). Kupperman simplifies this definition “to achieve political objectives without the full scale commitment of resources” (Chomsky, 1991, p.1). However, this second definition

transpires to be a description of 'low-intensity conflict (LIC) under the Reagan administration, which Chomsky unsurprisingly describes as "hardly more than a euphemism for state-directed international terrorism" (Chomsky, 1991, p1).

Chomsky is not known for holding back in his criticism of US foreign policy, which consists of innumerable acts of terrorism by their own definition, but this example does serve to underline the apparent obsession within the field with arriving at a universally recognised definition of terrorism. Chomsky goes on quoting Michael Stohl,

"that by convention [...] great power use and the threat of the use of force normally described as coercive diplomacy is not a form of terrorism though it commonly involves the use or threat of the use of violence for what would be described as terroristic purposes were it not for the great powers that were pursuing the very same tactic" (Stohl in Chomsky, 1991, p. 1).

These issues of definition create obvious problems in a field of research dependent on governments anxious not to be defined in inappropriate ways. One important distinction that forms part of the definition in this study is outlined in the ways terrorism is made distinct from warfare. The importance of this will become apparent in later chapters which focus specifically on mechanisms of moral disengagement, but suffice to say, attacks on soldiers are broadly regarded as warfare, while attacks on civilians are terrorism. The important point here for this study is that they are both acts of violence, one legal and the other illegal. Critically, the state department has various small prints in its definitions that blurs these lines,

emphasising the similarities including the attacks against off-duty servicemen as terrorism not warfare etc. This cross-over of contextual meaning has interesting implications for the later parts of this section on definition and moral categorisation.

Goldstein (2003) looks at some of the issues around the impact of terrorism globally. As part of this approach, he reviews modern terrorism and the process of radicalisation and support for these groups. He introduces the concept of the “super-terrorist” (Goldstein, 2003, p. 347) with access to and willingness to use nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. In addition, Goldstein reviews the modern concepts of technological and information terrorism. The almost complete dependence of western liberal democracies on technology and information as the bread and butter of finance, health and transport, policing and so on as the life-blood of successful functioning, makes them an attractive target for the modern terrorist or extremist group. These infrastructures as targets is slightly outside the remit of this study but the technology element is significant in terms of how recruitment and radicalisation processes now use the internet as the main conduit for information exchange and dialogue.

Goldstein also identifies another type of terrorism that also features in the modelling scenarios set out in Chapter Four. Personally motivated, non-group dependent terrorist activity such as Timothy McVeigh and the Uni bomber cited by Hanle demonstrated that there is scope for isolated “a-political thinking” (Hanle, 1989, p.14). Hanle (1989) describes these individuals as “estranged and fragmented

individuals [with]...loss of self-identity and doomed by soulless bureaucracy” (Hanle, 1989, p.16). This important because it represents the opposing viewpoints within the fields that account for transition to violence. Both group association and personal motivation are key variables in the model developed for this study.

Re-focussing on definitional issues; “Its [terrorism] definition should be the outcome rather than the starting point for our analysis, the conclusion rather than the postulate” (Weiviorka, 2007, p.597) In the concluding chapter to a contextual appraisal of current terrorism research edited by Martha Crenshaw, Weiviorka (2007) considers the issues of definition that have most relevance for this study - “this formerly untouchable” issue has become a worthy subject for inquiry, as evidenced by a major shift in the definition of terrorism” (Weiviorka, 2007, p. 597). Weiviorka’s argument is based on the point highlighted in these extracts above around problems of definition. These stem from how political violence is perceived, by whom and how this influences how it is labelled. Citing the popular ‘freedom fighter/terrorist’ analogy, Weiviorka infers that “platitudinously, they concluded that no definition could be given of terrorism” (Weiviorka, 2007, p. 597). This offers a new approach to progress beyond this definitional stumbling block. Weiviorka offers two possible approaches to definition. Firstly, that the definition of terrorism is a socially constructed “image with associated political, religious , cultural drivers which are universally labelled accordingly as terrorism” (Weiviorka, 2007, p. 597). The second approach is described as an examination of:

“the actions and actors that are called terrorist (regardless of who calls them so) in the hope that as research proceeds, it will be possible to refine the description by adding other attributes” (Weiviorka, 2007, p. 597)

This allows the definition to evolve to an extent out of research rather than biasing the direction of such research by responding to particular contextual labels. This study will therefore resist strict definition of terrorism and seek to review the transition to violence regardless of how it is perceived or labelled. The intention here is to maintain as much objectivity as possible.

Some other ideas that Weiviorka raises which will be considered later in this paper following the findings of phase one, include ‘desubjectification of the enemy’, an idea supported by Sprinzak’s theory of crisis of legitimacy reviewed later. These form an important part of how transition to violence might be modelled. Another observation he cites is the suggestion that the decisive step in engagement is not the first kill, or bomb deposited, but when groups or individuals accept or commit to a particular cause. Finally, the last observation by Weiviorka of relevance to this project is the assertion that the more contradictory the different meanings within one cause, the more potential violence will result. Another critical point raised in Weiviorka’s account cites the traditional reluctance of the scholar to consider the implication of the researcher’s relationship with their subject. Issues of access to primary sources are well known but a review of the “dangers on all sides” has been within the remit more of journalists than academics. Weiviorka identifies the need to set out which protocols are needed to frame the research in this context,

“conditions for scholarly knowledgeable inquiry...professional standards and our own intellectual relation to this dangerous subject of terrorism” (Weivorka, 2007, p. 597). These issues are considered throughout this project and will hopefully contribute to developing these protocols.

Ranstrom (2006) in his paper *Mapping Terrorism Research*, sets out one of the main issues faced by research in this field, which as this review will show, is a common thread of concern for many scholars, and constitutes the first important challenge for future research. Ranstrom writes:

“Over the last thirty years, the field of terrorism studies were largely confined to a small nucleus of scholars that were largely ensconced in the ivory tower” (Ranstrom, 2006, p. 127)

To fully understand the nature of the ivory tower in Ranstrom’s assertion it is useful to review a wide range of the findings and opinions of scholars in the field to help mould this study to usefully respond to research requirements for the future and build on existing knowledge about the subject.

2.1 Motivational factors, Radicalisation and engagement

The process that leads individuals from their original state through a process of radicalisation and ultimately, in some cases, transition to violence is complex. This section of the literature review begins by examining the current thinking by a range of scholars at each stage of this process. This first section reviews these topic in the

general context of terrorism research. The final sections of the literature review have a more refined and specific focus.

Horgan (1997), a science journalist and Director of the Center for Science Writings at the Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, New Jersey and a former senior writer at Scientific American (1986-1997), offers a useful first insight, explaining the current issues faced in researching political violence and terrorism. Horgan sets the scene by suggesting some of the most valuable lessons that we can learn about how to research this phenomenon come from how we interpret what this field of research has taught us so far. He begins, "The history of terrorism teaches us many things" (Horgan, 1997, p.89). He argues that the views held in some areas about terrorism are "seemingly incongruous and ambiguous" (Horgan, 1997, p.89) and that understanding the contradictions of these views are central to moving towards a more general understanding which "help psychological perspectives on terrorism move beyond their still pre-paradigmatic nature" (Horgan, 1997, p.89).

Dostoevsky's assertion at the beginning of this paper about the trade-off between 'demonising' and 'understanding' is one that Horgan is drawn to. Horgan suggests that in many ways, varied responses to terrorism infect the nature of the approaches used to understand it which confuses any lines of enquiry, he explains, "An uncomfortable realisation we are going to have to accept sooner rather than later is that terrorism is no longer incomprehensible or mysterious, yet the ways in which we pose questions relating to the psychology of the terrorist obscure this" (Horgan, 1997, p.90). The temptation in this field of research, Horgan argues, is to view the terrorism or political violence reductively. This is a re-current idea

throughout much of the recent literature on the subject implying that those in society charged with formulating a response to the perceived threat of terrorism are attracted by the idea of a homogenous threat which in turn should have a homogenous response. This is reflected in the approaches to study in this area and influences the conclusions of a great deal of research. This gives rise to the “fundamental misconception” (Horgan, 1997, p.92) as Horgan calls it that “we can remove the grievances of terrorists in an attempt to prevent terrorism from occurring” (Horgan, 1997, p.92). In other words, Horgan suggests that some research has oversimplified an equation in which the drivers or variables behind transition to violence can be identified, isolated and removed, without accounting for the interdependencies of some of these causal factors. He proposes that research should instead evaluate terrorism differently, responding to it with more flexible approaches. Horgan’s assessment views terrorism as creating violence, death and disruption and then further manipulating the responses to this in a deliberate and exploitative manner. Coupled with the emergence of single issue or religious terrorism, Horgan’s concerns are around the inadequacies of a response where “...the notion of addressing grievances is seen as a way forward in tackling terrorism” (Horgan, 1997, p.89). These concerns are of particular importance to some of the objectives of this research project which is mindful of the need to resist a reductivist approach.

Horgan goes on to offer suggestions about which direction the field should take in the future. He firstly outlines some requirements: “There are further important issues to recognise in attempting to develop a conceptual framework for

understanding terrorism within which meaningful psychological perspective might develop” (Horgan, 1997, p.92). Critically, this framework should not simply attribute characteristics to terrorist behaviour without careful consideration about the specific and unique nature of each test case example and the variables that influence it. In reality however, the perspective emerging from the continued research in the first instance skewed this perspective aligning it with a subjective and Western-centric bias designed to frame research questions which answered political questions and not psychological ones. The implications of this imbalance is explored in more depth throughout this thesis. The research model outlined in Chapter Four looks specifically at key predictor variables in an attempt to identify which factors or combination of factors work within this framework to influence behaviour and tendency to engagement in political violence. Two of these variables are regarded as particularly important in explaining the balance between individual motivation and dependence on group associated behaviour to trigger this behaviour typology. These are considered in the next section.

2.2 Role of group association vs. individual motivation

“As in all intimate relationships, this glue, in group love, is found inside the group. It may be more accurate to blame global Salafi terrorist activity on in-group love than out-group hate” (Sageman, 2004, p. 135). Sageman (2004) through empirical analysis based on the biographies of 172 Islamic operatives affiliated with the global Salafi jihad (the violent revivalist Islamic movement led by al Qaeda), concludes that the process of affiliation to terrorist organisations and engagement in forms of political violence cannot be adequately explained in terms of “common social

factors or personality predisposition” (Sageman, 2004, p. 135) on account of problems with specificity. Instead, Sageman sees the process as a group phenomenon consisting of three main stage components: social affiliation in groups which creates pre-violence bonds, ‘progressive intensification’ which promotes acceptance of certain political causes and exposure to radical organisations which leads to ‘formal acceptance’(Sageman, 2004, p. 135). It is only possible to speculate about the volume of theoretical findings which attribute political violence to social factors, compared to other variables in previous research, but it is certainly a predominant and popular theme. There is more detailed discussion around the balance of these predispositional factors like environment, exposure to violence, education, income and socio-economic status as ascriptive factors, against the contribution of more immediate situational triggers later in this chapter.

Of critical importance to this study is the importance Sageman places on the social bonds formed prior to affiliation within an extremist context and this is a factor that is incorporated into Phase Two of the analysis. The key point here is that in the evidence reviewed by Sageman, which is discussed in more detail later, it is the group that acts as a vehicle for radicalisation rather than an individualistic driver i.e. “formal affiliation with the jihad also seems to have been a group phenomenon. Friends decided to join jihad as a group rather than isolated individuals” (Sageman, 2004, p. 135). The catalysts for these opposing causes or motivations for affiliation form a key part of the analysis process set out in the methodology chapter of this thesis and are reflected in the modelling approach. In fact, it is this group phenomenon that seems to be most useful in explaining any increase in propensity

to violence and is one of three central predictor variables entered into the regression model in the pilot study and later through analysis of means on the outcomes of the a group cohesion simulation discussed later.

Of critical importance to this focus by Sageman on the group affiliation process, are the implications it has for theories around the recruitment element of radicalisation: "Instead of a top-down process of the terrorist organisation trying to recruit new members, it was a bottom-up process of young people volunteering to join the organisation" (Sageman, 2004, p. 135). This concept challenges some of the popular traditional speculation about "recruiters" drawing on potential new members.

Also key to these associations in the case studies outlined by Sageman are four important areas of enquiry that form the foundations of social affiliation that generates this type of group behaviour. The first of these is 'friendship'. Here, Sageman explains how association forms through friendship bonds which lead to group affiliation and where radicalisation is at odds with "the top-down recruitment and brainwashing of plotters...the mainstay of conventional explanations of Al Qaeda terrorism" (Sageman, 2004, p. 136). Clearly, these specific studies should not be viewed reductively or as characteristic of all types of potential terrorism but certainly can be regarded as aligned with modern forms of terrorism. From his case studies, Sageman found group size to be consistent, with an average of eight in each group. He argues that it is this group structure that facilitated increased levels of one-up-man-ship and "chatter about destroying the world" (Sageman, 2004, p.

138). Sageman suggests that this associated structure helps maintain momentum and keeps members motivated through a transactional or interdependent relationship. As Rotella (2006) explains in Sageman's account "The talk helps them stay fanaticised, to maintain their mind and never relent" (Sageman, 2004, p. 138). This supports the idea that there is more than one factor at work within these networks i.e. religion or politics are not the sole driving factors, rather they appear to work in combination with in-group individual psychological factors. Also, as Sageman suggests in opposition to the traditional role of the 'recruiter', affiliation of the groups to a radicalised cause was often by chance and not a unilateral or intentional recruitment process. Critically, in Sageman's case studies, affiliation to Al Qaeda was on a group, rather than individual basis. This assertion is represented in a key aspect of the simulation design used to test the effect of group behaviour on individual thinking in the main part of this study and is reviewed further in the section of this review focussing on group cohesion.

These points are compounded by Sageman's other observation about association of kinship. Among other studies, he cites the example of the 9/11 perpetrators. This group comprised two sets of brothers and three cousins. Although Sageman does not conclude as such, this might, in effect be observed as a 'ready-made' group with pre-existing strong bonds and associations. Whether Kinship, in this way, might accelerate the radicalisation process might be possible to examine in phase two of this study. The third area observed by Sageman is 'discipleship'. Here, he cites evidence of authoritarian conformity and loyalty to teachers and leaders in South East Asia. These relationships are shown to be very strong. Lastly, Sageman

reviews the role of 'worship' stating "mosques served many functions in the transformation of young alienated Muslim into global Salafi mujahedin" (Sageman, 2004, p. 139). This ties together his early points, outlining the area in which friendship, kinship and discipleship might be further cultivated. This last statement by Sageman appears to summarise a profile incorporating age, religion and social alienation. These facts, and Sageman's assertion about how best these relationships should be studied has helped given this current study direction and focus, "Only prospective participant observation studies show the importance of interpersonal bonds in recruitment into cults" (Loftland, 1965, p. 111).

Another proponent of the benefits of examining the network structures of extremist groups to gain an understanding of how they form and operate is Ressler (2006). Ressler promotes 'Social Network Analysis' (SNA) as a helpful tool in unpicking the drivers behind radicalised group behaviour: "social network analysis can provide important information on unique characteristics of terrorist organisation...from network recruitment, network evolution, and the diffusion of radical ideas" (Loftland, 1965, p. 111). Ressler explains the benefits of looking at how relationships form within these networks, how individuals are recruited and what might repel potential new members. This information, Ressler argues, has the potential to help interrupt recruitment processes. He cites the work of Sageman as a good example of SNA but also highlights some potential problems citing Sageman's descriptive techniques and the lack of robust modelling procedures. Ressler closes his discussion with a call for extended use of SNA but recognises it's limitations as a technique. Additional more conventional work around group

dynamics have also been considered in the next few paragraphs to provide as comprehensive a picture as possible to inform this thesis.

The work of Bion (1961) covers group psychodynamics, *basic assumptions* and *group mind*. This area is particularly relevant, specifically *basic assumption dependency*, as it potentially combines the biological innateness of this type of behaviour with the societal and environmental factors. Importantly, this ties in with idea of *scapegoating* in the way that internal anxiety can be projected onto an enemy or vented through a group leader to absolve or guide. This is perhaps most helpful in understanding the concepts of leadership religious or secular within groups. Jessica Weisbach (2006) explores this idea and other factors including childhood trauma, group dynamics, moral disengagement and religion, but concludes that none of these factors in isolation can trigger or maintain terrorist affiliation. The findings of Lifton's (1957) studies on thought reform also helped inform the initial building of the phase one modeling framework . Lifton explains group affiliation in this way as a process of exposing the potential candidate to 'successive psychological climates' that act extremely coercively to hook individuals within predetermined group structures. As Lifton states, 'He attains the rewards of self-surrender, of giving up his individual struggles, merging with an all-powerful force, and thereby sharing its strength" (Lifton's, 1957, p. 13). Arguably, it is this process of attachment that ultimately forms the basis for the group sustainability as touched on by Sageman above. Some of variables tested and reported later in this thesis expand this idea of group behavior effects and how they can be sustained over time.

Also relevant in the context of this research are aspects of social identity and self-categorisation theory as expounded by Tajfel and Turner (1979), which details how individual sense of self, motivation, judgment and perception is affected by group membership. Here, personal identity gives way to social identity and as individuals perceive themselves as part of a group they assume the characteristics of that group. As Turner argues, this begins a process of depersonalisation and self-stereotyping. In this way, group members adjust their sense of identity to match the collectively defined attributes of the group. This process of 'referent informational influence' is distinct to group behaviour and more complex than normative and informational forms of influence. This ties in with some of the later discussion around Sprinzak's theories of a dehumanisation process at work where in and out-group divisions are reinforced.

One of the central aims of this study is to draw on findings which might explain reasons for marginalisation and radicalisation and whether dialogue can be reinstated to improve social cohesion where possible. If terrorism is different in its nature and at different times in its development, then any action taken to prevent it must be responsive and mindful of this change. Understanding this distinction is key to understanding terrorism and will help facilitate more effective confrontation of this behaviour on ideological and political grounds rather than through coercive force. This knowledge will specifically help explain how the tactics of terrorism, as distinct from traditional warfare, such as civilian attacks, bombing and hostage taking, can be better understood and allow for prevention and early intervention.

This should shed some light on the reasons for the emergence and sustainability of terrorist group behaviour and how this might help inform strategies to bring these groups back into the political process through identifying the interdependence of all contributing factors and associated predictions or inferences that might be made. Any response therefore must be designed in the context of the group decision-making process and how it might be influenced. Also relevant in providing context are issues raised by the findings of Sherif and Sherif (1969) and their Realistic Group Conflict Theory. This line of thinking firmly rejects explanations of inter-group conflict, which adopt biological or psychological concepts, or analogies between human aggression and inter-group violence - instead they favour environmental influences. The remit of this project will draw together existing and new findings, both pathological and environmental to help explain the life-cycle of terrorism.

This is linked to Lewin's studies in the 1940s in which he equated reasoning and democracy. His findings suggested that group behaviour resists authoritarian pressure and can be more readily influenced through interactive processes of negotiation. Here the act of making a collective decision and creating a shared group norm led to greater commitment to carry out the decision. Lewin called this 'social engineering' but was criticised for suggesting tactics that were temporary and illusory and seen as predefined by the leader or stronger party. However, while neither style of negotiation, or indeed negotiation with terrorist groups at all is a strategy willingly employed in most circumstances, the findings of this study should clearly demonstrate that identifying the triggers, pathways and characteristics that lead to the emergence and sustainability of terrorist groups can more effectively

inform counter measures both pre-emptively and responsively in the way that these processes are created and potentially interrupted.

As Breakwell (1993) suggests, this shared representation also helps define an individual sense of self. In this context therefore, susceptibility to group affiliation is not strictly pathological, but rather, socially constructed and that this process occurs throughout the life-cycle of these groups. Critically, earlier assumptions in literature about psychopathology have been shown to have most relevance in leadership traits but are less helpful in explaining motivation at lower hierarchical levels. Importantly, this assertion does not preclude the role played by pathology in the process of radicalisation.

2.3 Transition to violence – a strategic logic

“The rationality of irrationality” (Shelling, 2003, p. 1), a term coined in 1966 by Thomas Shelling, is cited by Robert Pape (2003) in his paper *The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* as an accurate illustration of the paradox of terrorist behaviour. Pape has studied huge samples of terrorist incidents from the 1980s onwards and drawn conclusions about the obvious logic that drives, perpetuates and sustains terrorism as a political tool. Pape cites several examples of suicide terrorism forcing change including the eviction of US and French military forces from Lebanon in 1983, the Israelis from Lebanon in '85 and abandonment of the West Bank and Gaza strip in '94. Also, 1990 saw the creation of an independent Tamil state by the Sri Lankan government and later that decade Kurdish autonomy granted by the

Turkish government. These concessions, among many others, Pape argues, has generated an increase in suicide terrorist activity “largely because terrorists have learned that it pays” (Pape, 2003, p. 1). Pape goes on to suggest that many more traditional studies of this type of terrorist behaviour have looked at them in isolation and focussed on the “irrationality of the act of suicide from the perspective of the individual attacker” (Pape, 2003, p. 1). This is resonant of Horgan’s concerns about homogenous interpretations of radicalisation and further supports the argument that terrorist behaviour, even at this secondary state of actual activity cannot be explained as a single profile and that this is a shortcoming of previous research. Pape explains:

“Until recently, the leading experts in psychological profiles of suicide terrorists characterised them as uneducated, unemployed, socially isolated, single men in their late teens and early 20s. Now we know that suicide terrorists can be college educated, or uneducated, married or single, men or women, socially isolated or integrated, from age 13 to 47” (Pape, 2003, p. 1).

Pape therefore outlines five guiding principles from these assertions: Suicide terrorism is strategic, it involves the deliberate coercion of “national self-determination” of opposition state power, it is on the increase as a tactic, it tends to work only on a moderate level with less effect on changing national pursuit of important interests and lastly, undermining the actual ability of organisations to pursue this course of action can be seen as the most effective method of

prevention. The implication for this research therefore is the necessary acknowledgment of this tactical rationality as an important driver in affirming violence as an effective alternative.

From a different perspective, Crenshaw frames concerns in her assessment of what she terms “terrorism studies” (Crenshaw, 2003, p. 67). She describes a dramatic change of course in terms of US foreign policy in the wake of September 11 and like many others in the field, felt that the behaviour of the research community mirrored this reactionary response. Crenshaw sets the challenges faced by terrorism research within the context of wider US security and national interests and suggests “Such an integrated conception must be based on new ideas of both power and security” (Crenshaw, 2003, p. 69). The enemy perceived by the US in these terms should, according to Crenshaw, be recognised as a potential non-state entity, immune to military threat and driven to “violate norms” (Crenshaw, 2003, p. 69). To help illustrate her point, Crenshaw cites an assertion by Lesser from the RAND Corporation who explains:

“Most contemporary analyses of terrorism focus on terrorist political violence, without reference to its geo-political and strategic context” (Lesser in Crenshaw, 2003, p. 69).

However, progress is being made. Ranstrop in his assessments of the current state of research at the beginning of this chapter signals Crenshaw’s optimism at a way forward:

“...the study of terrorism, which is widely recognised as theoretically impoverished, stands to gain theoretical scope, precision, and cumulativeness of findings” (Crenshaw, 1992, p.1).

Even if we acknowledge Pape and Crenshaw’s ideas around strategic logic, it is still important to look behind the common rational of method and review the unique and individual motivations of specific political causes. Phase Two of this research will build on the the self-assessments of so-called ‘normal’ individuals from Phase One. Only when specific variables are identified as re-current at this level can the correlations and associations be applied in simulated examples. The design, advantages and limitations of this approach are discussed in the final chapter of this thesis.

The work of Sprinzak (1990) takes a slightly different approach to Pape and Crenshaw but his findings are also very closely aligned with the focus of this study. His assessment of the Weathermen organisation in particular operating in the US in the 1970s, provides a helpful context to examine the stages of transition to violence in direct action groups. Sprinzak found that through the development of direct action violent organisations a process of de-legitimisation of oppositional authority can lead to the formation of ideological terrorism. He identifies three main stages: Crisis of confidence, Conflict of legitimacy, Crisis of legitimacy. The central thread of Sprinzak’s hypothesis is that it is progression through these stages which culminate in a full transition to violence. Critically, according to Sprinzak, this progression

occurs over a period of time as the irreconcilable differences between direct action group or organisation progress beyond political opposition (crisis of confidence) to a conflictual exchange (conflict of legitimacy) and finally violent conflict (crisis of legitimacy). Importantly, this transition takes time and it is this protracted, historically grounded progression that Sprinzak holds as the most important component of his equation. The first stage is psycho-political where a movement or challenge maintains that confidence in the existing political government is eroded. The foundations of the established system however are not questioned and therefore no action is taken to delegitimize the structure of government. At this stage, it is not the system that is perceived as wrong but the individuals in power. It is characterized by an ideological challenge or counter-culture group but may contain some elements of unplanned confrontation or violence. The next stage is the continuation of this crisis of confidence where counter-government groups begin to question the system itself. This is manifest in angry protest based on a system that allows those in power to use tactics to mislead the populace. Crisis of legitimacy then emerges as an extension of the first two stages. This stage is characterized by a move away from political terminology. New lexicons emerge describing the system and those within it as sub-human. This is where antinomian behavior becomes more prolific.

This study is primarily concerned with the transition of groups between the latter two stages. As discussed above, this study will investigate the process in which individual identity can be seen to be absorbed by collective group identity as part of this transition from political dialogue to a delegitimation of oppositional authority.

Sprinzak describes the characteristics of this change as antinomian¹ in the way opposing power is de-humanised in the perceptions of group members to facilitate an effective and absolute disengagement from the political process. This also provides moral justification for use of violence against those increasingly perceived as sub-human. The simulation testing moral disengagement set out later suggests how this might happen in practice and should provide an empirical record of the factors that contribute to it e.g. perceived injustice on a transnational basis or perceptions of violent group behaviour. The importance of historical context in the deligitimisation process is also included in the variable model for the pilot section of the study.

In another paper, Sprinzak outlines his view that terrorism *per se* is an extension of normal society, “a form of human behavior...integrally linked to the normal world” (Sprinzak, 1990, p. 34). The key factor here is that terrorism or transition to violence in Sprinzak’s view is not only defined as the “climax of radicalization” (Sprinzak, 1990, p. 34) but results from a more protracted form of deligitimisation over a long period. This information forms part of Phase Two of this project with variables related to dehumanization and antinomian behaviour.

Continuing the discussion about the nature of transition stems from Schmid’s (2005) theory of terrorism as a form of psychological warfare. As such, he offers various suggestions to help in what he perceives is a fight against a medium of

¹ Antinomian describes an individual or process which rejects socially established morality. This idea is explored further as a component of the section on moral disengagement where violence can be legitimised through a realignment of moral standards.

violence, the primary purpose of which is to communicate a message or series of messages through the use of fear; he quotes Lenin: "The purpose of terrorism is to produce terror" This may seem self-evident but its simplicity is something that Schmid argues is often overlooked. He continues to build this case throughout his work and provides a series of recommendations that have the potential to reverse the intended effect of this fear.

Schmid's body of work is based on 50 expert responses to questionnaires which reveal some key profile information about the target group in question. These are that terrorists tend to be clandestine, idiosyncratic, politically motivated and interested in using randomly targeted innocent players as "message generators" (Lenin, 2005, pp. 137-146). The key point is that violence is used as a vehicle for communication and this has important implications for understanding the drivers identified in this study as contributors to change in the criterion variable, propensity to violence score described later. Martha Crenshaw echoes Schmid's claim stating "the most basic reason for terrorism is to gain recognition or attention" (Crenshaw, 1992, p. 386) and this ties in with her assertion about strategic logic in terrorist thinking.

The idea of terrorism as a form of communication seems to suggest that an intrinsic part of the response to it should focus on which communication strategies can as Schmid puts it "soften-up the terrorists and their constituencies" (Schmid, 1988, p. 47).

There are some indications in the literature then that explore several areas relating to the root causes of terrorism that this behaviour type cannot be attributed to specific causal effects which operate in isolation, rather, that affiliation with extremist groups and sustained membership of these groups is influenced by several interdependent factors that operate simultaneously. The next section sets out the views of other experts in the field that offer something of a roadmap to progressing terrorism research into the future.

2.4 Future research requirements

Schulze (2004) makes a clear argument for what has hampered terrorism research to date, and offer suggestions for future directions. He opens his argument with reference to J. Bowyer-Bell who claimed 25 years ago that “the academic response to terrorism had been a-historical and exaggerated, and closely associated with congenial political postures” (Bower-Bell, 1977, pp. 176-7). If we subscribe to the current commentary about terrorism research, the field has paid little attention to what Bowyer-Bell had to say. Like others, Schulze attacks the empirical shortcomings research in this field describing the “overriding deficiency of this state of stagnation is a dearth of empirically grounded research on terrorism” (Schulze, 2004, p.87). This is a current theme identified throughout the literature review and one of, if not the main reason, why this current study sets its foundations in statistical evidence, designed to inform and develop further research.

Schulze goes on to cite Reid (1993) and her assessment of the discipline as a “slow process of accumulation of scientific information [which] accepts all the myths until

empirical investigation proves otherwise” (Reid, 1997, p. 17). Again, it is lack of empirical data that hinders progress. Indeed Schulze describes the current status as “myopic and restrained and limits empirical research” (Schulze, 2004, p.87).

Schulze continues to set the scene around empirical deficiency citing Robert Gurr’s (1998) assessment that “with a few clusters of exceptions there is in fact a disturbing lack of good empirically grounded research on terrorism” (Gurr, 1998, p.15). Schulze thinks there are forces at work that shape the very nature of terrorism studies namely “a triumvirate composed of the media, government and academia” (Schulze, 2004, p. 87). This combination it seems, as outlined earlier, has produced decades of reactive attempts to explain terrorism. In particular, Schulze notes the incidences of hijackings and hostage-taking in the 60’s and 70’s that “galvanized liberal democracies into creating the foundation on which current terrorism research rests” (Schulze, 2004, p.87). However, Schulze offers something of a solution moving forward, building on existing research focusing on primary source material. Again, referring back to Crenshaw’s work, “Too few researchers in the field build on the work of others. The question for theoretical generalisations should always be balanced with attention to detail. Access to detail will always be a problem, but not to the extent of curtailing inquiry” (Schulze, 2004, p.87). It is clear then that the central argument suggests research should overcome issues of access to data, build on existing findings and direction, and be at least in part, empirically based.

In conclusion, Schulze notes in his essay ‘Breaking the Cycle’ three main considerations for postgraduate students pursuing these lines of enquiry. Firstly,

that an understanding of the history of terrorism research, prior to 1968, is essential to productive research on terrorism today. Second, to be wary of pursuing the in-topic and creating an imbalance in the research field and lastly, that any research requires good theoretically grounded case studies. This study seeks to address and respond to each of these three observations. In line with Schulze's advice, it is useful however to consider the shape of the research prior to 1968 to gain a better understanding of how this research contributed and shaped the face of research as it is today.

Pre-1968, research had been confined to a "small nucleus of scholars" (Ranstrop, 2007, p. 27). By 1988, Schmid and Jongman (1988) were only able to identify 32 leading terrorism researchers. To help understand how this research landscape looked prior to this, it is instructive to review the main events and developments that preceded the more recent evolution of terrorism research. The first half of the Twentieth Century saw two significant events that have helped shape terrorism as we know it today. Both world wars were strong drivers of nationalist sentiment, which began to erode the legitimacy of international governments and order.

Researchers discussing terrorism research during this period most notably Laqueur (1977) felt that this research was conducted by sympathetic "observers" in the last third of the 19th Century, "in a last desperate struggle of outrage and exacerbated human nature for breathing space and life" (Laqueur, 1977, p. 42). Conversely, other contemporary observers made less humanistic causal links describing terrorism as "evil, a form of madness with...an underlying physical disorder"

(Laqueur, 1977, p. 42). Lombroso (1896) connected terrorism to vitamin deficiency with others looking for explanations from barometric pressure, moon phases, alcoholism and drought; “cranial measurements were very much in fashion” (Zenker, 1895, p.262). It was not until Zenker (1895), the early anarchy historian, that any observations became objective and focused. Zenker stated: “*expressis verbis* that anarchist terrorism would by no means be explained by pauperism alone” (Zenker, 1895, p. 262).

At the turn of the century, anarchism and terrorism were less aligned. The nature of terrorism, and how it was regarded, coupled with its perceived complexities, cultural difference and social structures inhibited any meaningful study. One of the only definitions to emerge at this time was in the mid-1930s with an entry by Hardman (1934) in the *Encyclopedia of Social Sciences* describing terrorism as a “group or a party who sought to achieve its avowed aims chiefly through the systematic use of violence” (Hardman, 1934, vol. 14). Hardman also regarded the motive of publicity as a cardinal driver of terrorism and as a tactical mechanism. The key observations at this time, also seemed to be around defining terrorism as distinct from government-led or mob violence. As Laqueur (1977) points out the indiscriminate violence that characterized more modern forms of terrorism did not exist in the 1930s. Indeed, until the 1960s, the principle sources of information or review of terrorism “research” were broadly historical or designed to assess the legal implications of the phenomenon.

Interest in terrorism in the US in the 1960s began to pick up pace and it is perhaps this process of development that have created some of the limitations of terrorism research referred to in some of the modern literature. Linked to the Vietnam war and the US internal struggle socially and politically at that time, terrorism research regarded such behavior as an interruption to an otherwise stable liberal democracy, which had its roots in the inequality of society itself. In other words, the American system, characterized by the American Dream became, low income and poor housing which bred frustration which turned into aggression. Conflict studies conducted by Dollard (1939) on frustration and aggression prior to the outbreak of the Second World War corroborated this view. This concept was the basis of numerous research papers that used factor analysis and multiple regression to investigate the correlation between violence and various social variables including literacy, urbanization and caloric intake. This informed the development of the “Frustration Index”. This prompted over 650 scholars at the time to list revolutions and political violence as their field of specialization (Laqueur, 1977).

What followed were some macro cross-national research programmes that looked at conflict and behavioral aspects, but research found little or no link between foreign and domestic conflict behavior. A study including 84 countries discussed the issues around stability and whether change promotes unrest, but following this there was a general acceptance that the scales used were inadequate based on the “un-scalable” (Laqueur, 1977) nature of communist and third world countries “not unaware of the weaknesses of their concepts and findings that were all too often based on shot-gun statistical marriages. As Gurr (1972) put it: “factor analysis has

been used to give the appearance of statistical order in what remains conceptual chaos" (Gurr, 1972, p. 29).

Back in the context of modern research, there has now emerged several calls in for new studies to address issues around empirical rigor and statistical power of the analysis of terrorism which, to be successful must be mindful of the limitations of an early subjective understanding of terrorism research. This study maintains that there is equal importance to both qualitative and quantitative methods in assessing an area as varied and complex as this one but recognises that some previous research does in places produce subjective analysis which lacks empirical robustness. Silke (2004) explains how this often involved the "re-working of old material which already existed" (Silke, 2004, p. 60). He goes on to cite the assertion by Schmid and Jongman that "only 46 per cent of the researchers [in their study] said that they had managed to generate data of their own on the subject of terrorism" (Silke, 2004, p. 60). The findings here suggested that the majority of research was "based entirely on data produced by others" (Silke, 2004, p. 60). Andrew Silke further considers these issues citing Colin Robson's view that the concerns of research should be exploratory in the first instance, descriptive in the second and explanatory in the third (Silke, 2004, p. 57). Silke worries that terrorism research has continued to perpetuate the exploratory and descriptive stages but has not yet progressed to explaining the phenomenon. This he suggests, is caused by a combination of short term research motives, obstacles to systematic data collection, lack of objectivity and the emotive nature of the topic itself (Silke, 2004). This research has been carefully engineered to ensure where possible objectives,

data collection, methodology and analysis responds effectively in addressing these potential shortcomings. Indeed some have called for a total rethink. Haslam explains:

“Here again, though (as we have found out), there is a danger in thinking that the resolution of such matters is only ever an empirical issue - a question of ethics, resources, and careful design. These things are important, but ideology, politics, group memberships and vanity also have a role to play. You can lead an experimentalist to data, but you can't always make them think. The most important experiments are those which make such disengagement harder, and which encourage fresh minds to change the world not just reproduce it” (Haslam, 1997, p. 19). 15 years have passed since this assertion by Haslam but the message that empirical findings however statistically robust must be comprehensive and objectively applied if this complex phenomenon is to be understood holistically. It can be argued that research in this area continues to be susceptible to these risks as much today as when Haslam made this point.

A central argument that also reviews the issues outlined above, and suggests ways forward is put forward by Franks (2005). In the conclusion to his paper, *Rethinking the Roots of Terrorism: Beyond Orthodox Terrorism Theory – a new research agenda*, Franks repeats the call for a new research agenda:

“...one that contains a holistic, multi-level and multidimensional approach to terrorism and which allows the problem to be examined and explained from

wider perspectives. This agenda I suggest can be achieved by treating terrorism as conflict. This ontological shift will emancipate the study of terrorism from the chains of the political legitimacy debate and thus allow it access to the analytical tools of conflict studies [which]...provide a much more comprehensive understanding of the roots of terrorism and also provide a greater number of pathways for resolving violence” (Franks, 2005 , p. 33).

Picking up on Frank’s reference to root causes, part of his ‘solution’ does seem at odds with a large part of the thinking in the field outlined above in its pursuit of a profiled homogenous cause of terrorism. However, the concept of a changing ontology of terrorism does accord with the drive of this project to examine the violence behind the definition. It is for this reason that this study utilises a component of ‘conflict’ in phase one with analysis not only of terrorism and all its definitional shortcomings outlined at the beginning of this chapter but an attempt to focus on the actual process of transition to violence irrespective of satisfactory definitions. This study does not ignore the issues of definition rather attempts to de-contaminate the psychological and environmental issues for assessment, free of the subjective debate about who is a freedom fighter and who is a terrorist.

In their paper, Bergensen and Hann (2005) offer a very insightful assessment of transnational terrorism, which summarises well a wide range of the issues considered here. The first for these is the recognition by several experts in the field of the changing face of terrorism, “a new terrorism” (Jenkins, 2001, p. 1), “a new

breed of terrorist” (Stern, 1998, p. 1), a “new generation of terrorists” (Hoffman, 2008, p. 1), a “new wave of terrorism” (Rapaport, 1999, p 1). Clearly a common theme and one that has a major characteristics of this new form of terrorism as Sageman points out earlier in this chapter is represented by a network structure. This evolved, non-hierarchical form again has implications for the design of this project if it is to effectively respond to changes in research generally in the field.

Another new characteristic which is less clearly defined in the literature but nonetheless significant, is the increased reluctance for groups to admit responsibility for violence. This is significant because membership of a group was traditionally culturally or nationally defined. Now, as in the sample used in this study (British population), national and cultural divisions have become blurred, perhaps not in terms of still prominent cultural divisions within Britain but certainly in the context of a wider global community with vested interests and connections internationally. Bergensen and Hann also consider less delineated demands and motivations within groups as a symptom of this shift and argue that the change has largely been from political to religious. This in turn, they argue has caused a dispersal of targets internationally and made the associated violence more indiscriminate. This certainly seems to be the popular viewpoint with government departments and the media. The findings in the next chapter will hopefully give an indication as to whether this has been the case in terms of the behaviour that precedes transition to violence or non-violence in Britain today.

“Omar was a normal British teenager who loved his little brother and Man Utd. So why at 24 did he decide to blow up a nightclub in central London? (Burke, 2008, p.14)”. This question, one of three issues summarized by the quotations at the beginning of this paper has a complex answer. It is also a question asked in late 2011 by the Observer Newspaper. As a consideration, concern and discussion point in the Sunday papers, it is clear that understanding and addressing the significant failing of Britain’s social and cultural infrastructure is high up the agenda, particularly where this leads to bombs in nightclubs. The question everyone wants the answer to is why these young men resort to violence, why they become marginalised and ultimately radicalised and what drives this process. The review of literature in this chapter has attempted so far to summarise the evolving nature of this field of research showing where new behavioral phenomenon have been borne out of a modern, technological, global ‘terrorism’ (if it needs that label) and where empirical and qualitative analysis might explore the reasons why. Burke (2008), the Al Qaeda expert asking this question goes a long way in offering an answer. Using test cases from his research, Burke summarises the reasons why this is a complex question. In describing the efforts of the British security services attempting to profile Islamic radicals he explains, “one of their major problems is the immense variety of factors that lead young British Muslims into militancy” (Burke, 2008, p.23). Burke identifies that they have three main types: ‘the followers’ who have a vulnerability to radicalisation if they are in the right place at the right time, ‘the seekers’ who have an active interest in making contact with authority figures and then the ‘self-starters’ who, as Sales suggests above, effectively recruit themselves to a cause. The questions for this study must be asked of different elements of

these three groups. What makes a 'follower' susceptible and how do they respond to the process of radicalisation? What drives the 'seeker' to pursue knowledge in the first place? And lastly, what mechanisms allow the 'self-starter' to engage in the process? Burke, in his article, is careful to warn caution to avoid overreaction, "The threat from Islamic militancy needs to be kept in perspective" (Burke, 2008, p. 24) but he is clear that the triggers that drive these processes of radicalisation are still in their infancy in Britain.

In his book, Burke identifies stages that lead to radicalization and ultimately violence. He explains, "Modern Islamic terrorists are made, not born" (Burke, 2004, p. 284). Burke's process begins with recognition of a social injustice and this can be perceived or real. The second stage is the belief that existing channels of political dialogue are inadequate to transmit the message. The last stage is a process of overcoming the behavioral restrictions within society and embrace an ideology that permits crossing these boundaries. (Burke, 2008, p. 285) Burke believes it is the last stage that must be interrupted to prevent transition to violence. In Burke's examples and case studies, this ideology is encompassed in many forms but can be applied to any situation and operates by affecting individual perceptions of their circumstances "The real power of bin Laden's discourse is that, like Marxism, it explains a personal experience by reference to a convincing general theory and then provides a comprehensible programme of action" (Burke, 2004, p. 286). The model for this present study includes this combination for lack of alternative, authoritarian propaganda, group association and the transnational aspects as characterised by Salafi jihad. The complexity of these questions and the many

multilayered issues outlined in this review may be beyond the scope of this project but it will hopefully help inform the wider research field and go some distance to answering elements of these questions. The following section examines some of these elements highlighted in this review of literature in an attempt to determine which combination of these factors explored above manifests themselves most in the explanations of what drives violent behaviour.

The above section provides an overview of the current state of terrorism research and has attempted to draw on a range of evidence and research commentary to help define specific areas for the analysis which form the main part of this research project. The first pilot phase of research described in the next chapter draws on these observations and has distilled them into an inventory designed to record individual perceptions about which aspects of these theories are the main contributors to political violence and terrorism. The findings from this pilot are report later. The next three sections have attempted to dig deeper into the literature and refine the key variables which form the focus of attention during the main simulation section of this study. The areas examined in more detail, group cohesion, moral disengagement and authoritarian conformity are now reviewed in turn.

2.5 Group Cohesion, Osama is dead...long live Al-Qaeda


The Antinomian, the CEO and the Marlboro Man

This section of the literature review explores the work and research which specifically relates to the three main variables tested in the main part of this study, beginning with group cohesion. Some of these variables also feature in the pilot study that follows the literature review.

Much of the existing research into political violence and terrorism (including the work cited here), seeks to understand or explain not only the factors which trigger and nurture violent behaviour but also the human structure in which this process occurs. There is a sense in the literature that there is a desire to establish or define an individual identity which, through a process of metamorphosis germinate into groups and emerge a collective, often dehumanising entity led or inspired on another level by the corporate- CEO-style of terrorist soothsayers promoting their cause. The literature and research in this area variously tackles this question from different angles and on different levels. The scene is set in Rational Choice theory exploring individual motivations for engaging in violent conduct. It considers also, transitions to a collective identity and the implications of that position in terms of out-group rhetoric, sense of loyalty and diminished responsibility for action. The other main question relates to structure over which scholars set out the hierarchical versus flat group structure argument. Understanding these factors helps understand the human structures in which they operate and ultimately informs and furthers the thinking around how this translates into violent conduct. The schematic below summaries these interactions for the remainder of this

chapter which show the specific elements of cohesion and the other two proposed variables that will be discussed in this section. This model is intended only as a basic representation to help visualise how these factors might interact.

Fig. 2.5.1 – An impression of the general research framework



This model shows the varied components of group cohesion that are present in the literature and existing research. The next few paragraphs describe their relative and combined effect and considers how they might be simulated.

4.5.1 Irrational rationality

Earlier In this literature review, Crenshaw (1992) was cited in the context of her theory of terrorism describing it as having a ‘strategic logic’. To help understand this better, it is instructive to consider in the first instance the transition to violence from a group perspective using first principles about rationality. Gupta (1990), contributes to this debate by considering options for an integrated behavioural framework for analysing terrorism offering explanations for individual motivations and group dynamics. His work is an expansion of rational choice theory which

incorporates group-based motivations and an integrated model for analysing terrorism.

Based on the neo-classical concepts of economics, this evolving approach to individual motivation and its relevance in the context of this study was based on the fundamental assumption that an agent is actuated by self-interest. This, the first principle of Economics, utilised econometric analysis to identify the drivers of market behaviour, the buyers and the sellers and their motivations. This popular theory allowed for unprecedented access to a domain of understanding of macroeconomic policy in the United States and other super-economies. This in turn led to the transition of this theoretical base into socio-political science in the 1950s with the publication of Anthony Downs's (1957) seminal work and evolved into a well-recognised discipline.

In political violence and terrorism terms, this raises and answers some questions about what motivates individuals in a group and what exchange process takes place to form a collective output. Rational choice theory requires that individuals must make an assessment of expected benefits and cost in each of their actions.

Accordingly, without this assessment, action becomes irrational or a-rational. To help understand the relevance of this, it is useful to consider Olson's (1965) concept of the 'free-rider'. Olson's assertion is that public good or collective benefits are not restricted to those who participate in procuring them. He outlines a formula to demonstrate why this might logically lead some members of a group to reap benefits from the sacrifices of other members.

Participant = Benefit –cost

Non-participant = Benefit

Here, non-participants have the same net gain as a participant without paying any personal cost. Gupta argues by this logic therefore that members participating in violence to further the cause of a group must be acting irrationally and that this logic is amplified as the group size becomes larger. Although this has implications for Crenshaw's earlier assumptions about the strategic logic of terrorist behaviour, it does accord with the small group structures of modern terrorist cells i.e. a single participant's contribution becomes more significant in smaller groups. Gupta explains: "A single voter cannot affect the outcome of a national election. Nor can a single Islamic suicide bomber [can] *sic* expect to establish a global Islamic state with his or her sacrifice" (Gupta, 1990, p. 16).

Contribution by individual members of a group viewed in this way presents something of a paradox in the context of the research presented here i.e. rationality had seemed a key attribute in the participants of political violence and other types of terrorist behaviour. Indeed, Tullock (1971) supports this view suggesting that "a revolutionary is either an irrational being or is a hypocrite, who hides ulterior self-serving motives under the guise of lofty ideals" (Tullock, 1971, p. 53). What followed these assertions was a protracted critical dialogue set on exposing the flaws of behaviourism more widely. This has led Gupta to consider an alternative explanation and structure based on an expanded incarnation of the

rational choice framework. He proposes an integrated approach which has specific relevance for the findings set out in this thesis around violence and its association to group behavior.

Gupta writes: "I hypothesize that human beings as social animals, not only strive to increase their personal wellbeing, but also try to increase the welfare of the group in which they claim their membership" (Gupta, 1990, p. 17). Central to this expanded proposed structure is Gupta's belief that this dual objective is rational. Citing what Anderson (1991) calls an "imagined community" (Anderson, 1991, p. 2), Gupta described how this dual identity evolves from both ascriptive and adoptive identities. Ascriptive identity including birth characteristics: ethnicity, nationality, linguistic or religious association, where adoptive identities are assumed later in life and can include cult membership, pressure group affiliation, forms of class identity. Adoptive identity as such, is taught.

The group cohesion simulation in the next chapter is designed to test the interplay of these dual identities and their effect on propensity to violence score. The hypothesis anticipates that there is an effect on participants' engagement in violent conduct based on their self-perceived group identity. The argument in this research is that the draw of the collective drive to use violence outweighs individual desire to resist this approach. This is based on two assumptions: firstly that the objective of the group is achieved by violence and secondly, that an individual acting alone would abstain from this type of behaviour. The negative hypothesis here is cited by Gupta where engagement in violence is for personal gratification purposes or

where individual action has a significant altruistic motive e.g. personal salvation or sexual gratification from collective group behaviour. Although, as research and literature here shows, absolute self-serving or altruistic motives are unlikely. If we examine the collective identities of Anderson's 'imagined community', it is clear that as learned associations, these can be numerous. The challenge therefore as Gupta presents it is to establish a collective identity with sufficient number of subscribers as to be effective. This introduces the concept of a "political entrepreneur" or soothsayer - a political innovator who can create and recruit to these collective identities. This is the basis of radicalisation in the traditional sense and the subject of the first of the simulations in the next chapter and related simulations on authoritarian conformity. The remainder of this section considers the implications for the study of political violence within the context of these collective identities and the drivers which can be seen to promote violent behaviour executed as a condition of membership to that group or identity. This includes Gupta's recalibration of his cost benefit equation with both benefits and cost divided between the collective and individual motivation and how these collectives are constructed.

2.5.2 The Social Network - "*Terrorbook*"

Facebook and other social networking is handy to some and evil to others. Its relevance here is in its power to psychologically and physically mobilise groups by creating an addictive real-time community and in the way it is structured. In a virtual context, this is a modern phenomenon but social network analysis *per se* has been central to the structure and function of all social group types, not least the

interaction of political activism groups or terrorist cells. The relevance of a *'terrorbook'* network is significant here because it can be non-hierarchically structured and it principally develops contagiously. I have used Facebook here as an example to try to illustrate how the modern mediums of social communication, their speed and self-recruiting accessibility can help understand how fluid and private associative communication channels can be formed which are amorphous and broadly self-recruiting. This medium allows the individual or group to control membership and engage incrementally and relatively undetected. Critically, these networks have no central hub. On the face of it, these characteristics apply in equal measure from students organising a party to activists planning an attack. Critically, these networks are usually acephalic although this is not a prerequisite i.e. absence of leadership may be a factor in the amplification of degrees of violence or extreme behaviour in a group but does not seem to have any effect on group formation in this context. The implications of these issues are set out below.

First popularised by former Klansman and Aryan Nations member Louis Beam, the doctrine of 'leaderless Jihad' was introduced by Mustafa Setmariam Nasar (aka Abu Mus'ab Al-Suri). According to Sageman (2004), this concept drives his hypothesis that through Social Network Analysis jihadi groups can be shown to have moved from a hierarchical organizational model towards a leaderless resistance model. Under this model, small groups can engage in resistance or violent activity without central coordination.

This theory sees terrorism as an amorphous entity into which participants effectively recruit themselves. Critically, this process cultivates an environment which, by its nature, produces more highly cohesive groups with stronger bonds. Existing group behaviour research sets the context for this aspect of the study. Before reviewing the findings of the simulation in the next chapter which will test the effect of group cohesion on propensity to violence, it is instructive when conducting an experiment to consider Social Network Analysis drawing on the work and debate of Sageman (2004) and Hoffman (2008). This idea also has interfaces with the Rational Choice theories outlined above and the threat of group violence in the context of research conducted by Pynchon and Borum. The results of the group cohesion simulation will be reviewed in the context of this existing research.

2.5.3 Exploding the myths, Sageman

Through his exploration of terrorist networks and their structure, Sageman (2004), as the Economist puts it, “explodes each of the myths” (Economist, Jan 2005, p.19) about a traditional hierarchical terrorism networks. He describes how “Al Qaeda has evolved from the organisation headed by [the late] Osama bin Laden into an amorphous movement – a leaderless jihad” (Sageman, 2004, p. 43). Sageman “discredits conventional wisdom about terrorists by eschewing anecdotes and conjecture in favour of hard data and statistics” (Sageman, 2004, p. 14). Sageman argues for an alternative assessment of the structure of violent groups favouring a flat structure of distributed networks over a more hierarchically organized make-up. Central to this, is what Sageman refers to as the “bunch of guys” theory which applies a four step process to track the formation of a low level group engaging in

violence. He claims for example, that the operational entity known as Al Qaeda has been effectively “neutralized” and that the current principle threat comes from lower level diffuse groups that together evolve through a stage process. Sageman’s explains that in the first instance, associated groups become alienated. This can occur as a result of a collective real or perceived ‘outrage’ in the form of a witnessed or experienced traumatic event. Following this, there is a process of homophilic association where this experience or trauma is played out in group dialogue. The forum for this stage is increasingly conducted using the internet. The net result of these interactions is a ‘closed society’ stage which principally relates to families participating in Jihad. Lastly comes Jihad membership and violence. From these forums form networks argues Sageman and this increasingly popular theory about the epidemic effect of terrorism and how it develops has increasingly been identified as a framework by which this type of behaviour can be understood. Furthermore, this approach is not limited to academic research.

Within 2 weeks of the attacks on September 11, the Washington Post published their first attempt at a network or matrix of terrorists involved (displayed over).

Fig 2.5.3 – Terrorist Matrix, *Washington Post* 2001



Further research would reveal that some of the links between each of these group members existed prior to the technical training or experiences specific to this attack. As part of research commissioned for the National Consortium for the study of terrorism and responses to terrorism, Hendrickson (2009) reviews this theory to help understand how Sageman’s model can explain terrorist or violent behaviour and specifically how it relates to group structure and cohesion. He found that Sageman’s data, drawn from review of legal transcripts, news reports and personal interviews with key experts, were analysed using descriptive logistic regressions.

Compared with alternative traditional drivers of violence (demographics, religiosity, madrassa attendance, low socio-economic status and unskilled labour) the 'bunch of guys' measures returned a significant relationship with violence only in his expatriate group. There were no significant relationships with pre-jihadi clique membership or with families engaged in jihad. The conclusion was that Sageman's variables failed to substantially improve the fit of the model and that the results were similar when specified using linear ordinal logistic regression and multinomial modelling methods. The principle problems identified with this data therefore, were the small sample size (the models only examined 214 cases) and the lack of psychological measures (limited examination of human relationships). Hendrickson also levies some criticism around the limitations of Sageman's research compared to the unknown actual extent of the Al Qaeda network. The diagram below represents a network of prior trusted members as set out by Krebs (2001). Again, this example model is presented here to help visualise how the research began to develop an understanding of the links between individuals and cells engaged in terrorism.

Fig 2.5.4 – Trusted prior contacts matrix 9/11 bombers




Figure 2 Trusted Prior Contacts

Despite this, Sageman's theory in the context of this thesis is extremely relevant. Phase One of this research attempts to record individual perceptions about degrees of group cohesion as one of the most significantly correlated variables with perceptions of what causes this type of violence. Although Sageman's theory does not account for all the findings described in this pilot, the dimensions of hierarchy or absence of it is central to how groups are bonded and therefore impacts on group cohesion and this is a primary focus in both the pilot study and the second simulated phase of research. This contribution is discussed in more detail below including an assessment of the fairly frank exchange between Sageman and Hoffman on the subject. Principally, Sageman focuses not on the ascriptive characteristics of would be terrorists, age sex, nationality, religion and so on, instead focussing on their common links, irrespective of these factors, to Jihad, and specifically how these links are formed. The varying degrees of cohesion as channels into violence are characteristic of the simulation in this chapter and seem to be confirmed in the data from Phase Two. Acephalic groups can be seen to have a lower propensity to violence and so the question of leadership is an important one.

Sageman's theories around Social Network Analysis are designed to help understand the term 'leaderless jihad'. Among his main critics is Hoffman. Hoffman (2008) interprets Sageman's somewhat Al Qaeda-centric assessment as an assertion that the modern Al Qaeda has evolved into a non-hierarchically structured flat framework of self-recruiting, likeminded extremist wannabes or as Sageman put it – 'a bunch of guys'. Here Sageman's idea about the importance of

self-recruitment and prior group cohesiveness is central to the hypothesis tested in the section on group cohesion, but is subject to a degree of criticism from Hoffman. Hoffman accuses Sageman of a “brusque dismissal” (Hoffman, 2008, p. 10) of much of the existing literature on terrorism. Hoffman goes on to say that Sageman suggests that because of this group structural change, Al Qaeda has been all but ‘neutralised’. Hoffman cites the assertion by the National Intelligence Committee and later the Senate Select Committee that Al Qaeda is a “serious threat to homeland” (Hoffman, 2008, p. 10). Hoffman goes on to highlight the conclusion reached by former CIA and National Security Council Official Bruce Reidel that Al Qaeda is still hierarchically structured and operating accordingly (Hoffman, 2008, p.15).

Furthermore, Hoffman criticises Sageman’s assessment of these sources as alarmist suggesting Sageman has no empirical evidence, although Hoffman himself cites no evidence from the CIA or Security Council. Hoffman lists a series of inaccuracies related to “historically groundless parallels including the IRA and its necessarily hierarchical structure and the inadequacy of Sageman’s ‘bunch of guys theory” (Hoffman, 2008, p.15). He concludes this section of his paper by citing the example of Arch Duke Franz Ferdinand and Gavrilo Principes’s reliance on the hierarchical structure of the Black Hand Gang. In fact, in a subsequent article for the RAND corporation entitled *Redefining Counter-terrorism – The Terrorist CEO*, Hoffman emphasises the hierarchically organised, top-down structure of Al Qaeda stressing that it is this corporate style succession planning coupled with multiple modus operandi that has made them so resilient (Hoffman, 2008, p.15). This article and its

observations also opens with the concept that killing Osama bin Laden will have little effect on their global structure. Following his death in 2011, the extent to which this is true is not yet known but is considered further in the conclusion of this research.

Sageman addresses these criticisms by acknowledging his “brusque dismissal” of the existing academic literature by maintaining that “evidence should trump loyalty to authority” (Sageman, 2008, p. 34). However, despite this political academic debate, the important factor is the acknowledgement by this author that individual and collective perspectives are interdependent and equally critical to this area of research rather than one *or* the other as Hoffman and Sageman seem to imply.

There is also a misconception (possibly as product of the structure-hierarchy argument set out here) that group and individual identities are distinct or treated as such for the purposes of debate. The conclusions in the general discussion chapter maintain that a combination of these factors is required to create the environment necessary for this type of transition to violence.

2.5.3 The Lone Gun ‘Men’

There are factors as set out in the debate above, which bring into question which type of group can be regarded as highly cohesive and poses a question about which compounding variables affect the groups’ propensity to violence in this context. The simulations described in chapter four attempt to account for these variables by re-creating the decision making process in the context of varying degrees of group cohesion in an environment where the effect of these confounding variables is

theoretically lessened. This is to allow for measurement of a correlation between propensity to violence and group cohesion in as pure a form as possible. However, before reviewing the outcomes of this simulation, it is important to establish not only how the groups are constructed and how cohesive they are, but also identify the possible triggers for channelling this behaviour towards violence or non-violence. The work of Pynchon and Borum (1999) examines this question in more detail.

In their paper *Assessing threats of targeted group violence: contributions from social psychology*, Pynchon and Borum propose some key areas of focus. They suggest that the question should be approached systematically from the level of group behaviour, and individual behaviour within a group context. Specifically, they are interested in the impact of the group on individual behaviour. It is important to note here that central to Pynchon and Borum's paper is the assertion that research has historically focused on the threat of individually perpetrated violence and neglected in part the role of the group. Although slightly out of the scope of this current chapter, it is significant that acts of terrorism are often attributed (and are particularly memorable) to a 'lone gunman'. From Oswald to McVeigh, these incidents have often become the focus of media and social attention (Borum, 1999, p.45). However, Borum is quick to point out that these individuals, apparently acting alone, were in fact the product of previous or existing group activity. The simulation testing group cohesion also accounts for this distinction examining both pre and post-group propensity to violence scores principally measuring where the

group environment (at varying levels of cohesion) has a significant impact on individual PTV score.

2.5.4 Size matters

McCauley and Moskaleiko (2010) in *Mechanisms of Political Radicalisation: Pathways towards terrorism* identify 12 mechanisms of radicalisation, ten of which relate to the context of group identification and a reaction to perceived threat to in-group. In reaction to the application of rational choice modelling and motivated group violence (discussed above), McCauley and Moskaleiko suggest that rather than the free rider concept being a disincentive to engage in group risk taking, in small groups “where each member and each members behaviours is known to others, social rewards for participation and social punishments for free riding can make behaviour commitment after all related to group size” (McCauley and Moskaleiko, 2010, p. 30). This is pertinent because it has implications for the size of the group, relative to cohesion and motivation to commit to the cause of the group collectively. The optimum group structure is therefore a balance of several factors drawn out of the existing research around motivation, collective identity and cohesion.

Of immediate interest however, is McCauley’s statement that “radicalisation and terrorism are made possible by bringing individuals into small groups” (McCauley and Moskaleiko, 2010, p. 30). This concept forms the third dimension of the group experiment set out in the main experiment balancing together group size, cohesiveness and collective/individual identity. McCauley and Moskaleiko also

subscribe to the Sageman theory that terrorist cells are often disconnected and self-organising.

2.5.5 Individual versus collective identity

McCauley explains that radicalisation can occur on different levels. They set out a scale of 12 mechanisms of radicalisation and the corresponding level of radicalisation from individual to mass; five of which are specifically relevant to this chapter. These are summarised in table 2.5.1 below.

Table 2.5.1 – Mechanisms of Radicalisation

Level of radicalisation	Mechanism
Individual	1. Personal victimisation
	2. Political grievance
Group	3. Joining a radicalised group
	4. Joining a radical-power of love
	5. Extremity shift in like-minded groups
Mass	6. Extreme cohesion under isolation of threat
	7. Competition for the same base of support
	8. Competition with state power-condensation
	9. Within group competition-fissioning
	10. Jujisstu politics
	11. Hate
	12. Martyrdom

This research pre-dominantly focuses on the point at which groups are formed (mechanism 3) with the simulation covering some of these stages through to compensation for same base of support (mechanism 7).

To establish what drivers increase the likelihood of engaging in political violence, McCauley *et al* set out in their list of mechanisms, the possibility of a “giant step” by the individual into violence and cites the example of Wafa Idriss, the first female Palestinian suicide bomber, completing her mission two weeks after joining the cause. McCauley and Moskalenko acknowledge that this is possible but dismiss it as the norm – “giant-step transitions are notable precisely because they are relatively uncommon” (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2010, p. 30). Instead, they start at the point of an individual step process theory passing through Dissonance Theory where individuals will narrow the conceptual gap between immoral action and positive self-image. This process is the focus of the next section of this literature review and the focus of the second of the group simulations testing moral disengagement. However, critically they cite Milgram experiments as a good example of self-radicalisation but where feelings and perceptions about behaviour was not measured, only actions e.g. increasing voltage. These experiments were not group based but did involve an authority influence figure. McCauley and Moskalenko’s (2010) ‘power of love’ radicalisation mechanism is more related to group behaviour specifically that “terrorists tend to be recruited by those that they know as a security measure to avoid exposure. Love and comradery is therefore a very strong draw into a group. McCauley and Moskalenko cite the example of

Italian Brigade Rosse recruit who explained: “There are many things I cannot explain by analysing political situation...as far as I am concerned it was up to emotional feelings of passion for the people I shared my life with” (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2010, p. 32).

Therefore, enlistment capitalises on this and uses block recruitment to get groups of friends or relatives to join together, or as Sageman calls them: a ‘bunch of guys’. The most interesting and relevant point here is how this functions after conscription. There is an assumption described by McCauley and Moskalenko that groups recruited in this way will increase their sense of cohesion as they begin to share more common goals and threats. In the cohesion simulation, these different stages of group development are represented on staged levels, with blood-related groups and groups bonded through a single experience. Equally, this has implications for research on condition of membership or attachment on the premise that bonds that encourage affiliation with a group, also serve to make disaffiliation less likely. Other mechanisms identified by McCauley and Moskalenko are described in the general discussion, but the last relevant factor here for group cohesion is the mechanism of radicalisation under isolation and threat: the radicalised group becomes more isolated as it goes underground and then more cohesive; or as McCauley puts it: “the power of the relevant arguments and social comparisons is multiplied in an underground group” (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2010, p. 33).

Whatever the group structure however, it is clear from all the literature and research that some form of structure is already in place. There are some instances where smaller groups operate in isolation but this is at a later output stage following initial radicalisation. Perlinger and Pedahzur (2010) in their paper from the Political Networks Paper Archive – Social Network analysis in the study of terrorism and political violence, comment on the how research has tried to better understand this process. They maintain that attention shifted after inconclusive research yielded little empirical evidence on profiles, except that increasing attacks where there were not non-hierarchical paramilitary organisations but small informal “social frameworks which were adaptive and dynamic” (Perlinger and Pedhazur, 2010, p. 34). Attention refocused on the social dynamic within the groups and especially compelled them to investigate the “type and intensity of ties between the group members and their multifunctional nature are associated with the groups’ radicalisation , the emergence of a common identity and ideological commitment and engagement in violent activities” (Perlinger and Pedhazur, 2010, p. 34). Critically, Perlinger and Pedahzur make the observation that further studies related specifically to religious violent groups in Western countries by Hoffman (2008), Stern (2008) and others discovered that it was “not uncommon” to find cases in which the formation of the social framework responsible for the violence precedes the cause of the violence. This assertion is one of the many relating to group association and ascriptive cohesion (which may or may not have implications for the timeframes of radicalisation that is tested using the simulation in this chapter. To examine how the action of the groups in this study can be explained by qualitative analysis of their level of cohesion and how this affects individual

behaviour and ultimately collective behaviour. To get the most from this first simulation, it is important to consider some characteristics and components of groups mapping in this way. Perlinger sets out a rough framework which is helpful to consider here. The first stage is to establish who might be mapped or included in the group for assessment. Principally, determining who belongs in a group should focus on the actors ultimately perpetuating the violence or include early influence figures, supporters and “hangers-on”. In real-life scenarios, there has often been some confusion in the post-mortem analysis of terrorist or violent episodes about where the individual ends and the collective begins which warrants some review. In reality, this is not clear cut and is a likely combination of degrees of the same. Borum (1999) discusses the point in his research.

Prior to the Oklahoma City bombing, McVeigh had been a member of the Michigan Militia (Flesher, 1995 p. 22). Equally, Michael Griffin, who shot dead Dr. David Gunn outside his abortion clinic, had been reportedly affiliated with the pro-life group Rescue America. Aryan Nation member and white supremacist Larry Wyne Harris in possession of three vials of bubonic plague was also a product of the Patriot Council, an extremist Minnesota based group. Borum makes the point that while there is no clear causal effect in these associations; the existing literature has neglected to look at the influence in these groups on individual behaviour or the potential of groups acting collectively to the same end (Borum, 1999, p. 12). Pynchon and Borum’s paper is designed they say to “provide those responsible for assessing the risk of group violence with fundamental information about group behaviour that may be relevant to understanding and evaluation a groups potential

risk” (Pynchon and Borum, 1999, p. 133) . Based in the principles of social psychology Pynchon and Borum form a compelling argument that the paradigm of differing behaviour between groups and individuals is key to understanding a group’s propensity to violence. This is based on the premise that group membership affects the behaviour of individuals along a variety of behavioural dimensions. Pynchon and Borum assert that “although not all principles of group behaviour may be relevant to assessing a groups risk for violence, certain principles of group theory and dynamics may help” (Pynchon and Borum, 1999, p. 133).

What is critical from their paper and most relevant here, is their suggestion that individual perpetrators will vary in degrees of group affiliation and based on consensual bonds within a group are influenced to act violently or otherwise. As described earlier, this is particularly relevant to the first of the simulations relating to the cohesiveness of any given group the impact of this cohesion on the propensity to violence score of the group and the individual in isolation. The simulation in the next chapter measures the effect of group cohesion on PTV with the hypothesis that the more cohesive the group, the higher its propensity to violence. However, to help contextualise what factors are strengthened or weakened in this equation according to the degree of cohesion, it is instructive to further consider the framework set out by Borum. Their framework is based on four group behaviour elements for understanding risk i) Group attitudes and opinions, ii) Group decision making, iii) Motivations to group action and iv) Diffusion of individual responsibility (Borum, 1999, p. 135)

Within the context of group attitudes, Borum cites the work of Cialdini, Perry and Cacioppo (1981) providing evidence that individual opinions have more extreme tendencies in a group than on an individual isolated basis – this is widely referred to as “group polarisation”. This is important in the context of this research not least because it implies that PTV score will increase in the simulated group environment to a certain degree irrespective of group cohesion. This concept of group polarisation has two main premises which are critical to the simulation below. Firstly, that on joining a group, individuals are exposed to alternatives of previously unknown opinions and viewpoints with a more extreme slant or position. This can influence their own individual opinion distinct from pre-existing relationships within the group. Second, that membership of a group fosters “social comparison” between individual group memberships who then competitively adopt yet more extreme views than each other. As research by Festinger (1957); and Isenberg (1986) shows this has a net affect, regardless of the mechanism by which it occurs, of making overall group opinion advance its current view to a greater extreme i.e. violent one-upmanship. Critically, and related to Borum’s earlier point, the newly influenced attitudes of the individual can persist beyond and after membership of the group. Findings from the simulation in the next section both examine the effect of social polarisation including the mean differences in group opinion based on individual responses before and after group membership becomes a factor; with the final simulation considering authoritarian conformity elements including this phenomenon of social comparison and comparative opinion raising.

In addition to this interaction, is the concept of 'group think'. Janis (1982) was the principle proponent of group think. As mentioned in the literature review, this process underlines key details in problem solving based on a desire to reach consensus within a closed or isolated group. Group think can be characterised in several ways, some of which have relevance in later chapters in this thesis, including group perception of invulnerability, that antinomian or out-group hostility can result from over characterisation of enemy stereotypes and an increasing pressure to conform to the will of the group. The subsequent chapters address and simulate the concepts of conformity and moral disengagement but the main focus here are the circumstances under which group think may occur and it are these exact conditions which the group cohesion simulation seeks to test for. Research by Janis has shown that members avoid promoting viewpoints outside the comfort zone of consensus thinking "A mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when a member's striving for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action" (Janis, 1977, p. 6). McCauley and Moskalenko identify three conditions that lead to Group think: Directive leadership, homogeneity of members social back ground and ideology and Isolation of the groups from outside. In the context of the group simulation this applies in two of the group conditions where participants are blood or experience related.

Borum and Pynchon state these conditions as: i) highly cohesive groups – where outsider opinion can be rejected when it deviates from the group; ii) similarity in back ground and opinions of group members which decrease the likelihood of

alternative viewpoints and iii) members feel pressure to agree with a leader. This third characteristic is the subject of the simulation designed to test the effect of authoritarian conformity. Lastly, iv) time constraints and urgency reducing the decision making quality. This is also tested for in all simulations and reported as either high or low integrative complexity score depending on the group dynamic.

The third element of Borum and Pynchon's (1999) group risk assessment structure relates to group motivation. This is based on the principle that groups through their own collective identities are required to view themselves as better than other groups. This is widely known in the literature as in group/ out group bias and requires a degree of antinomian or dehumanising of perceived enemies. This element is outside the scope of this section of the literature review but is discussed next and is the focus of the second simulation.

The final relevant element of Borum and Pynchon's structure relates to reduced accountability for violence. According to this characteristic, individual members of the group believe that responsibility for a particular act of violence is spread out over the entire group thereby reducing individual responsibility. Borum and Pynchon do not specifically refer to the effect of group cohesion on this process, but the simulation testing this attempts to measure its affect and discuss the relative impact. The overall purpose of this research is to provide, in part, some operational guidance to help predict the relative propensity to violence of any given group. Borum and Pynchon assert that this framework, summarised here should be used to "address directly the issues of group violence [to develop] a scientifically

informed approach to evaluating group violence risk” (Borum, 1999, p. 135) To this end, they pose four central questions: 1. What are the norms of the group? 2. What is the structure of the group? 3. How cohesive is the group? and 4. What is the groups’ current situation? (Borum, 1999, p. 135). Borum recognises that these characteristics are dynamic over time and evidence is difficult to obtain. The structure and context of the simulations used in this research are designed to further the understanding of these issues. The remainder of this section focuses on exploring their third question around group cohesiveness.

As Borum and Pyncheon explains, “Cohesiveness describes the extent to which the individual group members feel a sense of collective association “a feeling of “we” (Borum , 1999, p. 136). This force of cohesion attracts some individuals to the groups and deters others from leaving the group. Again, Borum and Pyncheon reassert that Janis held cohesiveness as the main factor in influencing or creating group think (Borum, 1999, p. 135). Borum also suggests some contextual questions to test this concept. Firstly, what benefits keep members in the group, second, what is the penalty for leaving or disaffiliating and third, how concerned are members about the ideology of the group, or one another and how do they perceive threat from the outside. Moody and White (2003) argue that the defining characteristic of a strong cohesive group is that it has status beyond any group member. They define structural cohesion as the “minimum number of actors who, if removed from a group would disconnect the group” (Moody & White, 2003, p. 34). The relevance for this chapter is whether this hypothesis above could be used to effectively reduce a groups propensity to violence by interrupting the cohesion

of terrorist cells. This is an expansion of the social solidarity concept which examines how the linkages between group members maintain cohesion. Highly cohesive groups they argue, benefit from multiple paths and sets of alternative linkages known as the multiple connectivity features. Critically however, the structure of the group 'hub', will determine its relative strength and cohesion, concepts which are explored in the last section of this review on authoritarian conformity and the subject of the final simulation.

The group cohesion simulation that follows this literature review, tests groups with different degrees of cohesion from blood relations to unassimilated strangers. The principle hypothesis anticipates that as group cohesion increases so PTV increases. Equally, that decision making in a highly cohesive group becomes more black and white and that this will be reflected in a lower integrative complexity score.

The literature reviewed here, which has specific relevance to this to group cohesion, has therefore outlined several theories around group structure, cohesion and motivation both at the collective and individual level. While aspects of these theories are often over-lapping and similar, they often reach conflicting conclusions. The pilot study goes some way to confirming group cohesion as a perceived driver of transition to violence, and this is further tested for in the simulation testing degrees of cohesion against violence as a dependent variable. The group cohesion simulation has been designed to account for these theoretical assumptions and test how they combine to increase or reduce group propensity to violence. The discussion that follows the results section reaches a number of new

conclusions that help explain how these psychological and environmental variables interact and to what degree they evolve group behaviour in violence or non-violence. The next focus of the literature review relates to aspects of moral disengagement and the contribution it makes to the radicalisation process.

2.6 Moral disengagement - Jihad Joe

Double-speaking the language of non-responsibility...?

“Moral justification is a powerful disengagement mechanism. Destructive conduct is made personally and socially acceptable by portraying it in the service of moral ends.”

(Bandura, 1999, p.193)

In 2003, a Hungarian judge decided that two [Gypsy] men wrongly accused of murder should receive less compensation than they had demanded in their wrongful-arrest suit on the basis that their ‘more primitive’ personalities meant that they had suffered less. Bandura (2004) cites this as an example of how processes of dehumanisation minimise or belittle suffering and therefore impede justice. Dehumanisation in the context of political violence and terrorism is a component of the wider process of moral disengagement. These are strategies or psychological processes designed to construe a version of reality in which the participants’ own actions are made less reprehensible. In the last section, group cohesion was reviewed as a driver of propensity to violence. Some theorists maintain that transition to violence is based more on this cohesive ‘in-group love’ than out-group hate where collective unity outweighs externally directed behaviour. I will argue, based on the literature of the previous section and the simulation which follows on moral disengagement that there is a combined and necessarily interdependent effect of both of these variables.

This section of the chapter will review some key literature and related theories on moral disengagement before testing for its relative effect on propensity to violence, as defined in this study, in the simulation described in chapter three. Before testing how these mechanisms are applied in the context of terrorism, it is useful to consider the principles and function of moral disengagement in broader terms. This section will set out some key contributions from literature and current research that help to explain how rhetorical mechanisms are applied in several different contexts of violence and how these can be seen to relate to political violence and terrorism by a process of legitimising violence and encouraging the re-definition of moral guidelines. The impact of this concept will then be applied in the context of a simulation to determine the relative contribution of moral disengagement in the process of radicalisation. This is achieved by manipulating the simulation conditions to introduce a visual and rhetorical bias to test the effect of these on the overall PTV score.

2.6.1 If terrorism is murder...then what's collateral damage?

As mentioned earlier in this review, “The war on terrorism is terrorism” and “one man’s terrorist, is another man’s freedom fighter” are commonly cited observations about the paradox of how “terrorism” is defined. The subjective and potential coercive nature of the language used to describe political violence and terrorism is a minefield. A useful place to start an assessment of moral disengagement is with the concept of terrorism itself. If ‘terrorism’ is murder, then what is ‘collateral damage’? Bica (2004) considers this question and its conceptual language meaning in the context of the “Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) (Bica, 2004, p. 4) where, on

one hand, terrorists are morally culpable of murder as their actions intend the deaths of non-combatants. On the other, those responding to terrorism with military action do so with a perceived moral backing and therefore, according to DDE, are not liable for the deaths that result. Bica argues that both these positions are morally equivalent and that “neither are an act of war, but murder” (Bica, 2004, p. 4). The basis of his argument is that human rights, as they pertain to moral conduct are not absolute but are *prima facie* and can be overridden in the event of conflict. Bica contends that the *jus ad bellum* criterion which governs when a war is just or otherwise is manipulated according to requirement. Quoting Paul Ramsey in *War and the Christian Conscience*, Bica makes the point that “nothing hinders one act from having two effects only one of which is intended...moral acts take their species according to what is intended, and not what is beside the intention, since this is accidental” (Bica, 2004, p. 6). Bica argues that in this way the Doctrine of Double Effect is misused to distinguish between intentional killing (carried out by terrorists) and unintentional killing (carried out as collateral damage in responding to terrorists). This is important for the simulation testing for the effect of moral disengagement because in the realm of responding to terrorism, it implies that moral disengagement *per se* is not only a tactical mechanism to support violent behaviour or justify it but that it is a requirement without which these violent responses cannot be practically employed. In other words, responding to terrorism without this mechanism would *de facto* be morally defined as murder, as much as the terrorist violence is in the first instance. Critically however, terrorists are not bound by the same moral dilemma and as such, moral disengagement is a different ‘tool’ in their rhetorical arsenal.

The last section on group cohesion demonstrated that there is potentially (within the scope of this research), a significant relationship between the level of cohesion within a group and their propensity to violence. This assertion is context dependent and the effect will vary according to group norms where compliance and conformity may be distinct. This section on moral disengagement seeks to further review the related mechanisms in this transition process from non-violence to violence and establish whether they operate as distinctly separate or as a complementary factors combined with other influences. Some of the role played by Rational Choice Theory showed that a collective bond, when tightly formed might increase the likelihood of a group to engage in violence but is less instructive when we consider the actual mechanisms of this process. Is there something else at work here driving this transition? As we have seen, literature and research in the past has sought to 'profile' individuals within a group with a view to understanding how their ascriptive characteristics operate as drivers for violent behaviour; exposure to violence, religion, ethnicity and other demographics. However, there is an emerging view amongst some scholars, and one of the possible findings of this research, that "questions the analytical bias towards 'profiling' participants and suggests that it is situational factors which pull individuals into violence that matter more" (McDoom, 2011, p. 6). McDoom (2011) explores this question in his paper about inter-group violence. He observes that in any given violent situation, certain individuals participate in violence where others do not. Citing the examples of the ethnic riots between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda, Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan and the anti-Jewish pogroms and gentiles in the Russian Empire, McDoom sets out a contrast of 'dispositional' factors versus 'situational' factors. This touches on the

idea by Zimbardo (2007) in his book, *The Lucifer Effect*, that describes that not bad apples, only bad barrels prompt violence; or that environment drives violence as opposed to innate human factors. Historically, several studies, including some by Reaper (1933), Weinberg (1991) and Tambiah (1996) conclude that dispositional or ascriptive characteristics that McDoom describes, were common to violent behaviour. However, more recently, there has been a shift towards acknowledging that there are also situational forces at work; situational forces including group cohesion and moral disengagement factors.

The argument in its most basic form is that ascriptive 'profiling' *per se*, is an inadequate or unreliable predictor of who will engage in political violence or terrorism, with Horgan (2008) making the point that becoming a terrorist is rather a "process or journey" (Horgan, 2008, P. 233). Literature from the previous section on group cohesion linked high levels of group cohesion as a catalyst in this transition. McDoom references this concept: "micro-level psycho-social research has suggested that strong in-group identification is tied to out-group prejudice, stereotyping and discrimination" (McDoom, 2011, p. 23). This idea is supported by the findings from the previous section. Taking this a step further and examining the mechanisms of out-group discrimination in this equation, it is possible to challenge the perceived inadequacies of current research which "test whether...strong ethnic identification is tied to individual-level participation in ethnic violence" (McDoom, 2011, p. 23). This will determine if identification with violence is pre-determined either in the individual, collective identity, or can be established more spontaneously, applied in the shorter term. One of the most instructive examples is

set out by McDoom in his review of mass-killings, or genocide where, he argues, situational factors are the main driver of violence. A similar conclusion is reached by Arendt (1963) describing the 'banality of evil' and Browning (1992) in his study of war crimes where normal individuals are driven by their situational status to commit violent acts. The simulation on moral disengagement in this study is designed to establish what activates this type of behaviour and how it has been modelled, particularly whether the effect is the same where pre-dispositional factors are absent.

Waller (2007) developed a sophisticated model to examine this. In his book, *Becoming Evil*, Waller reviews the findings using a Rorschach instrument to measure the psychopathology of war criminals. His theories are met with some criticism but principally comprise three main arguments or factors that cause this activation. The first "cultural construction of world view" (Waller, 2007, pp. 6) considers in-out group emphasis and authority orientation. The second is the "construction of the other" (Waller, 2007, pp. 6) which is similar to social identity theory including aspects of dehumanisation and euphemistic labelling of evil actions. The third, "construction of cruelty" (Waller, 2007, pp. 6) relates to deindividuation and group acceptance. These constructs are important because they highlight the mechanisms that can activate this type of behaviour. However, as Campbell (2009) points out in her critique of Waller, he does not "tell us what we need to know about the direction, form and targets of our violent behaviour" (Campbell, 2009, p. 6). Critically, according to Waller, it is the situational factors

that trigger ethno-centric instincts with evidence that those carrying out these acts are “ordinary in all but the crimes they committed” (Campbell, 2009, p. 6).

There are several theories therefore about this process of radicalisation charting an escalation in behaviour that culminates in violence. Whatever the nature of the group and the collective identity or pre-disposition to violent behaviour, there are questions around the interaction between these factors, the individual and the extent which this interaction is a vehicle for transition. To contextualise the simulation testing this, it is helpful to set out one of the general and popular theories about the framework within which this behaviour evolves. Examining the process in this way, serves, in part, to isolate the relevant component elements. Moghaddam (2005) has described such a framework in his paper *The Staircase to Terrorism – A Psychological Exploration*. He begins by conceptualising “the terrorist act as the final step on a narrowing staircase” (Moghaddam, 2005, p. 6). The first important aspect of his theory that is relevant to this study is his assertion that the ascriptive or pre-dispositional factors are useful in profiling terms but “yield greater benefits when incorporated within a broader conceptual account of processes that lead to terrorist acts” (Moghaddam, 2005, p. 6). This idea corresponds with the approach taken later in this research, which attempts to examine some key driver variables or conditions conducive to terrorist type behaviour in isolation and interdependently. Meta-analysis of this kind, built up here from first principles provides a more comprehensive picture and has several advantages over the *post-hoc* nature of some research in this area. Although not a ‘real’ scenario, it can be

used to set a useful statistical benchmark. This idea is expanded in the final discussion chapter.

Moghaddam's staircase metaphor can be seen as a type of decision tree. The ascent has six floors. As individuals climb the staircase, they perceive doors and options open to them which diminish as the escalation increases. Critically, it is not the actual number of doors on each floor that is significant but the ability of the individual to see or perceive these doors or options and their ability to actively select them. Moghaddam stresses that the metaphor is designed to facilitate thinking about these issues, to provide a framework within which this transition can be better defined, visualised or understood. He maintains that it is not a formal model but may help direct future research. He also emphasises that the model relates specifically to terrorism.

If we skip to the fourth floor, where Moghaddam explains "there is little or no opportunity to exit alive" (Moghaddam, 2005, p165), it is difficult to see how exit strategies could have diminished so greatly. This is the one of the greatest benefits of modelling of this kind as it allows the temporary compartmentalisation of influence factors to help conceptualise logically the forces at work in the process. The most relevant stage (or floor) envisaged by Moghaddam from a moral disengagement perspective, or as he described it: moral engagement with the terrorist mind set, is the third floor where a "morality is constructed by the terrorist organisation" (Moghaddam, 2005, p 165). If this is the final stage before a point of no return or option for escaping alive, then cognitive moral re-alignment is a critical pre-cursor to this final transition to violence. Before examining more fully how this

mechanism operates, it is useful to briefly review the stages that precede it. There are several characteristics of each floor of Moghaddam's staircase to terrorism which help explain the process of radicalisation and support some of the other assertions and conclusions reached here and in other parts of this research thesis.

From the 'ground floor', which is occupied by the majority of any population that feel there are issues where metrics of fairness and justice are under threat. Some members decide to attempt to pursue these issues and ascend to the first floor. Critically however, there has been a traditional view and one that permeates a great deal of research and literature on terrorism, that highlights poverty, socio-economic factors and low levels of education as characteristic of those that make this move up the staircase. Moghaddam argues that in fact the evidence shows the opposite to be the case. He argues that "material factors such as poverty and lack of education are problematic as explanations for terrorist acts" (Moghaddam, 2005, p.162). Citing an example that in the West Bank and Gaza, support for the anti-Israelis' violent tactics is more prolific among Palestinians with higher levels of education (Kruger & Maleckova 2002 p.162). This pattern was mirrored by a similar observation about the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA): "Our evidence is that the calibre of rank and file terrorists does not support the view that they are mindless hooligans" (Coogan 2002, p.468). Terrorists captured as members of Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia and from what we know of the 9/11 bombers also support his view (Bodansky, 2001, p. 201). This has important implications for the research described here because it implies that these pre-dispositional factors of poverty and social marginalisation may in some cases contribute to the transition to

violence, but they are not a pre-requisite. This gives further support for the cohesion, authority and moral disengagement variables identified for simulation in this study which are tested using a population with normal or above average education and socio-economic level, or at least, there seems to be an effect for these variables irrespective of these factors. These shorter term influences that drive radicalisation therefore could arguably be applied to any individual at any time. They may be more effective building on pre-dispositional profiles but any significant result for these simulations, without these factors towards a higher propensity to violence, would imply that mechanisms of moral re-conditioning are a very powerful tool in escalating violence behaviour.

Back on the first and second floors of the staircase metaphor, several factors come together to prepare the individual (if they progress further) for moral re-conditioning. On the first floor, perceptions about personal mobility or an individual's ability to improve the situation they are in and the perceptions on procedural justice (Tyler, 1994, p. 3). Here the model describes a strong human pre-disposition or tendency to perceive the world as just; allowing for opportunity and personal mobility. Individuals holding this view can be seen to be less likely to behave non-normatively. A major characteristic of this balance according to Moghaddam, is the ability to participate in decision making and procedural justice. Again, Moghaddam highlights that the absence of repression of this right or access to democracy is not restricted to, or correlated with the income of countries or regions. He cites the examples in the improvement in democracy in Latin America and Africa compared at the time to areas with high levels of political violence in

Saudi, the Middle East and North Africa, where there is relatively higher wealth. Violent 'revolutions' in Iran and other regions seems to regurgitate existing regimes rather than create improved societies. Moghaddam contends that it is this environment which stems democratic engagement and leads to a displacement of aggression to a target that can better be blamed e.g. "America – The Great Satan" (Moghaddam, 2005, p. 164). How recent examples of the "Arab Spring" and their aftermath will fit into this picture or whether they will even be relevant to it is not yet clear.

There is something of an irony introduced here which has relevance for this research demonstrating the powerful effect of moral disengagement and attributing blame effectively to the desired enemy. Moghaddam uses the US as an example of the target of displacement of aggression and reasons for ascending further up the staircase. Since Freud, 'displacement' of aggression has been used as an explanation for terrorism. However, where this displacement rhetoric is against the US by Middle Eastern countries whose governments actually depend on US funding, it is clearly a distinct powerful psychological mechanism. This type of internal or external displacement operates within several populations including the UK and the US (albeit less potently). In this context, aggression is displaced against home governments in response to matters of perceived injustice e.g. Education costs in the UK and the war in Iraq. It is possible that it is these perceptions, rather than socio-economic factors that can be seen to pre-dispose members of a population to build on displaced anger and engage in violence. Considering Moghaddam's model in this way, helps to see and contextualise how 'normal'

members of a population could be radicalised. In other words, all the simulations in this chapter consider the effects of cohesion, authority and moral disengagement on an average UK population. Real life examples show how these individuals can act in groups to commit terrorism in their native country. The profiles of these individuals may exhibit no characteristics of previous exposure to violence or connection with their perceived 'brotherhood' but they may have an increasing tendency to displace aggression against authority or government; a characteristic, they have in common with almost everyone in that given society. This is important because it demonstrates three key factors. Firstly, that displacement can occur on a large scale within wealthy 'liberal' countries. Second, it demonstrates the relative power of moral disengagement rhetoric. Lastly, it can be seen as a possible substitute in understanding what has replaced the traditional pre-dispositional factors of poverty, marginalisation and exposure to violence. The final step of this process before transition to violence is in the refinement of this rhetoric. This is what happens on the third floor of the staircase and is the main focus of this section and simulation.

Moghaddam describes how the terrorist mentality is morally engaged and it is the opposition to the terrorist organisation that has disengaged morally. This is an important distinction. Moral disengagement is a mechanism for dehumanising the enemy to make them easier to kill. Moghaddam's model incorporates engagement with the terrorist morality a kind of reverse mantra which reinforces the utilitarian or greater good message that terrorism is morally justified, "in the context of the Islamic world, terrorist organisations have fed on the interpretations of Islam that

laud what outsiders see as acts of terrorism but that terrorists depict as martyrdom toward a just goal” (Davis, 2003, p. 78). This is designed to promote a strong sense of in-group affiliation through the creation of secretive and isolated parallel lives. Here, both group cohesion and moral disengagement operate simultaneously to progress the group or individual towards violence. This is a good example of the interdependency of the variables simulated in the next chapter.

One of the most interesting and relevant parts of this staircase model is the inhibitory mechanisms that apply in the execution of violence. This occurs on the fifth floor of the model. However, what is more relevant in terms of moral disengagement is the role played by Situational Action Theory (SAT). According to the principle of this theory, all moral actions are an outcome of the casual interaction between a person’s propensity to engage in a particular moral action and her exposure to environmental inducements to engage in a particular moral action expressed as follows:

$$\text{Propensity} \times \text{Exposure} = \text{Action}$$

SAT is applied in several areas of research but is useful in its explanation of the interplay between moral code, which is specific to an individual and moral context which is in turn, specific to an environment. The dominance or balance of each of these factors will determine behavioural outcomes. In other words, the decision to act violently can be influenced and driven by individual *or* environment depending on the circumstances. This is significant because it implies a degree of resilience to all decision making and suggests there is an interdependence of person and place which drives this type of behaviour.

2.6.2 Supernormal?

One of the principle prerequisites of this research is to define the nature of those that participate in violence. Historical exposure to violence and long-term radicalisation was long cited by scholars as a main driver for this type of behaviour. However, as reported in the earlier chapters, modern terrorism or engagement in political violence can be increasingly seen as perpetuated by 'normal' or 'rational' individuals who appear to become radicalised or make a transition to violent behaviour in a relatively short time frame. This has clear links to the Milgram and Zimbardo experiments where a similar transition took place extremely rapidly. To this end, participants in this study are drawn from what has been termed a "super-normal" population meaning that they were not selected on the basis of any specific criteria. It is important to note that 'super-normal' in the context of this thesis is not meant literally but designed to emphasise that as far as possible, participants are not known to have any remarkable characteristics that pre-suppose them to violence. The aim of the research is to identify the circumstances under which normal people might be quickly radicalised rather than *who* will become radicalised, and specifically how this environment is structured and the mechanisms which drive this process. There are obvious risks and limitations in drawing any assumptions about a given sample, and these are considered in detail in the limitations section of the general discussion.

Gabor (1994) in his work 'Everybody Does It' documents what he terms the transgressions of everyday normal people and draws parallels between these individuals excusing their own dishonest actions, with criminals committing their crimes. According to Shu, Gino and Bazerman (2009) Bandura describes acts of moral disengagement as "a cognitive mediator between the moral principles individuals hold and their behaviour when their behaviour is consistent with such principles" (Bandura, 1990, p. 193). Shu et al. seek to understand how ordinary people justify their immoral behaviour.

This process helps establish the mechanisms employed in groups of varying cohesion to justify or facilitate violent or non-violent behaviour. Some individuals apply the principles of ethical behaviour, favouring moral conduct or as Bandura puts it "people tend to refrain from behaving in ways that violate their moral standards" (Bandura, 1990, p. 193). Individual responses in normal behavioural terms aim to align moral standards and real actions. Where these aims are not aligned, individuals experience distress borne out of what is termed 'cognitive dissonance'. According to Festinger (1957) cognitive dissonance is a "state of psychological tension which arises when beliefs are at odds with behaviour" (Festinger, 1957, p. 4). To alleviate this pressure of dissonance, individuals will either amend their belief systems to match their actions or modify their actions to align with their beliefs. The previous section demonstrated that there was a significant correlation between group cohesiveness and propensity to violence score. Here, the aim is to determine the effect of the group environment on balance between modifying action or beliefs towards violence or non-violence. It is

worthy to note and pick up later in this chapter that some studies have found a modification interface between belief and action is sustainable i.e. the process by which these factors are aligned may be “durable over time” (Senemeaud & Somat, 2009, pp.25). This is important because the research on group cohesion in the last section in parts suggests that the effect of the group environment can be sustained even after groups have been disbanded. If this is true of modification to alleviate dissonance then the two may be linked i.e. moral disengagement applied for the purposes of committing terrorist violence may have a lasting effect on the individual depending on how effectively it can be cultivated in any given environment. Of particular relevance to this question is the third hypothesis set out by Shu et al which predicts that permissive environments will lead to increased levels of moral disengagement. There is also suggestion in the findings of Gino et al. (2009) and Mazar et al. (2008) that permissiveness also increases in more cohesive groups as there is an increased personal need to negatively update moral self-image as a form of face-saving in front of closer knit group members. This does not, of course, provide a *general* argument against permissiveness. Again this helps link the role of moral disengagement and the effect of group cohesiveness simulated in the next chapter.

2.6.3 Mechanisms of moral disengagement

In the context of this research, the principle question is whether mechanisms of moral disengagement have an impact on the propensity to violence score and whether this effect is used as a tool to coerce and radicalise and whether exposure

to it as a form of rhetoric is then adopted by those radicalised by it i.e. can it be used to incite violence in the first instance and justify violence later? Bandura is a leading expert in this field and provides some comprehensive and useful insight. However, it is important to understand the components of moral disengagement as they are currently understood in the literature. Bandura sets out this structure: “In this process of moral justification, detrimental conduct is made personally and socially acceptable by portraying it as serving socially worthy or moral purposes. People can then act on a moral imperative and preserve their view of themselves as a moral agent while inflicting harm on others” (Bandura, 1990, p. 45). While this explains the self-justification element, the transition to violence or persuasion into it (if that is in fact what happens) is less clearly related to moral disengagement. Understanding better how this mechanism might work and testing for it will help to answer this question.

If moral disengagement (as Bandura defines it) is a process of redefining the morality of violence then how is this achieved in stages from individual motivation to collective action? What is clear from the main proponent of the theory is that the process is evolutionary. As Sprinzak (1988) maintains “terrorists [...] evolve gradually rather than set out to become radicals” (Sprinzak, 1988, pp. 65). Bandura sets out the components of this process, which are also manifest in the simulation set out in this chapter. These include:

- Euphemistic Labelling
- Advantageous comparison
- Displacement of responsibility

- Distortion of consequences
- Dehumanisation

These elements overlap in parts, but defining some of them individually is useful to pinpoint where each plays a part in this process. Euphemistic labelling has become a well-used tool in the art of moral disengagement in all spheres. Watergate 'lies' become "different versions of the truth" (Gambino, 1999, p. 15); "clean surgical strikes" describe the bombings of schools in Afghanistan. Nixon's administration spoke openly of criminal activity as 'game plan'. Cohn (1987), also provides examples of this in the research on 'nuclear language' (Cohn, 1987). This type of sanitized or specialised jargon defuses the potency of the principle acts of violence or harm providing them legitimacy and these can extend into other areas of coercive persuasion in the context of terrorism.

The specific techniques listed above can be seen to inform the processes described in Moghaddam's third floor staircase model. Some of these were utilised as part of the visual and written stimulus in the simulation described in chapter four.

Behaviour and action is often shaped and critically justified in language. As described above this technique can be used to mask reprehensible action or in fact change or improve their meaning. A simulation using this technique to alter the perception of the possible outcomes ranging from violent to non-violent could be enhanced with the use of visual stimulus. There is also evidence of other 'tools' of moral disengagement. One of these, advantageous comparison, operates by juxtaposing acts of violence with other more extreme alternatives. When these alternatives are placed contiguously, the first one colours the perception of the

second one. Known as a 'sh@t sandwich' in corporate speak, the comparison with the atrocities carried out by a perceived enemy makes acts of resistance or violence more justifiable. As Bandura contends, for example, advocates of terrorism are quick to point out that the democracies of the UK, France and the US emerged following violence exacted against oppressive rule producing a form of comparative justification. The same applies to displacement of responsibility, divesting personal responsibility for actions by offsetting to another party as seen with some of the accounts of Nazi war criminals: "I was just following orders".

The principle concern for this section, as outlined earlier, regards the balance of moderating either beliefs or actions in decision making and collective or individual action is therefore critical to the research themes outlined in this thesis. The application of these methods does not achieve or justify violence by modifying moral standards but rather it lies in redefining the definitional morality of violence. It may therefore be a requirement of this process that the stability of redefinition be maintained over an adequate timeframe for violence activity to take place (Gambino, 1999, p.17). This is important because it implies that the redefinition, in the early stages of radicalisation or transition to violence would not be applied by the individual on themselves but imposed on them by a third party or the body of the group promoting the violence. This is tested for in elements of the simulations in the 'Participant 5' simulation designed to test for the effect of authoritarian conformity and through visual support for violence. The main research design is described in the next chapter but can further be informed by Bouhana's (2008) work which comprehensively reviews this subject and cites Bandura's assessment

that this “sanitising effect of ideology is a situational mechanism...not a strictly ‘intrapsychic construct’...it can be incited by other individuals, or produced by social systems and other collective identities” (Bandura, 1990, pp. 161). This manifestation of moral disengagement is consistent with one of the main premises of this research thesis, that while this process may apply in different circumstances, it may well help explain how groups can make a transition to violence where the mechanisms are applied in a short time frame without violence exposure antecedents. It may also therefore be the case that where an individual is exposed to these mechanisms repeatedly overtime, the rhetoric is internalised at which point it can be utilised by the individual themselves to perpetuate violent behaviour. Although slightly outside the scope of this paper it is instructive to note that this practice of institutionalising moral disengagements, according to Gambetta 2005, and Moghaddam (2003) that facilitates the training of suicide bombers, where on completion of their indoctrination can be kept in isolation for a period of time prior to carrying out their mission. Moghaddam points out that this isolation period has a shelf life: “The longer they wait, the more likely it is that they will change their mind” (Moghaddam, 2003, p. 25).

Sprinzak (1990) introduces the concept of what he calls the ‘violentisation of democracy’. Sprinzak implies that radicalisation emerges in the face of “unresponsive governments, hostile rivals, unfriendly media...” (Aronoff, 2006, p. 13) but as Aronoff maintains in his critique of Sprinzak’s theory, these factors may be present in the transition to violence but are far from the single or combined cause. This has implications for the design of the main simulation in this study, mainly that

it is not the circumstances or situation *per se* that determines the degree of violence in the outcome but rather that some other factor or combination of factors act as a catalyst. Arnoff explores Sprinzak's example of dismantling the Likud-led Israeli government in the late 1970s. His argument is that the underground organisation Gush Emunim were at their most violently prolific when the Israeli government were at their most responsive to their cause – not trying to sublimate their manifesto. These attacks were during a time when the most militant members of the government were in control including Begin, Shamir and Sharon. Arnoff sees this as something of a paradox in Sprinzak's thinking when the "underground actually struck at the peak of power and influence of the organisation that spawned it" (Arnoff, 2006, p. 45). Instead, Arnoff thinks that this outcome may have been driven by a desire to revitalise the radical stance of Gush Emunim. He calls this the "chain reaction of extremism" (Arnoff, 2006, p. 45) where in a political environment like that in Israel which promotes a multiplicity of parties and fuels competition between parties continually adopting increasingly militant positions. Ultranationalist affiliations in this example and several others seem to create this competition and tie in with the one-upmanship operating inside groups. This also has links with epidemic theory and other intra-group effects discussed below. Within the context of Sprinzak's theory and its examples, Arnoff attempts to establish an explanation, citing the possible military occupation in Israel after the war in 1967, as a normalising violence in society: "Whatever its origins, the erosion of civility and tolerance – both social and political produced conditions which were congenial to the growth of violence" (Arnoff, 2006, p. 47).

Berlet (2004) also describes a concept of demonization that, he argues, is a step beyond dehumanising. This is part of the processes of antinomian attribution. He argues that this “fuels dualism – a form of binary thinking that divides the world into good versus evil with no middle ground tolerated” (Berlet, 2004, p. 6). This particular concept, while born out in the grounded theory analysis, will be further explored by the integrative complexity assessment conducted as part of this assessment. All these factors and mechanisms of moral disengagement therefore may have an effect on the propensity to violence of individuals within a group. The final section of this literature review considers the role of authoritarian conformity in this equation before applying these principles in an initial pilot study and subsequent linked experiments to test for their relative effect.

2.7 Authoritarian conformity - The 'Participant 5' Project

“Those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities”

Voltaire

It could be argued that a large part of the theories emerging from this review are related forms of conformity. The traditional view of radicalisation has conformity as one of its principle components. Conformity itself incorporates elements of group cohesion, moral disengagement and group attachment. These factors can be seen to influence propensity violence within the context of conformity indirectly. The focus of this section of the literature review is the effect of authority on individual and collective propensity to violence in this context. The literature supports the idea that authority in this way is regarded as having a direct influence on terrorist behaviour and actions.

According to Aronson (2002) conformity is “a change in behaviour due to the real or imagined influence of other people” (Aronson, 2002, p. 253). In the context of political violence and terrorism, conformity works as part of a wider mechanism of adherence to social norms. In the case of the simulations described here, these norms may be pre-dispositional or imposed by the group. As with the group cohesion and moral disengagement variables reviewed in the previous two sections, the effect of the pressure of an authority figure in this collective and individual decision making process is a central element throughout the literature on

terrorism. To understand this potential variable more clearly, it is instructive to consider the various forms it takes.

Classical research has identified and defined several different manifestations of conformity. Normative conformity requires that an individual will yield to group pressure to fulfil a desire to fit in with a group. This aspect was most famously reviewed by the Asch experiment in 1951 and is based on degrees of fear that an individual will be rejected by a group if they do not conform. This is also related to aspects of group attachment and its effect on group membership and loyalty. In this case, the individual is motivated to comply with the will of the group and has clear overlaps with some of the operational drivers of group cohesion. It is characteristic with normative conformity for an individual to publically accept the views of the group, but privately reject them and this is a consideration in the design and analysis of the simulations that follow. This could be attributable to other group associative factors like 'choice shift' discussed in the cohesion section of the literature review where the influence of the group experience has a lasting effect. The nature of normative conformity does not apply in this case because it presupposes that individuals privately retain their original position. This also has some links with the fast emerging experiments testing the effects of 'Mortality Salience' on support and engagement in extremist behaviour. Both these aspects are slightly outside the scope of this study but could form a central focus of future research. These ideas are discussed further in the general discussion section on future research.

Other forms of conformity, informational and identification relate to the desire to be correct or to conform to a social role. This poses an immediate and difficult question in the context of this research. Milgram (1963) set out to test in a normal environment, individuals' obedience to authority and his now famous findings were very significant in this area of research. However, there are some views now that the effect he was actually observing was not obedience but conformity. This distinction has important implications for this study. Milgram was not interested in applying his theory in the context of war or extreme violence, or terrorism, he wanted to establish the effect of authority on obedience under a 'normal' conditions in a lab. This was focussed on obedience to a dictatorial situation at the expense of individuals' personal morality and ethical codes. In his 'learning' simulation, participants were asked to increase voltage shocks as a 'teacher' where the 'learners' responded incorrectly. Despite being made aware of the danger of this process, 63% of participants continued administering shocks to the maximum levels. Milgram concluded that the power of the situation demonstrated how the environment could influence levels of obedience. This was in part based on the idea that experimenter, perceived as an authority figure by the participants evoked high levels of obedience leading to harmful behaviour perpetrated against another individual. These findings triggered several follow-up studies that tested for the same effect, the majority of which returned similar findings. The pilot stage that follows this review considers individual perceptions about the role of authority figures in this context.

In his paper, 'Milgram and Zimbardo revisited: The Capacity for Cruelty in Normal Populations', Smith (1992) considers this in the context of early trauma and its effect on violent behaviour. Smith argues that "the expression of innate violence may actually be the result of undetected and/or unacknowledged shaping of violence through early trauma" (Smith, 1992, p.3). This is important because Smith questions Milgram's explanation of participants' compliance with shock treatment as an evolutionary bred obedience to authority which will "inhibit their own disruptive impulses" (Smith, 1992, p 3). Smith argues that propensity to violence is not innate but becomes part of individual psychology through conditioning. The premise of Milgram's theory is that human behaviour has a dual mode, which switches between autonomy (which is self-interested) and systematic (which is a compartment of social order). Milgram describes the interchange between these states as follows: "when people move from an autonomous mode to a systematic one, a 'critical shift' in functioning is reflected in an alteration of attitude. Specifically entering an authority system no longer views himself acting out of his own purposes but rather comes to see himself as an agent for executing the wishes of another person" (Milgram, 1974, p. 133). The idea here is that the individual has a particular relationship with authority and it is this that governs the decision to adhere to certain protocols rather than an accumulation of aggression or anger. As Fromm puts it: "in our effort to escape from aloneness and powerlessness, we are ready to get rid of our individual self either by submission to the new forms of authority or by a compulsive conforming to accepted patterns" (Fromm, 1969, p. 156).

However, there is a question over whether the observed effect in the cases observed by Milgram is obedience to authority or conformity to an expected social norm. If we consider the realism of the scenario and environment set out by Milgram, it is possible, as with modern day entertainment psychology e.g. hypnosis, that participants have a tendency to 'play-along' with situations that they know to be false. These, often subconscious processes are both cognitively and emotionally driven and can influence behaviour in this way. For example, in Milgram's experiment, there are several cues that would alert the participant to the simulated nature of the environment including non-verbal communication and an awareness of the pretence of the situation. In conformity terms, the actions observed by Milgram were participants' draw to the please the experimenter and conform with the situation and behave as expected. A possible explanation is less the desire to obey and receive instructions but rather to align to a more attractive view point. In this sense the conformity is driven by admiration and coalescence rather than a sense of duty to obey; in the way that an iconic figure head might inspire and convince. Either way, societal norms and practices, including deception and popular culture this has in some cases made some individuals suspicious of people's motives when they are asked to conform. For example, the Milgram experiment may be less likely to yield the same results today as people's cynicism makes compliance less likely. This is a complex question, but what is relevant, is the point that these types of perception are changeable over time. Further to this is the assertion that in these types of simulation, perceptions not only alter over time, but also during the simulation. It seems reasonable to conclude that if Milgram's participants had been asked to administer the maximum voltage from the beginning of the experiment,

conformity levels would have been lower. This makes the process incremental and therefore decisions to proceed are also based on how far the participant has conformed up to that point. If we consider Al-Qaeda as an example, there is some evidence to suggest that this type of authority pressure is applied at the level of emirs (running individual terrorist cells). When Mohammed Siddique Khan and Omar Kyam discussed Pakistani training camps, they were advised to be “totally obedient” (Coleman, 2010, p. 244) to their emir. The same can be seen with the Gas Lomos cell where Barot who recruited cells himself and was known as a charismatic leader. These concepts can be seen contradict some of the earlier assertions by Sageman and other about the emerging leaderless nature of terrorism. However, as is described below, this may partly be explained by recruitment and radicalisation which can be seen to be self-selected on the ground but following causes that are inspired or promoted by more iconic figures.

One of the most interesting elements of the role of authority in recruitment and the radicalisation process is how it has evolved. It is clear from the findings from the previous sections on cohesion and morality literature that no single factor in isolation drives the transition to violence; rather each component contributes to a combined effect. To understand this relative contribution, it is necessary to review how the role of authority in extremist recruitment has changed. A recent study by Neumann (2009) called *Joining Al Qaeda: Jihadist Recruitment in Europe* outlined the practical significance of this point principally that the nature of recruitment is changing. Earlier sections of this review identified certain traditional assumptions about the role of authority in the radicalisation process. A media driven perception

described the main recruitment of Islamic extremists through Imams and community figures 'preaching' anti-Western sentiment. Part of what attracts the media attention in these cases is the high profile nature of these community and religious leaders accused of inciting violence. The media profile of Abu Hamza for example was verging on a parody representing what the government termed agents for the axis of evil. Neumann's findings suggest that this balance is shifting: "recruitment is now being conducted outside of mosques in smaller private venues and being led by low-profile activists, not imams" (Poole, 2009, p. 1). Neumann contends that this shift is a result of surveillance on mosques as a responsive tactic. This example only relates to the perceived activity of Islamic extremism but the principle translates to other forms of radicalisation. Neumann's focus is however, Muslim communities and groups which are in some cases being targeted for extremist incitement. Neumann estimates that 13 per cent of all British prison inmates are Muslim. This trend already seen in the US, means that prison is an ideal breeding ground for recruitment. The key point here is that in many cases, authority figures operating in prisons not only have a captive market, but also have potential recruits that are already pre-disposed to crime or violence and have become disenfranchised socially. Although, this study reviews the variables pertinent to the radicalisation process more generally, reference to specific examples is useful. Where the influence of authority figures can be seen at their most potent is where they draw together these environmental and rhetorical factors, acting as a kind of catalyst in the process. These circumstantial or structural factors e.g. group cohesion and moral re-alignment cannot occur without some substance or perceived evidence. In the example of the Muslim community, there

are some other factors that drive this type of cohesion and provide ammunition in the form of statistics for extremist propaganda. To help understand what these might be, it is instructive to consider some facts. 69 per cent of British Muslims of Pakistani or Bangladeshi ethnic origin lives in poverty compared to 20 per cent of white people and the unemployment rate for Muslims is higher than for all other ethnic groups (HM Government, Census sub-report, 2005, pp. 43). It is therefore very relevant, in the context of Muslim extremist movements that elements of social exclusion is linked to institutional discrimination. Ameli et al. (2004) found in their study that 80 per cent of British Muslims had experienced discrimination, an increase from 45 per cent in the 1990s, a fact which is corroborated by a Minority Rights Group International study which charts the deterioration of the Muslim access to social rights: “access to education, employment and housing and a rise in open hostility” from non-Muslim communities (Ansari, 2002, p.3).

These factors then, may be useful to provide the impetus and some of the reasons why individuals make these first steps towards regaining control of their identities using violence, in a similar process to that described in the previous section where the staircase to terrorism model outlines the combination of factors that first ignite the feelings of resentment and narrow the options down until violence is perceived as the only alternative. In more extreme cases, extremist leaders have taken these feeling of marginalisation and in turn escalated them to repression for their purposes. This is the point during the radicalisation process or recruitment phase where all these factors are drawn together. To achieve this successfully, the ‘leader’ or authority figure in question, must possess a hefty arsenal of rhetorical

techniques and critically, they must have charisma. Charisma in the technical sense has more scientific implications than its popular use implies and this is discussed below. Firstly, it is necessary to review how these enhanced techniques are applied.

Bulliet (2007) reviews as an example of this, a tape circulated by bin Laden sympathisers which variously entices support and convinces potential supporters of Al-Qaeda. The first interesting observation is that bin Laden is never cited on the tape as any form of leader nor is he mentioned by name. However, his image and face dominate the tape throughout. Bulliet notes that religious rhetoric is absent from this propaganda instead communicating a simple message, the logic of which requires no prior knowledge of the teaching of Islam. The film begins with bin Laden reciting one of his own poems and then various images of the USS Cole and super-imposed explosions are juxtaposed with the evocation of holy places including Medina and Jerusalem. Images of US military forces are then spliced in. As Voll (2007) explains, "the video does not engage in the Islam and democracy debate. It presents a perspective...of overwhelming military force that is used to compel Muslims" (Voll, 2007, p. 5). The central point however, is that bin Laden seems most interested in promoting change from the top-down rather than from the grass-roots of the Muslim international community. This form of impositional authority, where the pressure is applied from above is an important consideration in understanding the interface between the circumstantial factors in the transition to violence process and the authoritarian influence that helps drive it. In a case study reported by Heusmann (2010), we can see how this process can work in an extreme form and, as will be discussed in more detail in the general discussion, how

each of the mechanisms studied here can be short-lived and often transitory. In other words, they have a short shelf life and however extreme and effective can at the same time be precarious, a fact that gives rise to possible counter tactics of interruption. He cites the case of Ariel Ahmed, a 20-year-old Palestinian woman who at the last moment on Wednesday, May 22, 2002 decided not to proceed with her suicide mission. There are several examples in the literature of similar cases, but this is an excellent illustration of the effect of authority on the individual, without the additional influences of group pressure, demonstrating that while there is routinely a combination of the factors simulated in this study at work in the transition to violence, there is a suggestion they too can operate in relative isolation where one element is particularly dominant. However, in the case of Ahmed is particularly useful because it includes her account of the thought process and experience that led to the interruption of her mission. During childhood, she had been exposed to violence and had arguably become desensitised to it. She was seduced and fell in love with a terrorist leader, who was then subsequently killed by the Israeli army. This she claimed had robbed her of her future and she entered into a dysphoric state. However, during her recruitment, little effort was made to draw her into the cause using the sophisticated processes highlighted in parts of this literature review and in the event, she aborted her mission. In her own words she said: "As I walked down the pedestrian mall, I looked at the sky, I looked at the people and then I remembered a childhood belief – that nobody has the right to stop anybody's life" (Heusmann, 2010, p. 16). Here, certain factors in her conditioning and environment were absent and this weakened her resolve to proceed. This raises a question around how successful authoritarian pressure can

be without additional circumstantial factors. Appleby (1997) explores this idea further in the context of Palestine and the idea of authority and 'charisma'.

"The presentation of religion as immutable truth, as a solid rock in a sea of uncertainties is key to fundamentalist leaders' worldview and political ambitions" (Appleby, 1997, p, 5). Here Appleby (1997) describes the stabilising influence of the leaders in the context of political extremism. He maintains that fundamentalism is akin to nationalism citing the rivalry between Hamas and the secular nationalist forces of the Palestine Liberation organisation. However, what is important in this example, is the role played by the authority figures. Appleby contends that the leader of Hamas, Shaykh Ahmad Yasmin, "brings more than the usual political consideration to the situation" (Appleby, 1997, p. 5) which has its basis in religion. He describes an interdependence between political realities and spiritual imperatives suggesting that allegiance to these factors creates an image of fundamentalist leaders as "uncompromising absolutists" (Appleby, 1997, p. 5).

Appleby goes on to suggest that where politics is necessarily a series of compromises, the interplay between this and absolutist devotion to religion or spiritual principles creates in the fundamentalist leader a dualism or double-identity. These competing identities are not well reconciled argues Appleby. Miller (1997), reports too on the "seemingly schizoid" (Miller, 1997, p. 67) quality of Sudan's Hassam al-Turabi, the Muslim leader of the National Islamic Front. Miller describes how al Turabi, like Samuel Heilman will routinely dismiss human rights violations and assassination attempts (in the case of Heilman) despite "overwhelming empirical evidence" (Appleby, 1997, p. 6) to the contrary. This is

essentially a process of separation or detachment, which is a preservation mechanism. However, both aspects of this role need to be engaged to order to survive and influence any followers. The Ayatollah Khomeini as an Imam succeeded in facilitating the Iranian government's operations of violence, as did Sayyid Muhammad Fallah for the Lebanese Shiites through Hezbollah. Like Turabi, these leaders exercised a specific brand of authority and influence while staying out of the spotlight. As Appleby summarises: "politics is indeed a dirty business, especially for holy men whose spiritual discipline and personal detachment feeds the expectation that they might somehow be above it all" (Appleby, 1997, pp. 6-7). The double-speak and rhetorical tools involved in this process are evident from the review in the previous section on moral disengagement. Here, we are principally concerned with the individual, the leaders or authority figures that utilise these mechanisms and how this drives conformity and affect propensity to violence. This influence, argues Appleby, begins with charisma. The effect of authority figures on behaviour and the ways in which they can influence an individual or group's propensity to violence relies on their ability to act as a kind of transmitter or catalyst, facilitating the transition to violence. In some cases, but by no means in all, the presence of this authority can drive the radicalisation process more rapidly actively regulating the process to ensure that members of a group comply and progress accordingly. By exploring this concept further and identifying the links with counter terrorism opportunities using similar mechanisms, it is possible to define the role of authority figures and conformity as the main driving force, which when present, draws together the other components or circumstantial and group features that drive the transition to violent behaviour.

According to Klein (1968), charisma is an important analytical concept: “Charismatic authority is religious or revolutionary. It emerges in response to social crisis or a perception of social crisis. When legitimacy is called into question, the charismatic leader is a new source of legitimacy. There are no rules, but to persist the charismatic authority must transform itself or create a structure of rules” (Klein, 1968, p. 285). The implication here is that drawing on the cohesion of a group and using an arsenal of moral disengagement and coercive persuasion, an authority figure or leader is the manifestation or the ultimate representation of their chosen cause, a symbol which epitomises what others will move towards applying in equal measure to violence and non-violence, from Ghandi to bin-Laden. The rules are set or reset by these individuals. Weber’s (1930), evaluation of the charismatic leader described by Cavalli (1987) explains that she is “the source of the law”. This incorporates moral principles as well, the kind that we saw realigned in the last section. Appleby explains: “He liberates his followers from any sense of guilt towards the old laws and principles that he has discarded and gives them new laws and principles, arousing a sense of obligation and of moral duty towards them” (Appleby, 1997, p. 7). The key words for this section are ‘liberates’ and ‘arousing’. Critically, it is not necessarily the content that holds the influence but the delivery, the leader or authority figure acting as a catalyst. Furthermore, this type of leadership, described here as charismatic, has another important distinction from traditional or rational authority in the way that it contradicts the established protocols or rules, a “kind of claim to authority which is specifically in conflict with the bases of legitimacy” (Appleby, 1997, p. 7) a kind of revolutionary. Weber calls this ‘Ausseralltaglichkeit’, or emancipation from routine where the authority figure

introduces a pattern of conformity and legitimises it. Unlike democracy, this is recognition of the legitimacy of a leader rather than being derived from their consent. This is an important distinction, because it implies that in these situations followers of these types of leader behave in response to a sense of duty or obligation rather than according to their own will. It is possible therefore that in the simulations in the chapter four on the authority figure serve two main functions; to establish the obligations and to ensure compliance. This can be seen in the examples cited in the last section of this review of Khomeini in Iran where attempts were made to normalise this type of authority, to make it normative and therefore sustain a 'normal' state of fundamentalism in the Islamic republic in evidence of what Appleby terms "searing inspirational oratory" in the rhetoric of Khomeini, Fadlallah and Turabi.

According to Mosaddeq (2009) the UK government has an inadequate understanding of the core social factors behind violent radicalisation. This research is designed to contribute to exploring these issues to better understand them. One of the emergent conclusions from each section of this literature review on group cohesion, moral disengagement and here authoritarian conformity is that the factors contributing to violent radicalisation are potentially necessarily interdependent. Therefore, any approach or tactic to interrupt this process and reduce the transition to violence must account for this combination of factors for two reasons. Firstly, it permits an understanding of the varied mechanisms at work before, during and after radicalisation and of the environment in which it occurs.

This allows government and media and social influence organisation to address radicalisation on its own terms. Secondly, recognising the role of the authority figure in this process as a catalyst opens up a central channel to influence the rhetoric that operates at the core of radicalisation. Mosaddeq maintains that the one of the failings of the government in the UK to address the issue of radicalisation, is that they view the elements of the process as separate or contingent. He feels that Muslims have been marginalised in the UK and are not integrated into civil society and it is this fact that has allowed the mobilisation of Islamist extremists. Mosaddeq argues that where there has been engagement with British Muslims, it has been within the context of counter-terrorism and this reinforces the negative view held by some Muslims about the UK government (Mosaddeq, 2009, p.3). The conditions necessary for radicalisation involves several connected push and pull factors. Described by Mosaddeq, this begins with social structural inequalities, civic exclusion and social alienation creating an unstable Muslim community which perceives itself as political impotent. The media then reinforces this polarisation between Muslim and non-Muslim which is further fuelled by foreign policy issues which underlines the victimisation of Muslims. These are the 'push' factors'. What is of importance in this section is what Mosaddeq terms the pull factor which "comes in the form of Islamist extremist ideology" (Mosaddeq, 2009, p.4). This is where authority figures or those touting radicalisation rhetoric exploit the circumstances created by the preceding push factors. This is an access point at the root of the radicalisation process where the disillusionment, rhetoric, moral disengagement and cohesion is applied often through an influence channel and it is at this point that counter-measures that take

account of the real grievances of British Muslims can best be deployed. This is not to say that authority figures or those preaching radicalisation should be removed, rather that their tactics are successful and should be emulated to reverse the process. In this way, the mechanisms of radicalisation can be used to interrupt the process itself. To understand this point, it is helpful to consider some facts. The current approach by the British government and part of the Prevent agenda, assume that all British Muslims are potentially susceptible to radicalisation. A MI5 Behavioural Science Unit report claimed: “there is no typical pathway to violent extremism” for British Muslims who fit “no single demographic profile” (Travis, 2008, p. 45). According to this government report, any British Muslim could therefore be “at risk” (Travis, 2008, p. 45). Mosaddeq contends that the wide range of characteristics of disillusionment afforded by the government to Muslims in the UK are symptoms of a wider problem and have no direct correlation with a propensity to violence. This is supported by the disconnect between generally held views by Muslims and their support for violent extremism. Mosaddeq cites the example that while between 30 and 40 per cent of British Muslims would support the introduction of Shariah Law into parts of British society only 1 to 2 per cent believes terrorist attacks in the UK would be or is justified. In other words, the promotion of shared values and social cohesion is distinct from countering extremism and the two should not be conflated.

It follows therefore that any counter terrorism strategy must recognise the interdependent factors that make up the radicalisation process and separately address the issues of a broken social contract with UK Muslims. If, as the

hypothesis in the final simulation in the next chapter proposes, authority figures exact the highest level of influence directly impacting propensity to violence, it seems logical that this is the approach that could counter these drivers. The pilot and simulations described below test for both of these effects; a promotion of violence and a promotion of the peace and incorporate the key factors identified in this literature review firstly identifying some individual perceptions about causes of this type of violence and then some experimental simulations to test their relative effect on increasing propensity to violence.

Chapter Three - The Pilot

3.0 Introduction

The preceding literature review set out the general position regarding the current state of the research in the field. The latter part of the review considered literature specific to the three main variables tested in this study. This section of the thesis, will report the findings of the pilot study using 30 UK participants to assess individual general perceptions about causes of violence. The results and discussion are also reported here. This is followed by a chapter setting out the methodology, design, results and discussion from the second phase of the research: The Simulations. This section reports how each of the key variables: group cohesion, moral disengagement and authoritarian conformity correspond to the main dependent variable: propensity to violence. Phase Two of the research builds on correlations established in Phase One (pilot study) while considering other emerging factors highlighted in the literature review that might also contribute to a process that shapes propensity to violence. The aim is to determine through statistical analysis and review, the relative contribution of key variables drawn both from the analysis in the first phase of the research and additional information, literature and existing research in the field. This is achieved by reviewing three key independent variables (described below) and how they affect a dependent variable (propensity to violence).

An inventory based questionnaire (Phase One - Pilot) and Paragraph completion exercises (Phase Two) are the two main methodologies applied to achieve this. The next section describes the design and methodology of the Phase One questionnaire, followed by the manipulation of key variables in a practical group experiment with the relative effect measured by analysis of variance tests in Phase Two. This second phase also incorporates Integrative Complexity Analysis (ICA) conducted to explore how participants respond to conflict scenarios as reflected in the differentiation of group discourse. The scale measuring propensity to violence was revised following the pilot study to better represent the type of violence scenario simulated in phase two (see 'Note on propensity to violence at the beginning of this thesis).

3.1 The next steps

Over five years, as this research project has developed, there has continued to be developments in the research and literature in the field of terrorism research exploring what motivates group and individual propensity for violence. Phase One data presented below, sought to identify, based on the literature and related experimental inventories, how individuals perceive the drivers or motivating factors that generate this type of behaviour. While Phase Two of this research is related to the findings from this pilot study more in-depth reviews of research in the field (literature review) helped refine an approach for the main study which focuses more specifically on key driver variables, Phase One attempts to combine the post-hoc approach employed in traditional research with more current accounts of how individuals themselves regard violence and its causes. As with any research over a period of time, the findings trace an evolving understanding of the subject which

attempts to respond to the criticism and demands of the field of research and its scholars. It is important to note here that the Phase One pilot data presented below was produced in the very early stages of this project and used to help shape the three key variables measured in the main Phase Two of this thesis. The hypotheses and assertion in the main body of the research (Phase Two), is therefore shaped by the developments in research and thinking since 2005. The study of terrorism has become increasingly important in the subject of violence and political research and continues to take centre stage in the commentary that exposes the processes of radicalisation and social constructs that scaffold them. Research going forward therefore, if it is to be operational useful and contribute to the knowledge base more generally must be driven by both existing and new research and respond to the demands of the discipline to progress. The study of terrorism is a vast and complex subject and for this reason, a clear focus and research question is essential to make this contribution and to open new avenues for research into the future. As indicated in the literature review, in this comparatively new subject (in its modern incarnation), a large proportion of the literature offers conflicting views about what type of research is required and how it can best be conducted. Further to the design of the first phase of this research project, the empirical aspect was unquestionably the most elusive and the most difficult to pin-point. Understanding the 'root causes' of terrorism has been the principle question and motivating factor behind most research, but with a phenomenon that has rapidly changed form and comprises innumerable types, this has been difficult. The questions about the rationality of violent behaviour, the countries in which it occurs and the demographics of those who exact the violence are some of the more popular

questions but far less literature and research examines the actual transition process. Amongst the journal articles and research briefs, one paragraph has stood out through this process and has been key on defining the steps that have shaped this research. It identifies key questions for assessing individuals influenced by groups in the context of political violence and serves as a good illustration of the basis of this thesis. In Behavioral Sciences and the Law journal. Pychon and Borum (1999) outline the following questions:

“We propose three main questions for investigations involving individuals influenced by groups: (1) how important is the group to the individual?; (2) how likely is the individual to deviate from the group?; and (3) how likely is the individual to move toward a violent or extreme solution? As with the questions suggested for evaluating a group’s risk for violence, these questions are derived only from existing theory and research and are intended as a starting point for considering how to incorporate such information into an individual’s risk for violence. Definitive implications of the answers for estimating risk are not currently available in the empirical literature” (Pychon & Borum, 1999, p. 335)

This extract raises some of the most critical challenges around the steps that lead to the culmination of extremist violence. It ties together three central components: the perception of the group identity as held by the individual, the freedom of the individual to exercise their own autonomy and the likelihood of this balance leading to a violent outcome. The structures of violent groups, their cohesiveness, their

loyalty, their influences and the rhetoric they are exposed to, all play a combined role in this journey towards violence and these factors are the focus of the experiments that follow. The factors that combine in this equation therefore pertain to the individual, the group environment in which they exist, the rhetoric that defines this environment and its outputs, and the catalysts that draw these factors together. In the tradition of moving from the general to the specific to hone a research question, chapter four guides the reader step-by-step through each of these, before assessing their combined effect in shaping group and individual propensity to violence.

3.2 Background

From the outset, this study has been continually refined to reflect both the literary and methodological requirements of the current research climate, that new research both build on existing findings and respond to emerging theories about effective research design to ensure as far as possible objectivity and generate a degree of empirical robustness in any findings that result. Consequently, this pilot phase is designed to identify some key variables that may increase individual and group propensity to violence which will be tested using simulations in Phase Two. This is designed to evolve the research from first principles incorporating a wider body of research, drawing on and hopefully complementing existing findings. The aim here is to record individual perceptions about the factors that might contribute to violent behaviour and establish their relative and combined contribution to a radicalisation process of a transition to violence. This is achieved by identifying independent variables that represent the factors that drive violence and creating an

overall measure, or dependent variable, constructed from environmental, demographic, experience and personality factors i.e. a variable that acts as a metric for an individual or group's 'propensity to violence' based on their own perceptions. By producing empirical evidence and qualitative assessments in this way, the aim is to generate research that is paradigmatic, non reducivist and operationally useful. The following paragraphs outline the refinement of this model's analysis instruments and explanation about the research processes of Phase One.

3.3 Phase One – Methodology (Preliminary Pilot Study)

3.3.1 Design

The aim of this preliminary pilot phase of research is to model the relationships between relevant variables incorporated within the transition to violence process based on the perceptions of a sample of 30 UK residents. In other words, how far can psychological perceptions about environmental and social factors help explain the processes operating during radicalisation towards violence? This will go some way to identify which combinations of variables are positively correlated with violent behaviour according to the perceptions of individual participants in this pilot study and help to confirm the main areas of focus for the second and main phase of this research.

The stages that precede and form part of a transition to violence have been discussed throughout the last chapter reviewing the literature around this subject. The literature identified certain factors, the combination of which may facilitate this transition to violent behaviour. The dependent or criterion variable developed for this research is Propensity to violence (PTV) score. This is measured as a compound of responses that indicate willingness to engage in violence, experience of doing so in the past and other perceptions around the circumstances under which terrorist or political violence might be justified. The pilot achieves this using a series of psychological inventories in this pilot study and in Phase Two using experimental simulations. It is proposed that this propensity to violence (PTV) score will be affected by a number of variables. The purpose here is to identify which of these

variables or combinations thereof are most highly correlated with increased PTV scores. For an explanation of how the definition of propensity to violence is applied and evolves throughout this study, see the section A Note on Propensity to Violence at the beginning of this thesis.

Data in this pilot phase was collected via a survey which was completed by 30 self-selecting participants in a UK based survey. The inventory developed to measure propensity to violence was based on the following inventories. Some of the inventories were designed to provide context for the opinions on violence and were not subject to specific analysis e.g. the Couch & Bales 7- item measure of aggressive mistrust, unlike contemporary measures, potentially has more relevance to the overall context and aim of the study. These results however are not included in the analysis.

1. 27 item parcel, five factor model including variables: environmental, belief systems, social identity, demographic, experience of violence (Wray, 2007)
2. 10 item measure of the big-five personality inventory (Gosling, SD; 1992)
3. 8 item measure of authoritarian conformity (Couch & Bales, 1960)
4. 7 item measure of aggression (Couch & Bales, 1960).

The first of these inventories, which looks at environmental and other social factors, was developed to measure some of the metrics identified in the literature and wider research and forms the basis for the analysis in this pilot. The others on aggression, authority and personality were drawn from established classical

experimental theory. These questions were presented to the participants online and by post in a survey entitled '*Violence, Authority, and Aggression – A study of attitudes towards violence in Britain*'. The variable parcels are described in the procedure section below detailing how each measure in the questionnaire corresponds to each variable parcel. Full copies of the questions are provided in the appendices (page 321).

The hypothesis for this pilot study is shown below:

- Null Hypothesis (Ho): Group association (or cohesion), Transnational support for violence and authoritarian conformity will not be more significantly correlated with Propensity to violence score (PTV) than the other variables tested.
- Hypothesis 1/alternative hypothesis (H1): Group association (or cohesion), Transnational support for violence and authoritarian conformity will be more significantly correlated with Propensity to violence score (PTV) than the other variables tested

Fig 3.0 – Pilot Study Survey extract



violence, authority and aggression

a study of attitudes towards violence
in Britain



3.3.2 Participants

A total of 30 participants took part in the Phase One pilot study. Taking part were 16 males and 14 females, with an average age of 28 years. The table below summarises some basic demographic information for the participants:

Table 3.0 - Pilot phase participants demographic summary

Gender	Ethnicity	Religion	Age
Male 16	BME* 19	Agnostic 2	Ave = 28 years
Female 14	Non- BME 10	Christian 8	(Range = 17 –
	Refused 1	Muslim 6	30)
		Refused 14	

*BME = Black & Minority Ethnic

80% of the sample was educated to at least college level and 4 of the participants hold a postgraduate degree. Of those that gave responses, 8 participants had reportedly been or are associated with a gang culture in central London and one recorded membership of a radicalised organisation. The sample was obtained in response to an advert posted in two central London universities, one sixth-form college and a public sector charity office inviting potential participants to answer a short survey about their views on violence. 11 of the respondents to the advertisement were later identified as college peers, and had known each other prior to taking part in the study. This was also a factor in the abnormally high proportion of the sample with previous exposure to violence but this was not known at the time of analysis. As such, the random nature of the sample was later found to be compromised.

The surveys were issued and returned via post and email over a three week period in August 2006. All participants were informed that their responses were

confidential and that they could withdraw from the study at any time. Participants were also invited to ask for more information about the survey or the wider research project.

3.3.3 Procedure

Each participant completed one survey. The initial version of the survey returned by all participants used a scoring inventory between one and ten. This was subsequently altered to match inventory scales in existing studies, integrative complexity analysis scoring and the PTV outputs used in Phase Two of the study for consistency. The pilot results were re-coded to produce a score out of seven. The variable parcels analysed are explained below.

Data was recorded and entered into SPSS for analysis. The initial main assessment employed a cross-sectional approach reviewing all variables in a single model. This method is appropriate for this design in that it reports several variables simultaneously. However, unlike the proposal methods for Phase Two of this study (which uses analysis of variance techniques), none of the variables are being manipulated. This type of correlation research will examine relationships between recorded variables. This allows us to see which aspects of behaviour are related. The technique used here was multiple regression, specifically, hierarchical multiple regression. This allows variables to be entered into the regression model in an order determined by the expectations of this study as outlined below.

3.3.4 Variable parcels

For the purposes of successful regression analysis, individual questions were grouped in variable parcels. Each parcel of variables has been assigned into two blocks to be modelled hierarchically. Block 1 below represents the variables that, it is anticipated will explain most of the variance in the dependent variable (PTV score) based on the existing literature and research which cites these aspects of behaviour as being most prominent in processes of radicalisation. Block 2 contains secondary variables expected, in the context of the sample, to explain less of the variance of PTV score. These are also based in the literature but are regarded as having a diminished effect. These blocks of variables represent the factors that are perceived as drivers of violent behaviour in the context of this research. The variables have been coded to help create a basic initial equation which shows how they might interact and help to inform the simulation experiments in the main phase of this thesis. These codings, which are explained later in this chapter, do not relate to the regression modelling and are supplied for clarity only. These blocks are as follows:

Block 1 Independent predictor variables parcels

V.1(B) Group cohesion effect (GAE) – This parcel is made up of a range of variables that draw on individuals' experience and perceptions of violence associated with group behaviour. This relates to several studies, notably Sageman (2004), Zimbardo (2007) and Burke (2008), which focus on the effects of group cohesiveness on propensity to violence and collective identity. The questions asking participants to

indicate the extent to which they agree with the following statements (shown in full in the appendices (p. 321) and which comprise this variable include:

- i) Violence is more likely in groups;*
- ii) I would behave violently in a group but not on my own;*
- iii) Isolated groups should use political processes to express their views;*
- iv) Engaging in violence is usually a group behaviour.*

V.2(B) Transnational violence support (TVS) – This parcel combines variables that test experience and perception of how violence is supported transnationally, a characteristic which according to Sales (2007) and others in the last chapter, engenders modern terrorism and political violence. Questions from the survey that comprise this variable are:

- i) violence against non-combatants as revenge...is just;*
- ii) Violence against one people should be paid back with violence;*
- iii) Western occupation of foreign soil is not the main cause of terrorist violence;*
- iv) It is alright to shoot someone that has invaded your country.*

V.3(C) Authoritarian conformity (AC) – Draws on how individuals and groups respond to authority, specifically within the context of violence provocation. Later in the study, findings will also be compared with the authority and aggression inventory models devised by Couch and Bales (1960). Questions from the survey that comprise this variable are:

- i) It is alright to obey leaders in society even if they promote violence;*

ii) I often openly agree with people who promote violence but privately think that it is wrong.

Block 2- Independent Variable Parcels

V.4(A) Exposure to violence (EXPV) – Tracks responses of participants' reported experience of violence both in childhood and more recently. Questions from the survey that comprise this variable are:

i) violence was a common occurrence on my childhood;

ii) Exposure to violence makes it seem more normal

V.5(B) Personal motivation (PM) – Records perceptions around whether violent behaviour has individual drivers, polarised with group dependence. Questions from the survey that comprise this variable are:

i) An eye for an eye, a tooth for tooth;

ii) Violence is sometimes necessary to make a positive change;

iii) The decision to engage in violence...is an important part of personal identity.

V.6(C) Violence as power (VP) – Indicates where respondents perceive violence as associated with form of power. Questions from the survey that comprise this variable are:

i) violence is an expression of power;

ii) Display of violence helps maintain a position of strength.

V.7(A) Historical significance (HS) – Records responses that exhibit perceptions about the importance of violence in historical context and history as forms of collective social identity. Questions from the survey that comprise this variable are:

i) People remember violent struggles in history more than they remember non-violent struggles;

ii) People who engage in violence are less likely to be remembered in history.

V.8(D) Non-violence (NV) – These variables relate to questions designed to record deliberate non-violence responses e.g. “Violence is never necessary to support a cause even where there is no obvious alternative”. Questions from the survey that comprise this variable are:

i) Violence is always avoidable;

ii) Violence is never necessary to support a cause;

iii) Violence is never inevitable in a multi-cultural society.

Dependent outcome variable

V.9(D) Propensity to violence (PTV) – Overall score allocated to each participant based on responses to questions indicating experience of violence or implied willingness to engage in violence. Questions from the survey that comprise this variable are:


i) I would engage in violence in some circumstances;

ii) I have engaged in violence behaviour before.

A full version of the survey (based on a converted 7-point scale) is available in the appendices (p. 321).


The reported scores based on the extent to which participants agreed with the statements above were recorded, providing a mean average score for each variable parcel score. These pilot data were designed to help to confirm the relative influence of each variable according to individual perception. The variables are not applied in practice at this stage. This is the central aim of the main phase of the research. However, before reporting the findings from multiple regression analysis, it is instructive to consider the following basic models which show how these factors might interact. The variable matrix set out below in fig 3.1 shows how these independent variables will be modelled with the dependent variable, propensity to violence. It is important to note here that the additional inventories included in the pilot study were not subject to specific analysis. Included to provide possible context, they have been disregarded in the main analysis as the study has developed and refined its focus. All results below are based on the 27-item inventory and modelled in two blocks as the diagram below shows. The model is designed around the anticipated main drivers for perceived increase in violence.

Fig 3.1 - Variable Matrix



An additional model in fig 3.2 shows where these factors might appear in the process of radicalisation. This is considered in detail in the context of the findings of Phase Two but it is useful to postulate about how this might look in basic terms. This model outlines the overall framework that interconnects the stage processes of transition to violence from Original environment or a non-violent state which has been labelled (A1), through motivation for entering affiliate groups or aligning to a cause (B1). This stage is separated into self-interest and group dependency. The penultimate stage then examines the experiences within the group environment looking at pressures, influences and group type (C1). The framework outputs (D1/D2) are eventual transition to violence or non-violence. These stages are set out in fig 3.2 below.

Fig 3.2 – Transition to violence process map variables (A-D)



This is a rudimentary model designed to help begin to define each of the stages and factors that exert an individual and combined effect on the process of radicalisation. Each stage of this model contains one or more of the variables outlined above. For example, “**V.7(A) Historical significance (HS)**” forms part of the original environment section of the model - represented by the letter in parenthesis after variable number. Therefore, the version number refers to the order that the variables are entered into the model and the letter refers to which part of the transition map it occupies. The aim is to identify which combinations of variables represent the most powerful drivers at each stage of the model above. This will generate profile scenarios which will be tested in Phase Two as individual hypotheses in group simulated experiments. The nature of these simulations is outlined later in this chapter.

The requirement here is to calculate which combination of variables A,B, or C is equal to either D1 or D2. It might be the case for example that $V4(A)+V1(B)+V3(C)=V9(D)$ but when $V5(B)$ is added into the model then the power

of V9(D) is reduced, increased or moves towards V8(D) (see fig 1.0 for coding). Multiple regression analysis using ANOVA at this stage of the research will help to develop this model and can predict the Dependent variable (D) from IVs A,B and C. This is the relationship between the original environment, the motivation for radicalisation, the impact of radicalisation and how a compound of these produces a violent or non-violent output transition.

Logically, the complexity of identifying the behaviour type that precedes violent action might be seen to be dependent broadly on three components of any individual experience: Who they were to begin with? What their motivation for alignment might be, and the nature of experience of radicalising. These are the central themes that are most prominent in literature and research on terrorism. The balance of this model is therefore a reconciliation of its components to generate the output of the degree of violence. This is measured as propensity to violence (PTV) score as set out above. The process of data collection and analysis to generate this model is outlined below.

3.3.5 Pilot Results

There are a number of emergent issues, advantages and shortcomings from this analytical approach. The overriding issues relate to access to primary sample sources. In the case of this study, the primary sample for phase one is drawn from the UK population. This has two key advantages. First, it allows accurate assessment of individual and group behaviour prior to transition to violence

(although this was later seen to be compromised with regard to this sample).

Second, it investigates the behaviour of culturally, ethnically and religiously diverse individuals and groups from an apparently 'normal' population i.e. the sample was designed to be relatively un-remarkable in the context of political violence. This intended aspect was also partially compromised and the idea is discussed in more detail in Phase Two where a significantly increased sample size was drawn to address these earlier limitations. Initial descriptive statistics shown below provide some basic information about the data.

Table 3.1 – Pilot study descriptives output

	Group cohesion	Exposure to violence	Trans support for violence	Personal motivation	Religious motivation	Authoritarian conformity	Violence as power	Historical significance	Non-violence
N	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
Mean	5.1	3.4	4.0	3.8	3.6	2.8	2.5	4.5	4.6
Std Error of mean	.264	.285	.251	.283	.339	.361	.270	.287	.354
Median	5	3	4	4	4	2	2	4.3	4.8
Mode	5	3	4	4	4	1	1	4,3	6
Std Dev	1.45	1.56	1.38	1.55	1.86	1.98	1.48	1.57	1.9
Variance	2.09	2.43	1.89	2.40	3.44	3.92	2.18	2.47	3.78
Range	6.00	6.00	6.00	5.00	6.00	6.00	5.50	6.00	6.00

As the table above shows, most respondents answered within a fairly consistent range averaging around 6. This in part might reflect the reverse or negative coded questions. The highest mean score for positive effect as a perceived driver of violence was Group cohesion or association (m=5.1). Transnational support for violence (m=4.0) and the historical element (m=4.5) also returned higher mean values. Non-violence also returned a higher mean value reverse coded.

To help understand how each of these factors can be seen to affect the dependent variable (PTV score), a summary of the correlations matrix is presented below:

Table 3.2 – Correlation Matrix summary of variables tested against PTV score

	Group cohesion	Exposure to violence	Trans support for violence	Personal motivation	Religious motivation	Authoritarian conformity	Violence as power	Historical significance	Non-violence
Pearson correlation	.797**	.325	.802**	-.288	.579**	.744**	-.049	-.126	-.378*
Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.079	.000	.123	.001	.000	.798	.507	.040
Sum of squares	58.52	25.78	55.98	-22.63	54.47	74.80	-3.65	-10.04	-37.21
Covariance	2.02	.889	1.93	-.780	1.88	2.58	-.126	-.346	-1.28

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

These Pearson correlations indicate that the variables most strongly linked with the dependent variable are group cohesion, transnational support for violence and authoritarian conformity with significant correlations at the 0.01 level.

Based on these conclusions and evidence from the literature, multiple regression was then applied to the data to hierarchically construct a model using the variables outlined above. At this pilot stage in 2006, the expected correlations between Propensity to Violence (PTV) score and other variables were expected to be stronger for three key variables: Group association, Transnational support and Authoritarian conformity. These variables were entered into the model first. The findings of this analysis are set below. Please refer to the appendices (p.270) for SPSS data output tables and charts.

Table 3.3 – Model Summary SPSS output

Model Summary^f

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics					Durbin-Watson
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change	
1	.920 ^a	.847	.830	.72234	.847	48.049	3	26	.000	1.804
2	.930 ^b	.865	.814	.75483	.018	.562	5	21	.728	

a. Predictors: (Constant), Authoritarian conformity, Transnational violence support, Group association effect

b. Predictors: (Constant), Authoritarian conformity, Transnational violence support, Group association effect, Violence perceived as power, Historical significance of violence, Personal motivation , Exposure to violence, Non-violence score

c. Dependent Variable: PTV score

The table above shows the output for Regression analysis applied to the blocks of variables to compare the relative contribution of each block. The early sections on the literature review indicated that the principle variables with the most potential to affect engagement in violence were Authoritarian conformity, Group association (cohesion) and transnational support for violence. In block 1, the three predictor variables were selected to quantify their contribution to the PTV score prediction. The variables in block 1 appear to contribute most of the prediction, compared to block 2. At this pilot stage, the objective was to establish which predictors contributed most to individual perceptions about propensity to engage in violence and to provide some direction to the design of the main phase of this research. The ANOVA output below shows that most of the effect for the model was created in the first block of variables.

Table 3.4 – ANOVA data output (Pilot Phase One)

ANOVA^c

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	75.212	3	25.071	48.049	.000 ^a
	Residual	13.566	26	.522		
	Total	88.779	29			
2	Regression	76.814	8	9.602	16.852	.000 ^b
	Residual	11.965	21	.570		
	Total	88.779	29			

a. Predictors: (Constant), Authoritarian conformity, Transnational violence support, Group association effect

b. Predictors: (Constant), Authoritarian conformity, Transnational violence support, Group association effect, Violence perceived as power, Historical significance of violence, Personal motivation , Exposure to violence, Non-violence score

c. Dependent Variable: PTV score

Table 3.5 – Coefficients output table (Pilot data – Phase One)

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for B		Correlations			Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Zero-order	Partial	Part	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	-1.173	.534		-2.195	.037	-2.271	-.075					
	Group association effect	.410	.132	.339	3.114	.004	.139	.680	.797	.521	.239	.497	2.014
	Transnational violence support	.551	.127	.433	4.343	.000	.290	.811	.802	.648	.333	.591	1.692
	Authoritarian conformity	.273	.089	.309	3.079	.005	.091	.455	.744	.517	.236	.584	1.713
2	(Constant)	-.788	.981		-.803	.431	-2.828	1.252					
	Group association effect	.392	.151	.324	2.592	.017	.077	.706	.797	.492	.208	.411	2.435
	Transnational violence support	.500	.145	.393	3.436	.002	.197	.802	.802	.600	.275	.491	2.037
	Authoritarian conformity	.262	.109	.296	2.397	.026	.035	.489	.744	.463	.192	.420	2.383
	Exposure to violence	.168	.126	.150	1.338	.195	-.093	.430	.325	.280	.107	.509	1.963
	Personal motivation	-.128	.105	-.113	-1.221	.236	-.346	.090	-.288	-.257	-.098	.746	1.340
	Violence perceived as power	-.082	.111	-.069	-.744	.465	-.312	.148	-.049	-.160	-.060	.737	1.357
	Historical significance of violence	-.026	.095	-.023	-.273	.787	-.225	.172	-.126	-.059	-.022	.875	1.143
Non-violence score	.039	.103	.043	.381	.707	-.174	.252	-.378	.083	.031	.496	2.016	

a. Dependent Variable: PTV score

Each of the variables were modelled using SPSS. The model summary findings show that the association between the predictor and criterion variable PTV is fairly strong (multiple R = 0.92 for the key predictor variables). R-Squared shows the variance of the two blocks. Block one (group association, transnational support and authoritarian conformity) explain 85% (.847) of variance with block 2 explaining 2% (the difference between .847 (block1) and .865 (block2)). The Durbin-Watson value is close to 2 indicating that this model meets the assumption that independent errors are tenable. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that there are some correlations between participants' perceptions about which factors contribute to violence and the propensity to violence inventory score developed here. This provides some confidence in the PTV scoring for the purposes of more detailed applied research in the simulation experiments conducted in the next chapter.

In addition, the F values far greater than 1 for both blocks supporting the regression power as much greater than the inaccuracy within the model increasing the ability of the model to predict the criterion variable (PTV) and that it is unlikely to have happened by chance. b values show relationships between PTV and predictor variables. Positive values (Group association, Transnational support, Authoritarian conformity, Exposure to violence) have a positive relationship, with the rest negative.

The significance of t value shows that block 1 has more impact on t value PTV score than block 2 which is not significant. Tolerance is not less than 2 for all variables suggesting no problem with multicollinearity. VIF values represent an increase in

variance from linear dependence. VIF is lower than 5 threshold in all cases again suggesting no multicollinearity and stability with the b and beta values. There are however potential issues with the normality of distribution for authoritarian conformity but all other variables meet the assumption of normal distribution. Outliers may need to be removed before wider analysis in the main project and Phase Two.

There is also a requirement here to increase sample size for the second stage of Phase Two. The proposed increase would provide at least 150 participants tested in groups to establish the relative effect of each of these variables comparing group means using One-way-ANOVA.

Overall, the initial regression model supports the earlier proposal that the three key variables do explain a larger part of the variance of the outcome variable PTV. In addition, to ensure that there were no outliers in the sample that would be sufficient to contribute disproportionately to the correlation identified in the model, charts were produced to check for clusters in the upper right and lower left quadrants for the Pearson's correlation charts. Scatterplots were reviewed (as well as doing other routine checks), and they do seem to look like the typical plots of strong correlations, without notable outliers or other oddities. A larger population sample will help to confirm these findings and the effects of the variables identified here more accurately and increase statistical power. These charts are included in the appendices (p. 288).

Therefore, the initial pilot findings support the assertion that some variables are perceived to have more of an impact on the transition to violence than others. Components group association (or cohesion) and transnational support from the 'motivation' stage of the transition model coupled with authoritarian conformity from the Radicalisation impact stage, form the first area for analysis as strong predictors of PTV score. These will be tested in detail using a larger sample in Phase Two.

"While nothing is easier than to demonise the evildoer, nothing is more difficult than to understand him" (Dostoevsky, 1969, p.34). Dostoevsky was certainly correct in his assertion that understanding this type of behaviour is complex process. Each variable identified above, and many in addition to those, plays a part in driving transition to violence but as this initial analysis shows, there seems (certainly within this small sample) that some factors have a more significant weighting than others according to individual perception. The next requirements for this project and its line of inquiry is to confirm and further support these findings (across a wider sample) and secondly look at how these variables interact to affect a refined PTV score. The following section sets out the methodology and results from the main simulation study.

Chapter Four - The Simulations (Phase Two)

The Antinomian, the Entrepreneur...and the Marlboro Man

It has been argued that the “business” of modern terrorism has the principle characteristics of commercial branded enterprise with internal defensive rhetoric, iconic leadership and a perceived identity (Gupta, 1990, p. 3). These characteristics are the manifestations of three key aspects of political violence and terrorism, and the subject of simulated testing and analysis in this section of my research. Each of these ideas is explored in detail throughout this chapter.

The preliminary pilot phase of this research (reported in the previous section) identified some key drivers affecting propensity to violence: strength of group cohesion, authoritarian conformity and transnational support for violence. These findings, combined with emerging data and research in the field has helped identify the three main areas of focus for this study. Different groups and scenarios exhibit different manifestations and combinations of these variables in the following experiments. The aim is to examine how the relative contribution of each of the variables described below to a revised propensity to violence dependent variable.

Each of these factors will be analysed and assessed in logical stages:

1. **Group cohesion** – how does the strength of the interpersonal bonds within a group affect their collective and individual propensity to violence (including group attachment and condition of membership)?

2. **Moral disengagement** – which processes of disengagement or dehumanisation affect transition to violent behaviour?
3. **Authoritarian conformity** – how does the presence of a group authority figure influence group propensity to violence?

This section describes the design, methodology and findings from three main independent variables derived from a combination of outputs of the prelim pilot study and some more recent literature on the subject set out in the later sections of the literature review. The section that follows describes three experimental conditions designed to simulate the three key variables described above. Each of the following three experiments presents the findings of a simulation designed to test the relative effect of each variable on propensity to violence. The design and methodology for each of the three simulations is described below. This is followed by the results and discussion for each presented in turn. A subsequent general discussion will consider their relative and combined influence on political violence and the radicalisation process and consider some of the policy implications, limitations and future opportunities within this research. Although the following simulations are measuring separate variables, they are presented together to improve the structure of this section and allow the combined and integrated effects of each variable to be presented consecutively.

4.1 Methodology

This section describes the methodology for each of the experimental simulations before reporting each of the results sections and associated discussion in turn.

4.1.1 Design

159 participants, drawn from a normal UK population were invited to take part in an experimental simulation about decision making in the context of political violence. Participants were presented with a hypothetical high pressure political scenario. The scenario required that they consider how they might behave as a member of a political extremist group acting against a repressive government. These participants were allocated in groups to three experimental conditions to be tested using variations of the same paragraph completion designed to simulate the three key independent variables: group cohesion, moral disengagement and authoritarian conformity. Details of the participants and their demographic profile are shown in the participants section. A total of six hypotheses and null hypotheses are tested using this approach.

4.1.2 Participants

A summary of the demographics of the 159 participants drawn from a UK population taking part in the study are shown below. An anonymised full list of participants is located in the appendices (p. 313)

Table 4.0 – Participants Demographics Extract

Gender	Ethnicity	Religion
Male 133 Female 26 Refused 1	Black & Minority Ethnic 41 White 52 Refused 66	Agnostic 14 Buddhist 2 Catholic 2 Christian 43 Hindu 1 Muslim 9 Refused 90

**BME = Black and minority ethnic group*

**Participant 116 withdrew from the study. They were not replaced. Some of the participant marked 'REFUSED' include the confederate participants from the simulation on authoritarian conformity.*

The majority of the sample (83%) was male. Just over a quarter were from Black or Minority Ethnic groups (26%). Over half of the sample (56%) refused to supply information about their religion. Of those that did, Christianity was the largest group (27%).

Participants were recruited over a period of 8 months in central London, UK as they responded to an advertisement placed in their workplace inviting them to participate in an experimental simulation about decision making. The workplaces were all located in central London. The type of workplace varied between public and private sector organisations. 160 participants were initially recruited in total (including 2 reserves). Both reserves were used to achieve a sample of 160.

Following this, one participant withdrew from the study and was not replaced because of timing issues. Participants were also recruited via a research website inviting participants to engage in the study. Both advertisements are shown below.

As described above, the sample included mainly male participants from a mixed

ethno-political and social background. As described above, the participants were recruited for certain characteristics including some related by blood and or life-long friendships. For clarity, the breakdown of these group types representing the variables for testing and their relative characteristics of the groups are explained fully below. Full details of the participants are presented in the appendices (p. 313). There were some emergent limitations and risks identified later in the study regarding the sample process randomisation. These issues are explored in the general discussion – Chapter Five along with other limitations around the study design.

Fig 4.1.1 – Participant online recruitment advert extract



bomb.com - Counter Research International - Microsoft Internet Explorer

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

Back Forward Stop Home Search Favorites Refresh Print Stop

Address <http://www.cri.mfbiz.com/#/bombcom/4544528588> Go Links

Spit it out...

Home

Login

Contact CRI

News

bomb.com

Current research

Gallery

Time out

Events

bomb.com

What goes on before the bomb goes off...?

Welcome to CRI online blog and discussion forum "bomb.com". So called because it invites members to contribute their views, opinions or theories about which factors might drive the radicalisation process that can lead to political violence or terrorist behaviour.

Have a look at some of the posts below and give your view or start a new discussion topic.

With the permission of the authors, some of the content from the discussion below will be included in the current research publication "What goes on before the bomb goes off...?"

Gun powder, treason and plot...[Register here](#)


Friday 5 November 2010

Swap Gunpowder and Treason for Semtex and Western anti-imperialism, and consider what Guy's M.O. might be in 2010...

As part of the bomb.com research programme we are recruiting participants to take part in a live simulation on Friday 5 November at 8pm. Participants will be asked to take part in one group exercise. The event will last approximately 1 hour.

If you, or anyone you know are interested in taking part please visit www.cri.mfbiz.com at click on the bomb.com link on the menu bar. We are particularly interested in participants that are related by blood or are work colleagues. You will receive joining instructions on registration.

All CRI experiments are conducted in accordance with British Psychological Society guidelines and participants may withdraw at any time.



Done Internet

Start | 2 Micros... | 7 Windo... | 3 Micros... | 8 Micros... | Adobe Ac... | 2 SPSS ... | bomb.co... | Quick Launch | 13:33

The participants were allocated into 8 groups of five under the following headings:

Table 4.1 – Group type and characteristics

Group Type	N	Description
High cohesion	40	Volunteer participants were asked to invite family members to take part
Experience cohesion	39	Participants were recruited as groups of colleagues at least 1 years' experience of co-working
Low cohesion (visual stimulus)	20	Participants had not met prior to taking part in the study. Presented with a variant of the PCT* scenario
Low cohesion (proxy)	20	This group had no condition applied
Authoritarian (non-violent)	20	Participants had not met prior to taking part in the study. Groups contained 1 confederate of the experimenter.
Authoritarian (violent)	20	Participants had not met prior to taking part in the study. Groups contained 1 confederate of the experimenter.

**PCT – Paragraph completion test*

As the table above summarises, the first group of **'high cohesion'** participants, once recruited were asked to invite family members to take part in the study. This was designed to test for the effect of long-term kinship or blood ties in the decision making process. This group was the most challenging to construct with 5 of the 8 groups having all members related by blood. The remaining three groups contained a combination of family members and life-long friends.

The **experience cohesion** group consisted of 8 groups of work colleagues with at least one year's experience co-working. Typically, these groups were drawn from London based companies and were based on existing corporate team structures. The companies were mid-sized public and private sector organisations. One of the participants in this group withdrew from the study (participant 116) and due to

timing restrictions was not replaced. This group therefore has a total of 39 participants.

In total, both '**low cohesion**' groups comprised a total of 8 groups of 5 individuals who had not met prior to taking part in the study. In the main data, they are divided into sub-groups (proxy and visual). This was originally designed to represent both low cohesion 'proxy' support for transnational violence (this condition was not ultimately tested for) and 'visual' stimulus in the moral disengagement condition (see below).

The 'authoritarian' groups also comprised self-selecting volunteers, divided into 8 groups of four who had no prior knowledge of one another; the fifth member of the group was placed as a confederate of the experimenter. In four of the groups, the confederate expounded and encouraged their group to agree a violent outcome, while in the remaining groups, the confederate promoted non-violence.

4.1.3 Procedure

Arranged into 31 groups of 5 (and one group of 4), 159 participants (with the exception of the low cohesion visual who were presented with an enhanced scenario) were asked to consider the scenario set out below on paper, firstly in private, recording their answers on an answer grid. They were allocated 10 minutes to carry out this exercise. This part of the experiment was conducted in a large ante-room where participants had sufficient space to consider and record their own answers. They were then immediately led to a room with 4 other participants and

invited to discuss the scenario as part of a group simulation. Groups were given 20 minutes to reach a consensus where possible and record their answers individually. Finally, participants were asked again to consider the scenario privately and record a third answer. This was done in the simulation room without further communication between group members. Participants were allocated a further 10 minutes for this part of the experiment. These three points of response were designed to test for any effects of the condition types over time. The only deviation to this set up included issuing members of the visual stimulus group with an enhanced scenario and additional contextual visual stimulus and the presence of a confederate stooge in the groups assigned to the authority condition. This is described in detail later in this section. Findings are presented in the results section.

The simulations were conducted over a period of four months (April to July, 2009) principally on Tuesdays and Wednesday evenings using three almost identical meeting rooms in a single central London location. The rooms (corporate meeting rooms) were clean, basic and well lit with a central meeting table and chairs for the participants. Some of the later sessions were video recorded. In line with BPS guidelines, participants were advised that they could withdraw from the experiment at any time. All groups were de-briefed following the experiments and given the opportunity to ask questions about the study.

The groups (with the exception of the visual stimulus group) were asked to consider the scenario (outlined below), discuss and consider its implications and select one

of five possible outcomes ranging from non-violent to violent. An explanation of the relative degrees of violence represented by each outcome is described below. The outcomes of the three individual and group average responses were then analysed in the context of group type using multiple means comparisons in a one-way ANOVA. These scoring options are the basis for identifying the dependent variable: propensity to violence (PTV) score. As set out in detail below, this inventory is a 7-point scale rating individuals and groups collectively on a range between violent and non-violent single option responses. The degrees of violence in each option relative to the others are outlined below.

4.1.4 The scenario

The following scenario was presented to individual participants on paper as follows:

“You are five members of the ‘Peoples Freedom Alliance’ (PFA). You are all citizens of the Independent Republic of Londinium, a totalitarian state controlled republic. Your group has been founded by likeminded individuals in response to the harsh measures imposed by your government on its people. Your aim is to promote accepted basic human rights and gain support in liberating your fellow citizens from this oppressive government regime. The government, the IRL is unelected and corrupt and has imposed increasingly harsh sanctions on its people. Over the last decade, the regime has tortured or killed several of its opponents including using tactics of partial genocide. Your group has huge public support but despite intervention from international agencies has been unsuccessful in achieving any political voice and the IRL has attempted to dismantle your group by making it illegal for any citizen to engage with or support the PFA. Several supporters of the PFA have been imprisoned or killed to achieve this end. Aside from some underground support, you are the remaining members of the PFA.

You have received intelligence that the IRL intends to use severe tactics to remove the threat of PFA to maintain full control of the republic. In this, now covert underground meeting of the PFA members you must discuss your options for progressing your cause and redress the imbalance of power in the IRL. There are a number of action plans set out below. You must discuss your position and agree by consensus vote which approach to take. Because of the urgency and the threat of immediate danger, you must reach a consensus within 20 minutes. Please use the record sheet to record which outcome you select and give a justification or your collective reasoning for choosing this option”.

Option 1 – Take some government officials hostage and ascend to the roof of the parliament building to protest. This will build support and give PFA exposure, but if captured imprisonment is certain.

Option 2 - Go underground and disband to avoid capture. As the main promoters of the PFA this option may save your lives, but your cause will be lost. The only hope here is for others to pick up and recruit more supporters. There is however a good chance that momentum could be lost.

Option 3 – Build a large incendiary device and deploy it in the public park opposite the government building where you have received intelligence that key government officials and other members of the IRL government responsible for atrocities against your people will congregate for a meeting.

Option 4 – Surrender your cause and turn yourselves over to the IRL government authorities. Publicly denounce your cause to avoid the death sentence.

Option 5 – Take forceful control of a radio station and issue a statement that demands the IRL government give you a political voice in the name of democracy. This approach has in the past been unsuccessful. If caught, you will be imprisoned. There is the potential for some loss of life.

The scenario above is designed to create an environment which is hypothetical but contains recognisable elements for the participants. That is, the scenario was designed to place the participant in a group and in a position of perceived collective control and authority. It stresses the injustice of the environment and emphasises through the options that action can be taken to address these injustices. A strong sense of personal and collective responsibility is also part of this rhetoric. The outcomes are designed as closed and defined options to simulate a degree of pressure and reduce the participants' perceptions of choice. As described earlier in this chapter, there are additional options to allow for participants who refuse to engage exceed the parameters of the simulation. These additional options are detailed below. Responses are coded and entered into SPSS for analysis. A copy of the 7-option coding table is presented here for clarity. This table also includes an explanation defining how each option varies in its degree of violence relative to each of the other options or how they are independently defined. The options are presented non-sequentially to control for selection bias in the participants' individual responses.

Table 4.2 – Coding for scenario options

Mean group score code	Collective group option output	Degrees of violence (independent definitions)
1	Option 0 – Group member indicates during the simulation that they do not wish to select one of the options presented. Options are rejected as too violent.	Additional option representing participants’ views that all options presented are not applicable or too violent in nature
2	Option 4 – Surrender your cause and turn yourselves over to the IRL government authorities. Publicly denounce your cause to avoid the death sentence.	<u>Does not</u> incorporate the use of violence. <u>Does</u> involve surrender and denouncement of cause.
3	Option 2 - Go underground and disband to avoid capture. As the main promoters of the PFA this option may save your lives, but your cause will be lost. The only hope here is for others to pick up and recruit more supporters. There is however a good chance that momentum could be lost.	<u>Does not</u> incorporate the use of violence. <u>Does not</u> involve surrender or denouncement. <u>Does</u> involve physical retreat and partial risk to continued cause
4	Option 5 – Take forceful control of a radio station and issue a statement that demands the IRL government give you a political voice in the name of democracy. This approach has in the past been unsuccessful. If caught, you will be imprisoned. There is the potential for some loss of life.	<u>Does</u> incorporate the use of ‘moderate’ discriminate violence. <u>Does</u> retain element of political process dialogue and freedom of speech. <u>Does</u> acknowledge ‘contained’ risk to life of civilians.
5	Option 1 – Take some government officials hostage and ascend to the roof of the parliament building to protest. This will build support and give PFA exposure, but if captured imprisonment is certain.	<u>Does</u> incorporate the threat and use of extreme discriminate violence. Does acknowledge ‘contained’ risk to life of civilians.
6	Option 3 – Build a large incendiary device and deploy it in the public park opposite the government building where you have received intelligence that key government officials and other members of the IRL government responsible for atrocities against your people will congregate for a meeting.	<u>Does</u> incorporate the threat and use of extreme indiscriminate violence. <u>Does not</u> account for political process or freedom of speech issues. <u>Does</u> acknowledge mass uncontained threat to civilian life.
7	Option 6 - Group member indicates during the simulation that they do not wish to select one of the options presented proposing an alternative more extreme approach.	Additional option representing participants’ views that all options presented are not applicable or require more extreme measures.

The options, designed to incrementally represent the range of violence in group responses additionally includes extra-inventory options designed to account for participants' responses that fall outside of the five options presented during the simulation. As the table above shows, each of the options represents an independently defined degree of violence defined by specific characteristics ranging from non-violent surrender and denouncement of cause, through the use of political process, contained discriminate violence to indiscriminate use of violence against civilians. As described above, the options were presented to the participants at three points during the process. This was designed to minimise conformity where individual participants were less able to suspend their belief i.e. allowing participants to record their own answers could help better identify outliers and reduce to chance of participants 'playing along' in an artificial sense. This was regarded as a better test of real conformity i.e. that the effect of the variables could be manifest even where there was no pressure to publically conform. This focus on a group score comprised of individual scores is designed to ensure sufficient sample size and while retaining manageable and realistic group "cell" sizes. Immediately following the group simulation, participants were asked again to record their preferred option in isolation (post-simulation condition). This was designed to test for any sustained effect of the group experience on individual decision making. Individual responses were coded according to the degree of violence in each. Additional coding was included at both extremes of the scale to account for responses outside the parameters set in the simulation where participants rejected the options presented as too violent or rejected them as insufficient proposing alternative more extreme options. Participants were not advised of these

alternatives; developed as a contingency for responses outside of the simulation parameters. The options were presented in the simulation in a non-incremental order to help participants to focus on the content of the options independently rather than their relative position on the five point violence scale.

4.1.5 Integrative Complexity Analysis

In addition, to ensure comprehensive analysis of any correlations, the findings will be subject to both statistical quantitative testing and a qualitative assessment (mainly quantitative analysis of qualitative raw data) using integrative complexity analysis (ICA). Integrative complexity is a measure of the intellectual style used by individuals or groups in processing information, problem solving, and decision making. Complexity looks at the structure of thought processes, while ignoring the contents of the dialogue. It can be scored and assessed using verbal materials: books, articles, fiction, letters, speeches and speech transcripts, video and audio tapes, and interviews. Integrative complexity has two components, differentiation and integration. Differentiation refers to the perception of different dimensions when considering an issue. Integration refers to the recognition of cognitive connections among differentiated dimensions or perspectives. Measured on a 7 point scale, ICA can be applied to assess the decision making process employed by individuals within a group according to language used and discourse interaction. In this study, the ICA scoring was conducted by two researchers and their scoring was polled and averaged. Unlike more traditional ICA, the integration and differentiation of individual discourse within a group dialogue was scored during

live simulations using the principles of Integrative Complexity. Some of these group discussions (where permitted) were video-recorded. These extracts were reviewed to test for general scoring accuracy.

This was designed to test for relationships between PTV score and IC score. The scoring was based on a seven point inventory which assessed individual dialogue segments from each participant based on the following prototypical criteria established by Tetlock *et al.* (1987) and adapted for this study (Wray, 2009).

Table 4.3 - Integrative Complexity scoring guide

Code	Scoring parameters
1	No sign of conceptual differentiation or integration. The participant relies without qualification on a simple one-dimensional rule for interpreting events or making choices.
2	The participant recognises the potential for looking at the same issue in different ways or along different dimensions. Differentiation is emergent but not fully developed. Between categorical structure of score 1 and differentiated structure of score 3.
3	Identifies distinct ways of dealing with the same information or stimulus. Simultaneously holding different ideas in the mind. Not conceptual integration but differentiation.
4	Evidence of integration of conflicting conceptual ideas. Must include a) clear representation of alternatives and b) must be recognition of a dynamic relationship between them. Integration may be tentatively expressed.
5	Explicit expression by the participant of integration e.g. mutual influence, causal attribution of ideas expressed. Alternative perspective must be held simultaneously and viewed interactively.
6	High level of schema interaction, expressed as plan, processes, or courses of action. Specific explanation of moving parts and their interaction overviews and organisational principles expressed.
7	Presence of overarching principle or perspective pertaining to the nature (not just existence) of the connectedness or relationship between alternatives and how they comprise the overriding principles.

Correlational analysis shows that for all of the experiments in this chapter, 151 participants were coded according to the ICA scale above. These were found to correlate significantly with one another (.349) at the 0.01 level confirming a stable but not very large inter-agreement between the Integrative Complexity judges.

Table 4.4 – Inter-judge Integrative Complexity Scoring Agreement

Descriptive Statistics			
	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
ICA Judge Score 1	4.0066	2.00831	151
ICA Judge Score 2	4.3377	1.83262	151

Correlations

		ICA Judge Score 1	ICA Judge Score 2
ICA Judge Score 1	Pearson Correlation	1	.349**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	Sum of Squares and Cross-products	604.993	192.662
	Covariance	4.033	1.284
	N	151	151
ICA Judge Score 2	Pearson Correlation	.349**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	Sum of Squares and Cross-products	192.662	503.775
	Covariance	1.284	3.358
	N	151	151

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The following sections describe in detail how each of the three variables was tested, including hypothesis and the group types involved. Where material creates repetition for each section, it has been removed.

4.1.6 Simulation 1 - Effect of group cohesion on propensity to violence

The hypotheses for this section of the research are:

1. Null hypothesis (Ho): The strength of group cohesion has no effect on the propensity to violence (PTV) score.
2. Hypothesis 1 / alternative hypothesis (H1): An increase in the strength of group cohesion causes an increase in the propensity to violence score.

This experiment will assess the behaviour of different group types in the context of how each participant responds to the set scenario described above and measure the degree of violence in this response based on a 7-point violence inventory described earlier. The groups used in this experiment include:

1. High cohesion
2. Experience cohesion
3. Low cohesion

The mean scores for these groups are compared using a one-way ANOVA at three points (before, during and after the simulation) to measure the correlation between level of group cohesion and propensity to violence and whether any effect is sustained over time.

The results of this simulation are set out in the main results section. Below is a description of the two further simulations, and hypotheses.

4.1.7 Simulation 2 - Effect of moral disengagement on propensity to violence

The hypotheses for this section of the research are:

1. Null hypothesis (Ho): The application of moral disengagement stimulus has no effect on the propensity to violence (PTV) score.
2. Hypothesis 1 / alternative hypothesis (H1): The application of moral disengagement stimulus causes an increase in the propensity to violence score.
3. Hypothesis 2: Integrative complexity of group and individual discourse will be reduced by the application of moral disengagement stimulus.

During this simulation, 20 participants from the Low Cohesion (visual) group received an identical brief as in Simulation 1 testing but with an enhanced scenario.

The group tested in this simulation was:

1. Low cohesion (visual)

In this condition, enhanced written and visual stimuli were provided to contextualise the scenario presented to the participants. This was designed to manipulate the moral disengagement variable. The enhancements to written text are highlighted on the extract below. The scenario was presented to the participants without the highlighted words. Again, the outcomes were analysed using multiple means comparisons in a one-way ANOVA. A summary of the scenario presented to the participants is below. Results are reported in the main results section.

The 'altered' Scenario

*"You are five members of the 'Peoples Freedom Alliance' (PFA). You are all citizens of the **now desolated** Independent Republic of Londinium, a **cruel** totalitarian state controlled republic. Your group has been founded by likeminded individuals in response to the harsh measures imposed by your government on its people, **especially children**. Your aim is to promote accepted basic human rights and gain support in liberating your fellow citizens from this oppressive government regime. The **oppressive and brutal** government, the IRL is unelected and corrupt and has imposed increasingly harsh sanctions on its people. Over the last decade, the regime*

has tortured or killed several of its opponents including using tactics of partial genocide. Your family and friends have also been lost Your liberation movement has huge public support but despite interference from international agencies has been unsuccessful in achieving any political voice and the IRL has attempted to dismantle your group by making it illegal for any citizen to engage with or support the PFA. Several supporters of the PFA have been imprisoned, tortured or killed by these inhumane pigs to achieve this end. Aside from some underground support, you are the remaining members of the PFA. You must stop this genocide.



You have received intelligence that the IRL intends to use severe tactics to remove the threat of PFA to maintain full control of the republic. In this, now covert underground meeting of the PFA members you must discuss your options for progressing your cause and redress the imbalance of power in the IRL. There are a number of action plans set out below. You must discuss your position and agree by consensus vote which approach to take. Because of the urgency and the threat of immediate danger, you must reach a consensus within 20 minutes. Please use the record sheet to record which outcome you select and give a justification for your collective reasoning for choosing this option”.

Option 1 – Take some government officials hostage and ascend to the roof of the parliament building to protest. This will build support and give PFA exposure, but if captured imprisonment is certain.

Option 2 - Go underground and disband to avoid capture. As the main promoters of the PFA this option may save your lives, but your cause will be lost. The only hope here is for others to pick up and recruit more supporters. **It is certain that momentum will be lost and the murder will continue.**

Option 3 – **To protect these innocent children from a life of torture and repression,** build a large incendiary device and deploy it in the public park opposite the government building where you have received intelligence that key government officials and other members of the IRL government responsible for atrocities against your people will congregate for a meeting. **Free your people from these evil maniacs.**

Option 4 – Surrender your cause and turn yourselves over to the IRL government authorities. Publicly denounce your cause to avoid the death sentence. **Accept that you are powerless to make a difference.**

Option 5 – Take forceful control of a radio station and issue a statement that demands the IRL government give you a political voice in the name of democracy. This approach has in the past been unsuccessful. If caught, you will be imprisoned. There is the potential for some loss of life.

4.1.8 Simulation 3 – Effect of authority figure on propensity to violence

This final simulation tested the effect of an authority figure acting as a confederate of the experimenter on the group's propensity to violence, in one condition and their propensity to non-violence in a second condition.

The hypotheses for this section of the research are:

- Null hypothesis (H₀): The presence of authority figure has no influence on group decision making processes and collective outputs, increasing or reducing propensity to violence.
- Hypothesis 1 / alternative hypothesis (H₁): The presence of authority figure influences group decision making processes and collective outputs, increasing or reducing propensity to violence.

This simulation tested for the effect of authority on propensity to violence using participant groups consisting of 20 participants per condition:

1. Authoritarian (non-violent)
2. Authoritarian (violent)

In this condition, the fifth participant acted as a confederate of the experimenter and was instructed to dominate the group discussion encouraging the group to favour either the most violent outcome or the least violent outcome. The outcomes were also analysed using multiple means comparisons in a one-way ANOVA. A

summary of the scenario (identical to simulation 1) presented to the participants is above (without additional text). The confederates' scores have been removed from the data analysis to minimise any confounding effects.

4.1.9 Group Cohesion - Results

The following results section reviews the statistical analysis of the three main simulations to test the main hypotheses set out above. The objective of the simulated experiments was to test the effect of aspects of group environment on individual decisions about willingness to engage in violence. The statistical tests therefore designed to compare the group means in each condition, group cohesion, moral disengagement and authoritarian conformity. The design provided for a sufficiently large sample to measure the effect of the three manipulated variables prior to, during and after engagement in a group context. The results presented here confirm the parametric assumptions, compare the group means and integrative complexity scores and provide some additional narrative about the differences in means between groups. There is some discussion of the consensus group scores but for reasons explained below, this is not the main focus of the analysis.


Following the first simulation, analysis compared overall mean scores for each condition to determine the association between degree of group cohesion and overall group PTV score. As outlined above, this was measured at three different points in time (pre-simulation, during simulation and post-simulation). The table below shows how the means for the main overall groups changed through the three time stages of the simulation, with high cohesion ($m=5.4$) and authoritarian conformity ($m=6.0$) emerging as the highest PTV mean scores during the simulation,

an effect which appears to be sustained post-simulation (see highlighted scores below). Following this is a chart showing the average mean scores for each group type and how they change throughout the conditions.

Table 4.5 – Descriptive Outputs Mean Score by Group Type (SPSS)

Column1	Pre-simulation	Simulation	Post-simulation
High cohesion	3.98	5.4	4.5
Experience cohesion	2.71	3.9	3.6
Low cohesion (visual)	2.4	4.8	4
Low cohesion (proxy)	2.9	2.4	3.1
Authoritarian (non-violent)	2.62	2	1.8
Authoritarian (violent)	2.25	6	5.8
Total	2.97	4.24	3.85

Chart 4.1 – Mean scores by condition and group type



As the chart above shows, the next least violent outcome after high cohesion was with in the low cohesion (proxy) group (m=2.9), then experience cohesion (2.7).

Low cohesion dropped off from its original level before simulation and then increased afterwards (against the general hypothesis). All others increased from original position before dropping back but sustained above original position (except non-violent which was the exact opposite).

4.1.10 Parametric assumptions about the data


Conventional statistics (parametric tests) were used to estimate the population parameter. Because this study uses a sample, a sampling distribution and a population, certain parametric assumptions are required to ensure that all components are compatible with one another. ANOVA has three: observations are independent, the sample data have a normal distribution and the scores in different groups have homogenous variances. Tests were conducted including plot of simulation PTV score and a de-trended² plot of simulation PTV score) confirm that these assumptions are met and that the data is normally distributed.

To test for effect of group cohesion on PTV score, and to avoid multiple t-tests (which increase geometrically as a function of the number of groups); Analysis of variance was used to establish the mean difference between group types in each simulated condition. It is important to note that the consensus scores although included in the appendices (p.291), were not the focus of this analysis. An explanation of this is included in the discussion section below.

² The Detrended Normal Q Q plot, shows the differences between the observed and expected values of a normal distribution. If the distribution is normal, the points should cluster in a horizontal band around zero with no pattern.

A one-way-ANOVA was used to test effect on PTV score among five group types of varying cohesiveness; before, during and after individual participants took part in the simulation. The means chart above provides an initial indication of how the group types differ in their propensity to violence with authoritarian and high cohesion having the highest values, authority non-violent the lowest. Visual stimulus seems to affect the PTV score more significantly than with the experience cohesion group or the low cohesion (support by proxy) implying that visual stimulus plays a significant role.

Chart 4.2 - Error bar chart identifying statistical outliers



Outliers identified in the chart above were investigated. These were values by two individuals that seemed to break away from the group. These did not skew the overall data effect and were therefore retained in the analysis.

Table 4.6 – Test of Homogeneity of Variance

	Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
Pre-simulation individual PTV score	.873	5	145	.501
Simulation PTV score	2.885	5	145	.016
Post-simulation individual PTV score	2.528	5	145	.032
Intergrative complexity score	2.680	5	145	.024

The main ANOVA output between groups tests shows that the differences between groups pre, during and post group simulation are all significantly different. For the high cohesion group in the during simulation condition, ANOVA ($F(5,145) = 48.5, P = .000$). A Tukey post-hoc simulation test revealed that PTV score was statistically higher during the group simulation (5.4 ± 1.2) compared to the pre-simulation condition (4.0 ± 1.5 min, $P = .001$). Post simulation was lower than 'during simulation' (4.5 ± 1.7 min, $P = .000$) but significantly higher than pre-simulation (4.0 ± 1.5 min, $P = .000$). The greatest effects of the group simulations in changing the PTV score overtime were authority conditions. This is discussed later in the chapter.

Table 4.7 – Analysis of Variance Output Table

		ANOVA				
		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Pre-simulation individual PTV score	Between Groups	59.672	5	11.934	6.310	.000
	Within Groups	274.222	145	1.891		
	Total	333.894	150			
Simulation PTV score	Between Groups	261.565	5	52.313	48.509	.000
	Within Groups	156.369	145	1.078		
	Total	417.934	150			
Post-simulation individual PTV score	Between Groups	163.967	5	32.793	16.128	.000
	Within Groups	294.827	145	2.033		
	Total	458.795	150			
Intergrative complexity score	Between Groups	183.082	5	36.616	28.482	.000
	Within Groups	186.415	145	1.286		
	Total	369.497	150			

During the simulation, PTV score differed significantly across the five groups, $F(5,145) = 48.5, P = .000$. These results demonstrate that the means are different but not how they are different. Post-hoc tests were conducted to establish the nature of the differences. With more than two groups, multiple t-tests would be necessary but these inflate the type 1 error rate. The full post-hoc Tukey Multiple comparisons tables are included in the appendices (p.278) but there is a shortened extract presented below. The output displays data for all group type conditions with including mean differences during the simulations. Pre and Post scores are included in the appendices (p.278) including a final portion of the table displaying the integrative complexity scores for each group type.

Table 4.8 – Multiple Comparison Outputs by Group Type and PTV Score (Tukey, HSD)

Dependent Variable	(I) Group type cohesion	(J) Group type cohesion	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Simulation PTV score	High cohesion	Experience cohesion	1.47692 [*]	.23369	.000	.8020	2.1519
		Low-cohesion (visual)	.60000	.28440	.288	-.2214	1.4214
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	3.00000 [*]	.28440	.000	2.1786	3.8214
		Authoritarian (non-violent)	3.40000 [*]	.30718	.000	2.5128	4.2872
		Authoritarian (violent)	-.60000	.30718	.374	-1.4872	.2872
	Experience cohesion	High cohesion	-1.47692 [*]	.23369	.000	-2.1519	-.8020
		Low-cohesion (visual)	-.87692 [*]	.28561	.030	-1.7018	-.0520
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	1.52308 [*]	.28561	.000	.6982	2.3480

	Authoritarian (non-violent)	1.92308 [*]	.30831	.000	1.0326	2.8135
	Authoritarian (violent)	-2.07692 [*]	.30831	.000	-2.9674	-1.1865
Low-cohesion (visual)	High cohesion	-.60000	.28440	.288	-1.4214	.2214
	Experience cohesion	.87692 [*]	.28561	.030	.0520	1.7018
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	2.40000 [*]	.32839	.000	1.4515	3.3485
	Authoritarian (non-violent)	2.80000 [*]	.34831	.000	1.7940	3.8060
	Authoritarian (violent)	-1.20000 [*]	.34831	.010	-2.2060	-.1940
Low-cohesion (proxy)	High cohesion	-3.00000	.28440	.000	-3.8214	-2.1786
	Experience cohesion	-1.52308 [*]	.28561	.000	-2.3480	-.6982
	Low-cohesion (visual)	-2.40000 [*]	.32839	.000	-3.3485	-1.4515
	Authoritarian (non-violent)	.40000	.34831	.860	-.6060	1.4060

	Authoritarian (violent)	-3.60000 [*]	.34831	.000	-4.6060	-2.5940
Authoritarian (non-violent)	High cohesion	-3.40000 [*]	.30718	.000	-4.2872	-2.5128
	Experience cohesion	-1.92308 [*]	.30831	.000	-2.8135	-1.0326
	Low-cohesion (visual)	-2.80000 [*]	.34831	.000	-3.8060	-1.7940
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	-.40000	.34831	.860	-1.4060	.6060
	Authoritarian (violent)	-4.00000 [*]	.36715	.000	-5.0604	-2.9396
Authoritarian (violent)	High cohesion	.60000	.30718	.374	-.2872	1.4872
	Experience cohesion	2.07692 [*]	.30831	.000	1.1865	2.9674
	Low-cohesion (visual)	1.20000 [*]	.34831	.010	.1940	2.2060
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	3.60000 [*]	.34831	.000	2.5940	4.6060
	Authoritarian (non-violent)	4.00000 [*]	.36715	.000	2.9396	5.0604

Prior to the group simulation, only high cohesion group and low cohesion (proxy) returned significantly different overall group mean scores with $m=4.0$ and 2.9 respectively. No groups had any conditions applied at this stage but it is interesting to note the Low cohesion proxy score reduced during the simulation and therefore represents the opposite effect from those outlined in the hypotheses, namely that group activities alone can increase PTV score. Indeed, during simulation, the low cohesion mean score ($m=2.4$) is not significantly different from the authoritarian mean score.

During the simulation, the descriptive output above for the groups indicate that the high cohesion group (related by blood or life-long friendship) ($m=5.4$, 95% CI [5.03,5.77]) exhibited a significantly higher PTV score than the experience cohesion group (bonded by a single experience) ($m=3.92$, 95% CI [3.62, 4.22]) and the low cohesion proxy group ($m=2.4$, 95% CI [1.79, 3.01]). They most significantly differed from the Authoritarian non-violence group ($m=2.0$, 95% CI [1.61, 2.39]).

The post hoc comparisons below show the means scores by group type for during the group simulation. The most significant differences are between the authority group types, with a mean difference of 4.0 at the 0.05 level. High cohesion not differing significantly from authority figure (violent) with a difference of $.600$.

Further commentary on the moral disengagement scores are included later in this results section.

Full Group consensus scores are reported in the appendix but were not included as a focus for this analysis. These scores represent where groups were able to reach a consensus, however this analysis uses the average individual score to represent the group output as potentially a better and more honest measure of how individuals would actually behave in reality. This aspect could be improved with a better study design and emphasis on the instructions to participants. It had originally been excluded from the study but is discussed more fully in the Limitations sections in the next chapter.

The table below confirms where group types are significantly different from one another during the simulation with the following table showing how some of the effects of the group exercise are sustained over time.

Table 4.9 – Post-hoc Tukey Output by Group Type (during simulation)

Tukey HSD^{a,b}

Group type cohesion	N	Subset for alpha = 0.05			
		1	2	3	4
Authoritarian (non-violent)	16	2.0000			
Low-cohesion (proxy)	20	2.4000			
Experience cohesion	39		3.9231		
Low-cohesion (visual)	20		4.8000	4.8000	
High cohesion	40			5.4000	5.4000
Authoritarian (violent)	16				6.0000
Sig.		.800	.065	.403	.403

Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.

a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 21.767.

Tukey HSD^{a,b}

Group type cohesion	N	Subset for alpha = 0.05			
		1	2	3	4
Authoritarian (non-violent)	16	2.0000			
Low-cohesion (proxy)	20	2.4000			
Experience cohesion	39		3.9231		
Low-cohesion (visual)	20		4.8000	4.8000	
High cohesion	40			5.4000	5.4000
Authoritarian (violent)	16				6.0000
Sig.		.800	.065	.403	.403

Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.

a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 21.767.

b. The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean of the group sizes is used. Type I error levels are not guaranteed.

The subset for alpha output below for post-simulation also shows evidence of a sustained effect for high cohesion and experience cohesion groups after the group exercise is completed.

Table 4.10 – Post simulation subset for alpha output

Post-simulation individual PTV score

Tukey HSD^{a,b}

Group type cohesion	N	Subset for alpha = 0.05			
		1	2	3	4
Authoritarian (non-violent)	16	1.7500			
Low-cohesion (proxy)	20		3.1000		
Experience cohesion	39		3.5641	3.5641	
Low-cohesion (visual)	20		4.0000	4.0000	
High cohesion	40			4.5000	
Authoritarian (violent)	16				5.8125
Sig.		1.000	.302	.261	1.000

Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.

a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 21.767.

b. The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean of the group sizes is used. Type I error levels are not guaranteed.


Where the variance is significantly different (see ANOVA output above) the results need to be adjusted using F-test (Welch and Browne-Forsyth). This adjusts F-Value (48.51) which tests for equality of group means while assuming homogeneity of variance (i.e. looking at the mean irrespective of the variance. This improves statistical power – see output below).

Table 4.11 – Welch and Browne-Forsyth output

		Robust Tests of Equality of Means			
		Statistic ^a	df1	df2	Sig.
Pre-simulation individual PTV score	Welch	5.954	5	55.206	.000
	Brown-Forsythe	6.488	5	117.833	.000
Simulation PTV score	Welch	57.291	5	55.631	.000
	Brown-Forsythe	50.509	5	110.460	.000
Post-simulation individual PTV score	Welch	32.579	5	58.314	.000
	Brown-Forsythe	19.469	5	137.950	.000
Intergrative complexity score	Welch	38.102	5	56.297	.000
	Brown-Forsythe	30.852	5	117.127	.000

a. Asymptotically F distributed.

Chart 4.3 – Error bar of during simulation mean PTV score



Above is an Error bar chart for (during the simulation: group dialogue and output) for the ANOVA of group cohesion level and propensity to violence score, to check visually how PTV score varies across categories of group cohesion. This is equivalent to how the ANOVA was used to analyse this relationship. The mean PTV score of each group type along with 95% confidence intervals is represented in this chart. Confidence intervals that do not overlap indicate that those groups differ from one another. Confidence intervals that do overlap indicate that these groups do not differ from one another. We can readily compare the group categories in this arrangement. High cohesion, low cohesion (visual) and authoritarian violence groups have a higher PTV than experience cohesion, low cohesion (proxy) and authoritarian non-violence.

Further analysis (included in the appendices p. 291) calculated means comparison between individual sub-groups in each condition. Although not the focus of this analysis, this data shows that there was no contributory significant mean differences between individual groups in a single condition at this level.

There is a significant relationship between PTV score and group type $P < .05$ and with an F-value of 48.51 we can also reject the null hypothesis. The results here confirm the hypotheses that there is an effect of the degree of group cohesion on propensity to violence as defined in the context of this experimental condition.

To assess the effect of repeated measures comparing these group means compared against a global mean from the other conditions, the data was re-analysed

removing all other conditions, leaving only high cohesion, experience cohesion and low (proxy cohesion). This left 98 participants in the sample. The following ANOVA output is based on this data set.

Table 4.12 – ANOVA output across simulation stage

ANOVA						
		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Pre-simulation individual PTV score	Between Groups	34.499	2	17.250	8.967	.000
	Within Groups	184.672	96	1.924		
	Total	219.172	98			
Simulation PTV score	Between Groups	125.376	2	62.688	51.362	.000
	Within Groups	117.169	96	1.221		
	Total	242.545	98			
Post-simulation individual PTV score	Between Groups	31.338	2	15.669	6.445	.002
	Within Groups	233.390	96	2.431		
	Total	264.727	98			

This output shows that there are significant differences between each stage of the simulation, before, during and after the group simulation. The multiple comparison output below shows that the mean difference was most pronounced during the simulation with a mean difference of 1.8 between high and experience cohesion and a 3.0 difference between high cohesion and low cohesion. Future experimental designs would critically account for this issue but this additional analysis confirms that there is still a significant effect between groups over time for a data set of participants in a single non-confounded condition. The multiple comparison for the cohesion condition only groups is shown below.

Table 4.13 – Multiple comparison post-hoc (cohesion sample only)

LSD

Dependent Variable	(I) Group type cohesion	(J) Group type cohesion	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Pre-simulation individual PTV score	High cohesion	Experience cohesion	1.25705*	.31212	.000	.6375	1.8766
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	1.07500*	.37984	.006	.3210	1.8290
	Experience cohesion	High cohesion	-1.25705*	.31212	.000	-1.8766	-.6375
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	-.18205	.38146	.634	-.9392	.5751
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	High cohesion	-1.07500*	.37984	.006	-1.8290	-.3210
		Experience cohesion	.18205	.38146	.634	-.5751	.9392
Simulation PTV score	High cohesion	Experience cohesion	1.47692*	.24861	.000	.9834	1.9704
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	3.00000*	.30255	.000	2.3994	3.6006
	Experience cohesion	High cohesion	-1.47692*	.24861	.000	-1.9704	-.9834
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	1.52308*	.30384	.000	.9200	2.1262
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	High cohesion	-3.00000*	.30255	.000	-3.6006	-2.3994
		Experience cohesion	-1.52308*	.30384	.000	-2.1262	-.9200
Post-simulation individual PTV score	High cohesion	Experience cohesion	.93590*	.35088	.009	.2394	1.6324
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	1.40000*	.42701	.001	.5524	2.2476
	Experience cohesion	High cohesion	-.93590*	.35088	.009	-1.6324	-.2394
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	.46410	.42883	.282	-.3871	1.3153
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	High cohesion	-1.40000*	.42701	.001	-2.2476	-.5524
		Experience cohesion	-.46410	.42883	.282	-1.3153	.3871

LSD

Dependent Variable	(I) Group type cohesion	(J) Group type cohesion	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Pre-simulation individual PTV score	High cohesion	Experience cohesion	1.25705*	.31212	.000	.6375	1.8766
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	1.07500*	.37984	.006	.3210	1.8290
	Experience cohesion	High cohesion	-1.25705*	.31212	.000	-1.8766	-.6375
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	-.18205	.38146	.634	-.9392	.5751
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	High cohesion	-1.07500*	.37984	.006	-1.8290	-.3210
Experience cohesion		.18205	.38146	.634	-.5751	.9392	
Simulation PTV score	High cohesion	Experience cohesion	1.47692*	.24861	.000	.9834	1.9704
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	3.00000*	.30255	.000	2.3994	3.6006
	Experience cohesion	High cohesion	-1.47692*	.24861	.000	-1.9704	-.9834
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	1.52308*	.30384	.000	.9200	2.1262
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	High cohesion	-3.00000*	.30255	.000	-3.6006	-2.3994
Experience cohesion		-1.52308*	.30384	.000	-2.1262	-.9200	
Post-simulation individual PTV score	High cohesion	Experience cohesion	.93590*	.35088	.009	.2394	1.6324
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	1.40000*	.42701	.001	.5524	2.2476
	Experience cohesion	High cohesion	-.93590*	.35088	.009	-1.6324	-.2394
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	.46410	.42883	.282	-.3871	1.3153
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	High cohesion	-1.40000*	.42701	.001	-2.2476	-.5524
Experience cohesion		-.46410	.42883	.282	-1.3153	.3871	

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

4.1.10 Group cohesion - Discussion

To help contextualise this, it is instructive to progress the earlier discussion from the literature review around the extension or interpretation of Rational choice theory in the context of these findings which suggest that when we join a collective action we engage “instrumental rationality”. In economic terms, an individual may wish to buy something for its practical value but at the same time covet its symbolic value. This psychological process offers a physical benefit to the individual but also in what it “says about them”. In terms of group cohesion, what is on offer to a prospective member of an extremist group are not only infrastructural benefits but also a particular image projected of that individual. The more embedded in the group, the more defined the image. As Gupta puts it, the Marlboro man formed the most successful advertisement in history without saying a word. He represented “rugged individualism” which resonated deeply in the American psyche. The effect: when I light a cigarette I get physical pleasure but also become my own person. Where this symbolic value is well established (in a highly cohesive group), members coalesce within the collective identity more profoundly. Whether the maintenance or reinforcement of this image leads to an increase in extremity of group behaviour requires further analysis. The effect of the group environment in this way is examined in the results section on demoralisation. However, low integrative complexity scoring, which is consistent with more extreme behaviour is significantly higher than expected in the highly cohesive groups. This is perhaps more relevant in the context of authoritarian conformity and moral disengagement processes where group dialogue can be seen as comparatively more saturated with coercively persuasive language emphasising violence or non-violence. There is however an

effect of group cohesion on integrative complexity without this influence. Another critical factor is the effect of 'choice shift' or 'group extremity shift' or 'group polarisation'. Results show in most cases that opinion prior to group simulation is reflected in group discussion and the majority opinion is amplified.

The results also shed some light on the debate about the structure of these types of groups. From the perspective of Sageman, if groups are flat in structure and increasingly a 'bunch of guys' recruited together by others that they know, then they are more likely to be more cohesive even before transition to violence occurs. In accordance with this logic, such terror groups will be more cohesive and consequently more violent. The results above illustrate this point.

The findings above show that cohesion may increase or amplify PTV score throughout this simulated process supporting Borum and Pynchon's (1999) assertion about the effect of the group on the individual. The increased post-PTV score (after the simulation) is consistent with the lone actors theories where group membership has a lasting effect on individual PTV score even when they have left the group. With the expected exception of the authoritarian non-violent group (which recorded an opposite effect), each group type increased their collective PTV score during the group simulation and although dropping again post simulation, it was still higher than the pre-simulation mean score. As Hoffman, Stern and others found, it is not uncommon for the formation of the social framework responsible for the violence to precede the causes of the violence. This explains in part the PTV score of the highly cohesive group. The most significant outcome here is that all these groups simulated

and tested at a single point, some already highly cohesive, some unconnected. The high cohesion group still exhibited the most significant correlation with PTV score. This is not to say that the other groups would not increase in PTV score over time but rather, an already highly cohesive group makes the transition to violence more quickly. More generally and before moving on, it is instructive to note that in terms of reliability this measure and some of those that follow have yielded descriptively substantial and inferentially significant results with no obvious threats to validity. The next two simulations will help to determine if there is consistency of findings across the diverse constructs that make up the three variables examined in this thesis.

Out of the findings, it is clear that group cohesion does affect propensity to violence. This finding is also supported by the fact that low integrative complexity score is also consistent with high cohesion and propensity to violence. The next results sections in this chapter build on the findings here assessing how authority pressure and moral disengagement produces a combined effect in the context of cohesive group structures and identifies their relative impact. Within a cohesive group, there is a language particular to that group that helps to justify and cultivate the norms of the group. The next section which reviews the results of the simulation testing the impact of moral disengagement rhetoric.

4.1.11 Moral Disengagement - Results

As with the results in the previous section, all data satisfied parametric assumptions and were normally distributed. The analysis considered three main factors: The effect of visual stimulus for 20 participants in the low cohesion visual stimulus condition, the mean PTV score relative to other group types, and the effect of moral disengagement stimulus on the integrative complexity score of this group in terms of their collective discourse.

As the Tukey HSD table 4.1.11 shows (see appendices p.278 for full table), the visual stimulus experimental condition ($m=4.8$) was significantly different from all other conditions except high cohesion ($m=5.4$) where it followed a similar pattern. The table shows the mean differences from low cohesion and their significance. This moral disengagement group is also significantly different from the other low cohesion group which had no variable manipulation applied. This control group (low cohesion proxy) in fact showed a reduction in the mean group PTV score during the group simulation which had reduced to $m=2.4$ from $m=2.9$ prior to the experiment. Full details of these data are available in the appendices (p.278).

The data and results reported here are drawn from the *post-hoc* analysis data tables. The table below shows the mean difference between the moral disengagement condition group (low cohesion visual) and the other conditions at group level.

Table 4.1.11 – Post-Hoc Multiple Comparison Data (Low Cohesion Group)

Group type	Mean difference	Std. Error	Sig.	Lower bound**	Upper bound**
High cohesion	-0.60000	.28440	.288	-1.4214	.2214
Experience cohesion	.87692*	.28561	.030	.0520	1.7018
Low cohesion (proxy)	2.40000*	.32839	.000	1.4515	3.3485
Authoritarian (non-violent)	2.80000*	.34831	.000	1.7940	3.8060
Authoritarian (violent)	-1.20000*	.34831	.010	-2.2060	-.1940
Group type	Mean difference	Std. Error	Sig.	Lower bound**	Upper bound**

nce is significant at the 0.05 level

**95% confidence interval

The effect of this condition returns significant difference between groups. In pre-simulation, the results show the visual condition (m=2.4, 95% CI [1.68, 3.12]) compared to during the simulation where (m=4.8, 95% CI [4.33, 5.27]). This reduced to (m=4.0, 95% CI [3.36, 4.64]) in post simulation assessment, a reduction of 0.8 of mean score, the second largest reduction after high cohesion on exiting the simulation. Tukey post test reveals that PTV scores for this moral disengagement condition was not statistically higher after group dialogue and exposure to visual moral disengagement stimulus (4.8+/-1.01min, p=0.29) and post simulation was (4.0 +/-1.38min, p=0.79) also not significantly different. This large reduction might imply that other short term factors in group formation, not previously established in high

cohesion group have a more sustained effect on PTV over time, with moral disengagement mechanisms having a high shorter-lived impact.

In this low cohesion environment, it seems from reviewing video evidence that the image becomes a focal point and reference to it throughout is frequent. The image is used as a discussion prop as each member explains their perspective. The main ANOVA output between groups tests shows that the difference between groups (during the simulation) are significant as reported in the previous section.

The ANOVA output for integrative complexity also shows significant differences between groups (during the simulation), ANOVA ($F(5,148) = 31.8, P = <.001$). The Tukey Post-hoc results shows the second highest mean Integrative complexity score ($5.3 \pm 0.91, P = <.001$). This result is significantly different from the Authoritarian (violent) condition ($2.2 \pm 0.89, p = <.001$), authoritarian (non-violent) ($2.5 \pm 1.05, p = <.001$) and the high cohesion condition ($4.0 \pm 1.08, p = <.001$). There was no significant difference in integrative complexity score from experience cohesion ($4.6 \pm 1.3, p = .243$) and low cohesion proxy ($5.6 \pm 1.3, p = .925$).

In this condition, the IC scoring reflected the fact that the stimulus as a focal point drew the group discourse towards repetition of the group perception which was largely absent in the other group discussions. In other words, it operated as an easily recognisable reminder that maintained the focus of group discussion and was routinely referenced throughout. In the discussion simulation the visual cohesion group reports the third highest PTV score and this effect continues post simulation.

Integrative complexity score may therefore have links with moral disengagement. During the simulation the low cohesion group returned the highest integrative complexity score indicating two possible effects. The first that group cohesion and authority (including where non-violence is advocated) make the group discussions more binary and black and white, kill or be killed. The second that a “normal score” as returned by the low cohesion proxy group exhibit integrative complexity score for this type of discussion. In the normal range, the visual stimulus which includes a dehumanising context in this case returns a greyer, more open group discussion. Images are used to create alternative perceptions of the victims (and therefore potentially more complex). Self-imposed moral realignment has a reductivist effect here and simplifies the perception of the issue which is also reflected in the language of group discussion. This raises a significant question around the link between low integrative complexity and high propensity to violence. The findings here show the opposite effect. Where ‘moral disengagement’ mechanisms are introduced, they have the effect of increasing the integrative complexity of the group discourse rather than diminishing it, they increase the relative propensity to violence. This finding requires further analysis which is outside the scope of this current research project. For example, it might be instructive to measure integrative complexity over a time series, with different interactions introduced at particular points. The use of integrative complexity analysis in this study is designed to understand better how during group communication, discourse by individual members can be used to convey (consciously or unconsciously) more than the explicit meaning in the words themselves. To explore the implications of this here, a review of the integrative complexity scoring comparatively across all group types in this study is required. In

the context of this simulation, the main effect emerging from the results relates to propensity to violence score and a useful way to translate the findings therefore is to consider its application in a case study.


We can see from the results that these mechanisms of moral disengagement are commonly used and that they do have some effect in this simulation. However, the effect of this mechanism in isolation (in the pre-simulation condition) was less than in other conditions; but both during and post simulation returned the third highest collective mean after high cohesion and authority group. This may have implications for the context in which the mechanism is applied. As implied in the review of Situational Action Theory in the literature review on this topic, a combination of both environmental morality and personal morality may have to interplay to create an effect. The final results section presents findings from the authority figure simulation.

4.1.12 Authority Figure - Results

The final simulation was designed to test for the effect of the presence of an authority figure on the overall propensity to violence score and the transition of attitudes and propensity to violence prior to the group simulation, during and post simulation. As with the two previous experimental conditions, results are analysed at three stages from uncontaminated individual position, during the group dialogue and during a final record of the participants chosen outcome options post-simulation. As with all data reported in this results section, the confederates' scores (who participated in the authority groups) have been removed from the analysis.

A one-way-ANOVA was used to test effect on PTV score among five group types including the groups with an authority figure before, during and after individual participants took part in the simulation. The means chart below provides an initial indication of how the group types differ in their propensity to violence with the two groups tested here, authoritarian and high cohesion having the highest values, authority non-violent the lowest.

Chart 4.4 Means of group type PTV score



As the tables in the previous section indicate, Tukey post-hoc comparisons of the five the groups indicates the relative impact of authority (“Participant 5”) groups on PTV score. Pre-simulation, the subset for alpha output shows that there is only a significant difference between the mean PTV score for low versus high cohesion groups ($m=2.9$ and $m=4.0$) respectively. Participant 5 (the experimenter’s confederate was inactive during the pre-simulation condition) with non-violent authority returning a ($m=2.6$, 95% CI [1.90, 3.3] compared with the violent authority group ($m=2.3$, 95% CI [1.97, 2.88]). Interestingly, (and perhaps by chance) at this

stage in the simulation, the non-violent group exhibited a higher original mean PTV score than the violent group. During the simulation, the Participant 5 authority groups displayed the most extreme change in PTV score entering the simulation as anticipated in the hypotheses and the most significant difference from one another. For the violent group $m=6.0$ 95% CI [5.52, 6.48] compared to non-violent ($m=2.0$, 95% CI [1.61, 2.39]). Authority violent group condition is also significantly different from all but the high cohesion group ($m=5.4$, 95% CI [5.03, 5.77]).

The effect of Participant 5 (confederate) is sustained post simulation where with the exception of the authority groups, most group PTV mean scores regress and become similar. Low (proxy) and High cohesion groups have significant differences at this stage ($m=3.1$ compared to $m=4.5$) but the most significant sustained effect is authority violent compared to non-violent ($m=5.8$, 95% CI [5.33, 6.30] compared with ($m=1.8$, 95% CI [1.30, 2.20]). The only condition in which there is minimal difference between these groups is in their integrative complexity scores which are ($m=2.5$, 95% CI [2.00, 2.99] for non-violent groups compared to ($m=2.2$, 95% CI [1.78, 2.62] which seems to suggest that the rhetoric of Participant 5 simplifies and dominates the dialogue and lowers its complexity, integration and differentiation levels.

Participant 5 in each case then has elicited the most significant effect (violent and non-violent) of all the group types. It is important to note that the groups containing a confederate were randomly allocated and had neither previous cohesion nor additional moral disengagement stimulus. The fifth participant therefore, in a group of this size was able to influence the group decision and this influence was seen to be sustained to an extent following the exercise. Observations of the groups during the

simulation showed that while there were varied levels of enthusiasm among the confederates, in all cases they entered the simulation with the authority to influence. They were also notionally aware of the purpose of the study and seemed (anecdotally at least) to respond to the expectations placed on them.

An interesting additional observation that links these findings within a more realistic context can be seen in the parallel between this simulation, which was designed as political and non-religious, and the emerging non-religious rhetoric applied in modern terrorist propaganda. There has been a move, according to some, from heavily pious dialogue to more logical rhetoric. If we return to the example of Mohammed Sidique Khan, the alleged leader of the London 7/7 cell, this style is evident in his beyond-the-grave transmission broadcast on al-Jazeera in 2005. He begins: "I am going to keep this short and to the point...your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world...we are at war and I am a soldier...now you too will taste the reality of the situation" (Rai, 2006, pp. 130-131). As Burke (2004) observes, Khan uses no-religious rhetoric and speaks in clear plain English. The entire group structure, the network and the cohesion of terrorists groups therefore utilise all these tactics. In the case of authority and its effect, power to inspire and justify has in the case cited here, effectively been devolved to Khan; he is communicating the will of bin-Laden in the same way that the Koran is accepted as a dictate from the highest authority. Khan's reference to 'tasting reality' echoes bin Laden summary of 9/11 when he said "what America is tasting today is but a fraction of what we have tasted for decades" (bin-Laden, 2001 in Rai, 2006, p. 67).

Group cohesion and moral disengagement provide some of the setting, authority pressure acts as a catalyst. The final chapter of this thesis considers these findings in the context of the existing research, the limitations of this study and the future research opportunities and possible policy implication for the future.

Chapter 5 - General discussion

5.0 The empire strikes back....

“Conflict is an issue that is said to have occupied the thinking of humankind more than any other, save only god and love” (Franks, 2005, p 7)

For every paradox and moral, scientific question there are at least two-sides of the argument. The discussion of what motivates terrorists is no different. Over several decades, this field of research has expanded exponentially driven by various obvious and some not so obvious catalysts along the way. The research mainly seems to have one common goal – to establish why terrorists blow things up – what goes on before the bomb goes off?

The language of terrorism research uses terms like ‘root causes’ and ‘strategic logic’ all of which try to explain the origins of this man-made concept as it is afforded a kind of mythical status. What would drive people to plant bombs? How can this happen on an apparently increasingly effective and large scale and in ‘liberal democracies’? Terrorists are an invisible enemy, with no moral compunction; they could strike at any time. There is a widespread perception that this threat is all around us.

In response, there is a collective social desire that at times can be transnational that good people must unite against terrorism. The events in New York on September 11

have created what is termed here the '*I know where I was*' syndrome. This unification, which is a sort of organic, or naturally occurring version of the psychology of US anti-communist rhetoric (and now terrorism) that has created a real or otherwise – it doesn't matter, notion that there is some bogey-man to be defeated as a unified collective. A similar consciousness pervades our collective psychology at times of national tragedy; the death of Princess Diana, the Kennedy assassination etc. My point is that it generates what seems like a morbid excitement – a sense of real loss or fear which seems diminished by the collective experience. I am alone in my grief if my wife dies. If Princess Diana dies – the grief is shared. This angle verges on the realms of an entirely different thesis but does serve to illustrate that with this mutual fear comes a corresponding desire to understand and review these feelings, a kind of anthropological fascination with the unknown, similar to other cultural triggers of the occult, cannibalism, children who kill other children and so on. Terrorism may also fit this description with its image created, not just in political or media realms but in some cases by the research itself.

This contribution to the field of understanding terrorism, outlined in the previous four chapters has attempted to identify from first principles some key drivers that increase propensity to violence and terrorism. The simulations that test these variables have been set in the context of the existing research and have tried to be conscious of the conclusions reached so far, the limitations around sampling, empiricism and realism; whilst also acknowledging the future requirements of effective continuing research. The aim of this thesis was to develop some original thinking and evidence to understand this phenomenon better. In phase one of this

thesis a new inventory (propensity to violence score) was proposed to identify the main phenomenological drivers of PTV score. This identified four main factors which were then simulated using a 'normal' population of British residents in phase two of the research. Analysis of the simulation data and findings have shown that there is a significant correlation (not necessarily causation but positive relationship) between propensity to violence and the level of group cohesiveness, the use of moral disengagement mechanisms, authoritarian conformity and the role of violence itself in group attachment. Through the progression of this research project the definition and concept of propensity to violence has evolved and been refined. Moreover, given that the variables were prior to the PTV measure, one might reasonably argue that the links are not only measuring constructs that correlational but also directly or indirectly causal.

Statistical analysis set out in the previous chapters showed that there were significant differences for some groups in each simulated condition. The main ANOVA output indicates these differences. These increases in propensity to violence scores, although not derived from a 'real-life' situation, set a statistical benchmark which helps track the impact of these variables over time.

Cohesiveness within a group was seen to affect the group discourse and as a result steered individuals towards a more collective and violent perception about what would prove effective in the given situation

The findings from this study show that there is also a significant difference between groups for the integrative complexity analysis which measures the two structural variables in group discourse (differentiation and integration)

The aim, following the identification, isolation and analysis of these three key variables was to measure their relative effect. This final discussion chapter draws together the conclusions of the research findings, set in the context of the current research climate. It also highlights the successes and limitations of this approach and identifies future requirements and policy implications. However from the outset, the objective was to process the wealth of literature on the subject and distil this to a pertinent and operationally useful question. Written at a similar time, although not included in the original literature review, was Moghaddam's model metaphor describing the components of the journey through radicalisation to terrorism. Although, this model did not inform the original design of the research, Moghaddam's description of the entire process is useful to help frame the questions examined by this research.

On the penultimate floor reached by Moghaddam's staircase, individuals (operating as a part of a group or cause), reached what he termed their point of no-return. Once the factors that create this balanced state where groups are poised and ready to strike, the precarious and short-term nature of terrorist violence becomes more apparent. These component parts come to operate and interact in a complex way and as Moghaddam describes it:

“the entire operation of recruitment, training and implementation of the terrorist act in some operations may take not more than 24 hours, the recruited individual is typically given a great deal of positive attention and treated as a kind of celebrity, particularly by the recruiter (who stays by his or her side constantly) and by a charismatic cell leader” (Moghaddam, 2005, p.165).

The extract almost perfectly describes each of the three components reviewed and simulated in this research thesis. There is no doubt that the equation has a good deal more than three variables and that the relative contribution by each varies dramatically from one circumstance to another. In this sense, what has emerged to this author is that it is this variable balance, constantly evolving that is required to be exact enough to create the ‘perfect storm’ conditions in which effective terrorist violence will be executed. Effective terrorism effects some policy change and a huge proportion of these types of acts have achieved this goal throughout history.

Terrorism is a unique enterprise in the way that it fascinates both the perpetrator and the victim, creating a political and social obsession that strives to understand the processes which precede and maintain these perfect conditions. The remainder of this chapter reviews the major developments in the field of terrorism in recent years, outlining how the phenomenon of terrorism has evolved and how the corresponding research in the area has responded. This will highlight how this research project has attempted to address some of the relevant phenomenological and practical requirements in the context of its focus on the subject. The main issues reviewed include: the acknowledged lack of empirically based data evidence to support the hypothesis about the drivers of terrorism; the reductionist approach to research, and

the shortcomings of this and wider research in that context; the *post-hoc* nature of research which takes a retrospective view of violence causes; the progress made in understanding terrorism as a logical, rational concept; and lastly the hypothetical nature of the research, which has in many cases inadequately married the theoretical with real-life case data. These ideas are explored further below.

Between 2005 and 2012 (the period of this research project), there were a number of major developments in the field of terrorism research and practice. Firstly, the discipline became increasingly impatient with the pace and quality of research, “The academic response to terrorism has been ahistorical, exaggerated and closely associated with congenial political postures” (Bowyer-Bell, 1977, pp. 476-7). This led to calls for less myopic, restrained and subjective research and more empirical logical analysis of the established facts. However, not until 2004, in a collection of essays edited by Silke (2004), was the extent of the shortcomings fully expressed. In a paper by Schulze, a section headed “Information Underload” (Schulze, 2004, p. 161) outlines how “terrorism studies are in a Catch-22. It is illogical, unreasonable and irresponsible to continue in a manner that hinders the evolution of the discipline” (Schulze, 2004, p. 163). Reading the literature in 2004, it was clear that there was a real need for effective research, with the road being led by a handful of passionate researchers, however there was a definite sense that some research was coming up short.

5.1 Terrorism by numbers

The first and main cause of this frustration was a clear lack of any solid empirical data and an apparent reluctance of researchers (including this one) to tackle the problem quantitatively. My personal starting point was a remark by Martha Crenshaw that “even the most persuasive of statements about terrorism are not cast in the form of testable propositions [they] lack logical comparability, specification of the relationships of variables to each other, and rank order of variables in terms of explanatory power” (Crenshaw, 2004 p. .21). In response, this study set out to identify how propensity to violence might be measured, at a self-perception level using classical and original inventories to measure the metrics behind this type of behaviour. This considered a wide range of possible drivers from conformity to exposure to violence and collective identity. Regression modelling of this data returned several individual behavioural variables that had a positive relationship with propensity to violence (PTV) score.

Phase Two of this research set out to review in further detail the existing and emerging research on three of the main variables that had correlations with PTV. These included group cohesion, moral disengagement and authoritarian conformity. In a qualitative sense too, these variables stood out in the literature and first-hand accounts of radicalisation and operational terrorism. Simulations described in the previous chapters tested each of the variables in turn, reporting their relative effect on PTV score as measured using a paragraph completion simulation. The findings, reviewed in the context of the literature and existing research, clearly showed a positive correlation in each case and in several cases the results were significant. The

data was tested for parametric compliance and normal distribution, outliers were accounted for and the analysis of variance, including *post hoc* analysis reported the relative effect of each simulated condition.

In the context of the original research objective, the data demonstrated that in the first instance highly cohesive groups exhibit a collective higher propensity to violence. In radicalisation terms, this is consistent with the observations by Sageman and others who describe terrorism as a self-recruiting, acephalic entity, and that affiliation is more likely in groups. Importantly however, there is no evidence from this research that groups are more likely to take this first step towards radicalisation together, rather that they will, once radicalised, be more likely to progress to acts of violence where their cohesiveness is stronger. It does follow however, that if like the brothers and cousins involved in the 9/11 attacks, they commit acts of violence together, then recruitment or early transition might follow a similar pattern. Further empirical evidence showed that the effect of being entered into a group, pre-existing or otherwise, affected the PTV score. Participants in all simulations exhibited an increased propensity to violence from before the simulation. Although, this dropped in the post-simulation and re-test. The effect of the group returned a higher average that before the simulation. In other words, being part of a group creates a collective impression on decision making which continues beyond the lifespan of the group. This effect is amplified in groups with a pre-existing bond. Further empirical measures applied in the three experimental scenarios above which have wider implications were the Integrative Complexity (IC) scores for each group during the simulation. The main finding is that IC scores were lowest for the authoritarian

violent group. This was followed by the authoritarian non-violent group. The other groups discourse increased in complexity as they became less cohesive. This empirical evidence indicates that where the 'Participant 5' condition was applied a similar effect for promoting violence or passivism was created as the confederate research controlled and oppressed the bias of group discourse. This is consistent with classical conformity experiments including Milgram. It also intuitively (although not scientifically) follows that the confederate promoting peace may employ less aggressive language and therefore return a slightly higher IC score. This was the case during the simulations, but was not significant.

The other interesting result for IC scoring was in the relatively high IC score for the visual low cohesion group presented with additional vocabulary to inform their discourse. The expectation had been that moral disengagement stimulus would have a reductionist effect on the group discourse and lower IC score. This was not the case. However, this group was also non-cohesive and this may be the driver for a higher IC score. It is outside the scope of this study but would be a critical addition to further work on group stimulus and discourse analysis.

The results also indicate that there is an effect when the role of traditional recruitment and radicalisation is compared to the proposed new social network approach to extremist affiliation. More traditional research and practical case studies mirror some of the findings from classical studies which show charismatic leadership and authority have the most profound and lasting effect on individual propensity to violence. From the simulations here and other observations, the

behaviour of the cohesive groups is such that the decision making process happened according to a pre-arranged hierarchy. The dynamics and relationships with these groups are already pre-established. As in any familiar relationship, this reduces the requirement for some of the normal social protocols and can be reflected in dialogue. Members of the group can anticipate the views of others and often have a pre-determined hierarchy. This hierarchy and other protocols may have been established over a significant time period, in the case of siblings and blood relations. This can have two effects, both of which are supported by the data. Firstly, that the integrative complexity score reduces as the group becomes more cohesive. This indicates that there is a faster decision making protocol within the group, therefore discourse becomes more binary. Secondly, there may be components of some individual social identify traits that require that they maintain their position in the group hierarchy. This has effect of an authority figure in the group with control over the discourse. However, this is naturally occurring and there may be more than one leader in the groups so the effect appears less that in the simulated authority group.

5.2 Reductionism³

Jenkins (2001) contends that “cold-blooded mass murder requires cold-blooded analysis” (Jenkins, 2001, pp. 1-14). The empirical data described above responds to this in part showing that there is a cause and effect between environmental variables and propensity to violence, and that this relationship is significant in some cases.

There is a danger however, that the interpretation of data can bleed into inference.

³ Note: Reductionism is an approach to understanding complex things by simplifying (or reducing) them to their most basic parts”. The term is used in this thesis to illustrate that in simplifying complex conceptual problems runs the risk of omitting the more subtle aspects of the problem which are in fact critical to its interpretation.

Above I have tried to summarise the facts as they are reported in each section, but any assumptions or inferences outside of this must be carefully considered. A combination of approaches is required to understand the phenomenon of terrorism holistically. One of the fundamental problems I have faced during this research is my personal assertion to those with whom I have interacted since 2005, that I am resisting attempts to explain why Muslims bomb their own people on buses in Britain. I reached one main conclusion from this conversation that informed and shaped my research. Principally, that a great deal of research (by no means all) has a definite bias, which is not necessarily empirically based, that make assumptions about religion and cultural ethnicity as a driver of terrorist or political violence. When the research looks to the popular theories and groups to explain any political behaviour, violence or otherwise, there is an obvious risk that it becomes infected with pre-conceived ideas. The point here is not that this approach to research is incorrect but that it incorrectly pre-supposes certain characteristics are present which help to explain behaviour. In other words, part of the explanation about why Muslims in the UK become terrorists will always take account of the fact that they are Muslim. There may be factors associated with this but it could be considered a confounding variable in the diagnosis of pure behavioural factors that drive violence. The design of my research has therefore attempted to remove this bias and isolate the behavioural aspects of terrorism as distinct from pre-existing characteristics. There are clear complexities with all types of behavioural research with overlapping influences and causal factors; this includes demographic and ascriptive characteristics. These findings from this research have been considered and accounted for these but this aspect of the research was secondary to the variables

tested for. The decision to conduct research using a 'normal' population in this was driven both by the desire to isolate the behavioural aspects and also because it allowed for higher sample access. The emerging phenomenon in research around short-term radicalisation amongst a native population is also supported by this aspect of the methodology.

A further aspect of this argument around reductionism is the drive for objectivity.

Some critics of the research in this field feel that in response to terrorism's profile as a political and social concern and the increase in terrorist activity, there were literally hundreds of 'thought pieces' that speculated about the infamous 'root causes' of terrorism. These have no empirical grounding but offered explanations about the narcissistic and psychopathic nature of terrorists. These approaches touch on the desire to create a monstrous threat which is more media hype than real danger.

Research in the field must build collaboratively and enhance existing knowledge, according to many critics this is dependent on how research findings are received and whether the subject is so emotive (or has been created that way) that governments, law enforcement, media, funding bodies and so on are influenced by what they want to hear. This idea is certainly consistent with some of the conclusions reached by Western government funded research projects which were criticised for being overly subjective. The drive for objectivity has been cited in this field as controversial and there are obstacles to research with this principle. Chief Constable, Ronnie Flanagan described the efforts to understand the terrorist activity in Ulster commenting "for me, understanding [such activity] comes dangerously close to authorising, sanctioning and approving" (Flanagan, 1999). The issue here is that the

nature of terrorism, particularly if it is current violence, encourages retributive feelings which significantly hamper objectivity when trying to reach the root causes of the problem. Perceptions can become extreme and this infects the way that research is conducted or interpreted. A useful way to understand the implications of this problem is to consider the aspects of moral disengagement that were reviewed earlier in this thesis. Those mechanisms, used in the military and by terrorists to dehumanise the enemy, also apply in this context. Angry governments, ordinary people and the media seek to demonise those engaging in terrorism and their apparent deviation from normal moral behaviour. This can push responsive research in the wrong direction and sublimates the traditional warfare mantra of understanding the enemy. The purpose of this chapter is to consider the implications of this and other research in understanding terrorism but also to contend that 'root causes' are not necessarily pre-disposed. This is one of the major conclusions of this research however this may be undermined by this problem of reactionary and biased investigation. For example, Lacqueur (2001) remarked soon after the attacks on the twin towers that:

“Madness, especially paranoia, plays a role in contemporary terrorism. Not all paranoiacs are terrorists, but all terrorists believe in conspiracies by the powerful, hostile forces and suffer from some form of delusion and persecution mania...The element of madness plays an important role [in terrorism], even if many are reluctant to acknowledge it” (Lacquer, 2001, p. 71-82).

In the context of other research, which has maintained and proven beyond reasonable doubt that those engaging in terrorism generally operate logically and rationally and are not 'mad', there are potentially serious consequences to this type of reactive precursor to research. This research had operated on the proviso that terrorism is caused by a number of factors, but it is clear that its prevention must emerge from an understanding of why individuals and groups rationally might choose violence as a vehicle for change. This has implications for how researchers design and choose to interpret data, which must be where possible, inferential as well as descriptive.

The method of data collection can also be a danger in the context of reductionism. For research in any field to progress, it is important that original data is produced and that analysis goes beyond the descriptive. Inferential analysis of data has been employed here as far as realistically possible building on existing literature and research and trying to break new ground. This is in part a response to the assertion by several scholars that researchers in this field were failing to generate substantively new data or knowledge, and were regurgitating old material. The research findings reported here build on existing findings and assumptions about human behaviour as it relates to violent behaviour. This approach on one hand addresses some of the concerns around the question of original data but also around problems with sampling. As Silke (2001) explains, it is expected that for hard to reach samples, like active terrorists, opportunity sampling is common. For this research, opportunity sampling was not required and although not entirely random (for reasons of group cohesion), the sample was fairly large allowing inferences to be

drawn about a wider population. It is important re-emphasise that the research makes no claim to have tested actual terrorists; only that based on existing information, it tests how a normal population would react in a potential extremist situation. Based on modern short-term and 'home-grown' radicalisation and emerging theories about the relative rationality, normal pathology and logic of those engaging in terrorism, this seemed a sensible approach. Silke goes on to say that "terrorism research is not in a healthy state. It exists on a diet of fast-food research: quick, cheap, ready-to-hand and nutritionally dubious" (Silke, 2001 p. 6). He contends that there is a lack of researchers in the field generally and those that do conduct research tend to do so alone and because of these pressures produce work that is based on less-time consuming methodologies. This work has necessarily evolved since its inception in an attempt to respond to these perceived shortcomings. In particular, terrorism research has been viewed by its most severe critics as contributing only by offerings from other disciplines and driven by the topical nature of the issue. As Merari bluntly puts it, research regards a "singular aspect of the problem, ignorant of the complex and heterogeneous nature of terrorism" (Merari, 2001, p. 69). The events of September 11 made a great deal of funding available and an appetite for further research, but much like the study of organised crime (which obviously has an overall higher net cost both in terms of finance and lives lost) it has not yet become a discipline of study as it seemed it would. One of the main conclusions of this research and wider review of the subject matter contends that whether or not terrorism continues to attract research, political and media interest, the factors that can be seen to contribute to its growth and the mechanism by which it is organised will continue to be a threat. Understanding the

conditions that harbour this threat can only be achieved when reactive and reductionist research practices are diminished or replaced by a desire to objectively understand the genesis of political violence and terrorism, both illegal and state-sponsored.

This idea about isolating the drivers of violence, where moral or immoral, legal or illegal has shaped this research from the outset. Much of the existing research wrestled with the definitional concepts until some papers began to acknowledge that with terrorism *per se*, it is virtually impossible to reach an agreed single definition. Jenkins described this 'definitional swamp' as being an obstacle to asking the most important question – why? Each of the three main areas of examination in this thesis: cohesion, disengagement, and conformity represent some of the key building blocks of what drives and facilitates political violence and terrorism. Although, these 'variables' may be enhanced or influenced by other factors, they can nonetheless operate in any context and, I have argued, are powerful enough to do so without the enhancement of ascriptive or other pre-dispositional factors. Examples of modern terrorism involving rapid and clean slate radicalisation support this idea. That is, radicalisation of individuals from scratch as could be seen in experiments conducted by Zimbardo and Milgram. The findings of this research are far less profound than either of these two classic studies but it does serve to demonstrate that the cause and effect relationship, notionally and according to data obtained, still operates irrespective of the definitional labels which attempt to describe the objective of the violence. Consider Chomsky's paradox: "We must recognize that by convention – and it must be emphasized only by convention – great power use and the threat of

the use of force is normally described as coercive diplomacy and not as a form of terrorism [though it commonly involves] the threat and often use of violence for what would be described as terroristic purposes were it not great powers pursuing the very same tactic” (Chomsky, 2001, p. 16).

I have attempted through the course of developing my research question, to extricate the empirical methodology and findings from this complex discourse but on review of the definitional or perspectives around terrorism, it is clear that this discourse and it’s application in research, media and politics forms the main obstacle to an inherently meaningful understanding of the terrorism. Fundamentally, this means that the motivations, root causes, mechanisms of political violence are legitimised, and de-legitimised throughout this discourse with definitional rhetoric contaminating any attempt to identify its component parts. Franks (2005) explains: “Terrorism is an essentially contested concept” (Franks, 2005, p. 1) and this has been the major obstacle in explaining and understanding it. He continues “As a result of the apparent confusion around the understanding and definition of terrorism, the study of terrorism has become pre-occupied with the constant debate that revolves around what actually constitutes terrorism and how to counter it” (Franks, 2005, p. 1). A degree of definitional posturing results from this debate which is perpetuated by the high profile and emotive nature of the subject itself. Consider the following policy implications in the context of a conflict between two ‘terrorists’.

5.3 Policy Implications - Osama vs. Obama

Emerging from this research is some evidence that individuals can be influenced to think differently in the context of how they perceive different levels of violence and how acceptable they regard violence as a medium for effecting social change or achieving particular political objectives. At the very least, this evidence that opinions can be amended or altered in a short time frame is a positive indication about what might be possible in this field over time. If these mechanisms of influence, regardless of how subtle, can be used to incite violence, then perhaps they can be applied to reverse transgression to violent behaviour. I would like to consider this possibility and potential resultant policy implications in the context of a wider international view, before considering how this might specifically apply to the UK.

“Mr Obama said he had been briefed last August on a possible lead to Bin Laden's whereabouts. He authorised the operation last week once he determined there was enough intelligence to take action. ‘It was far from certain, and it took many months to run this thread to ground,’ Mr Obama said. On Sunday, US forces said to be from the elite Navy Seal Team Six undertook the operation in Abbottabad, 100km (62 miles) north-east of Islamabad. US officials said Bin Laden was shot in the head after resisting. Mr Obama said ‘no Americans were harmed’. US media reports said that the body was buried at sea to conform with Islamic practice of a burial within 24 hours and to prevent any grave becoming a shrine. The man responsible for planes turned missiles and the worst terrorist attack in history is dead. So the war on terrorism is over right? Wrong. 90,000 documents revealed by Wikileaks, possibly 900,000 civilian casualties, Abu Ghraib torture and a still operational Guantanamo

prison. If the CIA knew nothing of bin Laden's whereabouts (which seems improbable) then withholding their information from the Pakistani intelligence services was a flagrant violation of the Pakistani government's authority. We might ask ourselves how we would be reacting if Iraqi commandos landed at George W. Bush's compound, assassinated him, and dumped his body in the *Atlantic*." (MSNBC, 2011)

Several commentators have long speculated about whether, the capture of bin Laden would spell the end of terrorism. However, much like the removal of Hussein, Gadhafi and so on, a perceived dangerous cause may seem temporarily acephalic or leaderless but the underlying problems and unrest, and perceived injustice still remains. This is a slightly simplistic view of the problem, but it serves to illustrate how short term international policy is directly reactive according to media events that have a high short-term impact but do little to affect deeper rooted issues and is further clouded in policy by the question of legitimacy. As Franks explains: "This is the conventional or 'orthodox theory' of terrorism and is based on the legitimacy of dualism that constructs non-state violence as terrorist while state violence is deemed to be legitimate" (Franks, 2005, p. 2). The relevance here is that even if a perfect policy model can pinpoint the causes of terrorism, there is a fear in this double-edged policy mandate that could legitimise non-state terrorism. In this sense, 'terrorism' has evolved as a pejorative term to claim moral legitimacy. The example of Hezbollah rhetoric in the previous chapter illustrates this point as they justify their action as morally lawful. So the door swings both ways – with each side believing right is on their side. Nothing new there but, if we consider what can be learned

from Orthodox Terrorism Theory, then the policy implications of the problem are more acutely obvious.

Comprised of three main components: functional, symbolic and ideological terrorism, Orthodox Terrorism Theory (OTT – no pun intended), it is possible to dissect what motivates different forms of terrorism and it is a contention of this author that where these ‘types’ are identical, then research into causes will not prevent violence. In this case, what is required is a fundamental revision of international policy and the way it mitigates perceived injustice. In other words, capturing bin Laden after instigating a war in Afghanistan to eliminate the problem at source, is the perceived moral equivalent of attacking the World Trade Centre and therefore has the opposite effect – It increases the likelihood of violence. A slightly better informed example of this problem is outlined by Chomsky when he was asked if the ‘war on terror’ was winnable. He replied that there are lawful approaches to respond to terrorism and cites the example of the US invasion of Nicaragua in the 1980s as an uncontroversial example (based on the international rulings). He summarizes the violent assault by the US on Nicaragua in which tens of thousands were killed and the subsequent economic sanctions imposed “which made a small country isolated by a vengeful and cruel superpower...more severe even than the tragedies in New York. They did not respond by setting off bombs in Washington. They went to the World Court, which ruled in their favour” (Chomsky, 2001, pp. 24-25). Now, Chomsky is not known for his support of American Imperialism, but it is nonetheless tempting to subscribe to his logic and without question, this research, written from a western perspective is inevitably in part seduced by both sides of the

argument. It is this fact that I feel hampers objective research most profoundly and one that I have attempted to account for in the design and presentation of my research. These biases also infect policy development. Research that attempts therefore to consider the contributions of environment and circumstance, and separate these from pre-existing ideas about 'root' or indigenous causes of political violence may help to develop more objective policy which is more widely applicable. Indeed, one of the more important general observations about research approaches in this area is the tendency to build a research model from the perspective of one or the other side of the conflict or conflicts in question. Schmid and Jongman, (1988, p. 179) warn against this explaining that while, popularity with decision makers may be diminished if there are no obvious partisan benefits or specific angles, neutrality, where it can be achieved, improves the contribution significantly.

Orthodox terrorism, the language of which has permeated much of the debate over the last few years has three main components listed that fulfil different functions. Franks argues that "these definitions...of discourse whilst comprehensively explaining how terrorism works and what it is intended to achieve, does little to explain why it occurs" (Franks, 2005, p. 7). Franks calls for the discipline of terrorism research to utilise a more –multi-tiered or hybrid framework or "alternative theoretical approach" (Franks, 2005, p. 20) to develop a more sophisticated understanding of what causes this type of violence. This is a drive towards looking more holistically at the subject and is a consideration which I hoped has shaped the principles on my research.

Another distinct but interesting comparison that might open possibilities for shaping policy development relates to the Aronson (1978) study. This different, but neighbouring topic area is based on the concept of the 'jig-saw classroom' whereby school classes can be divided first into 'expert groups', each of which is responsible for learning how to deal with one sector of a problem; and the class is then re-divided into parallel whole-topic groups, each of which has one representative from each of the expert groups. The system motivates everyone in the class to learn the material rather than to compete with one another. Results are typically better than with traditional teaching both in terms of how the material is learned but also in terms of inclusiveness whereby prejudice against low performing pupils, or those from minority groups disappears. Although not directly relevant, this procedure hints as to social structures in which terrorism or bullying is less likely to occur. This serves as a good example of where the principle and findings of simulated experimental research can be applied in conjunction to develop more effective policy based on evidence and not speculation. Aronson's work was widely acclaimed and not disputed but was not adopted wholesale in schools on the basis of total inertia. Research findings therefore require weight and supporting parallel data that promote general principles with specific applications. It is important to note that in this context, even negative findings can make a contribution here in the sense that they rule out, either in a general or a particular context the likely importance of some otherwise plausible variables. Similarly, techniques like Integrative Complexity and concepts of 'Mortality Salience' (which is discussed below) can help tackle some of the bigger obstacles faced by terrorism research in terms of policy provisions and influence. In particular, these types of mechanism, applied in conjunction with other

qualitative and empirical research are perhaps more in tune with the lower echelons of civil service local government, than with law makers and ministers in parliament, and critically offer them a metric by which they can monitor and consider policy initiatives as they emerge, are tested and either become staples of cultural and embedded counter-terrorism policy and thinking, or are discarded in favour of more dynamic approaches. In this way, this type of research also identifies what more is needed in an operational context to maximise the contribution of empirical and qualitative research in this field. This is a major possible objective of future research which is the focus of the last portion of this discussion. However, in order to explore future opportunity it is critical to learn from the mistakes of current research and its limitations with a view to eradicating these as far as possible going forward.

5.4 Limitations

One of the more complex and significant limitations with this research lies with the sampling procedure used. As eluded to earlier, It is notoriously difficult to get access to participants with real life experience or engagement with the type of behaviour explored in this research. Where it is possible, and there is some reference to this in opportunities for future research, potential participants are variously secretive, imprisoned or dead. Any research with these radicalised individuals is often by necessity, post-hoc or, in the case of primary accounts, retrospective. Where research does capture this type of data, there is an automatic and natural bias to assess behaviour according to previous actions, back stories and ascriptive or demographic profiles. This approach focuses on reviewing the back story for clues to

behavioural trends and motivations behind violence. This study was designed to measure behaviour in a current and real-time environment using a simulation, but this raised some intrinsic issues. By focussing on obtaining a sample with specific characteristics e.g. related by blood, validity brought by a truly random sample was diminished with the associated problem that analysis, at least in the current remit of the project, neglected the pre-existing characteristics of the sample. The assumption, based on recruitment process and place (corporate and public sector charity organisations) was that the risk of extreme behaviour would be diminished, but however diminished, this was an assumption and not without its drawbacks. Principally, the issue here is the absence of any real test for the effect of any previous exposure to group violence or behavioural typology and if this information had been collated more rigorously, the issue remains un-accounted for in the data analysis. I would like to incorporate this aspect as a central angle in any future research, including testing for effect where there is pre-exposure to violence against this existing data set. Other more basic issues with sampling created a data set derived from in several cases, self-selecting participants which also carry the risk of confounding factors. One of the most fundamental issues here is the impact of sampling on the general conclusion. If the point is that anyone can be radicalised i.e. it is not the profile but the person that drives the behaviour, then this argument is made stronger if similar behaviour can be eliminated in the groups currently the target of such suspicions. Or to put it another way, demonstrate that the groups currently under suspicion of this behaviour type, are no more likely to have a high PTV score than the sample studied here. Any future studies would require more

rigorous analysis of these demographics and a larger sample size to ensure statistical reliability while still achieving the types of groups required.

Also in the data analysis is the risk of overlap comparing for effect size using a global mean, i.e. there are elements of the analysis (although not all) where single conditions or variables are compared with all participants in the sample, some of whom may have been subject to alternative variable conditions.

Throughout the literature review and other reference to research, there are frequent examples of how these theories operate in practice, or historical terms. From Al Qaeda to the IRA, there are similarities in the behaviour type and scenario that can lead to violent group action. Indeed it is these themes that helped me and others refine research questions in the hope that they are firstly the right questions and secondly, yield some answers. Either way, what is required and is not sufficiently explored in this research, is an attempt to trace back the findings from these simulations to determine if they correspond to the original behaviour types that spawned the questions in the first instance. One instructive way to address this would be by exploiting more effectively the existing supply of Integrative Complexity Analysis on some of the discourse available in the interview transcripts and publications, web pages and propaganda videos of extremist groups to establish a two-way link between behaviour evidence to a research question, and back again.

Similarly, another under-exploited aspect of this research conceivable relates to the underuse of qualitative analysis. Included in the original proposal for this research

was a heavy qualitative element. Grounded Theory and Discourse Analysis had been set as the principle methodology for exploring the, perhaps more subjective possibilities about the 'root causes of terrorism' and there were certainly sufficiently examples to follow. In the interim, however, both the College and the field of research more generally placed a rapidly growing emphasis on the need for empirical data and statistical power. This led to the data outputs contained here at the expense of the more qualitative elements. Both Grounded Theory and Discourse analysis would have contributed significantly, enriching and supporting the data and perhaps providing a fuller picture of the mechanisms at work in the groups tested here. Future research would benefit greatly from the contribution of this type of analysis.

The scope of this project is another factor that may limit this research. This may have some overlap with a section on opportunities for developing future research and is also a matter, to some extent, of circumstance but on one hand the scope of this project is narrow in its focus on a few key variables and on the other too broad e.g. in its inevitably restricted approaches. To define better, the implication of this, it is important to consider how well research like this can contribute to or inform policy on the subject. In some respects, initial research by its nature must be broad to open the possible opportunities for narrowing scope in the future. This paper reviews the literature and identified three main variables for testing. One of the frustrations that can result from this is a sub-optimal balance between comprehensive, inclusive research and detailed findings that can help inform the finer demands of operational

policy and procedure development. I don't think this study always achieves the best balance but future research might help redress this.

There are also some related issues in the balance between the theoretical and real research environments. The data so far has supported the hypotheses that the three variables tested in this thesis have some causal effect on the propensity to violence in a simulated environment. It is also possible to contend without straying into conjecture too far that the effects experienced by the participants throughout the experiment were real. That is to say, degrees of cohesion effects group collective discourse and although this does not make action more violent *per se*, the processes of conformity and hierarchy in the group on one hand drive stronger members to become more extreme and on the other pull weaker members along. This effect was also observed where authority pressure and rhetoric was applied also to drive complicity among group members. In both the conditions, the mechanisms of moral re-alignment were also present and were also seen to operate in this condition where there was neither pre-existing cohesion, nor authority. What is not clear from these theoretical findings is whether these effects could be seen to increase the chances of participants carrying-out a violence act in reality. This is one of the limitations of this study, indeed is a limitation for this type of research question in general as it becomes extremely difficult to measure safely or in an experimental environment that is sufficiently believable. For reasons set out earlier in the literature review, particularly on authority and conformity, it the realism of these types of simulation that participants can be most sceptical about. Milgram set out to test for obedience to authority but may in fact have tested for conformity as his

participants may have 'played along' aware of the artificial nature of the experiment. Indeed earlier incarnations of the present study had sought to test what would happen at this point where theoretical violent tendencies are tested for real. The simulation was at best weak, fairly poorly conceived and detracted from the findings of the three main linked experiments. The potential to devise a larger scale simulation akin, at least in concept, to the Stanford Prison Experiment and Milgram's obedience simulations, is something reviewed as part of the future considerations for research later in this chapter.

Also within the limitations of scope is the question of types of violence or exceptional categories of terrorism that may not conform to the more general processes set out in this thesis. One of the more popular aspects of terrorism research focuses on suicide terrorism. There are points during this thesis that touch on the concept of this type of terrorism. Death in this respect being the end itself as much as any collateral damage that goes with it. Implicit in some of the more violent options presented to participants in the simulation, is the idea that members of their group, including themselves, may be killed in the pursuit of their cause, although suicide bombing is not specifically mentioned. One reason for this was that, as a study about group behaviour, the simulation was designed to assess how individuals think as a part of a group. However, the simulation could have accounted better for the possibility that members of a group driven by personal or collective membership motives might, in the context of much of the literature, choose martyrdom over long-term struggle, arguing, as they might, that it is more popular, and more effective.

The main data research in this thesis is derived from the literature and research in this field to date and from the findings of an initial pilot study about individual perceptions of violence. The main findings are based on three linked studies, analysed using one-way ANOVA. One of the limitations statistically therefore is that further analysis could be conducted to further corroborate the findings or identify different relationships between the variables and establish better the statistical power of these findings. For example, SPSS does not routinely provide an effect size and although the post-hoc tests presented here were sufficient to see the effect sizes on PTV score, it was necessary to conduct manual calculations to produce a between group effect size (R^2).

Further to external feedback, the results sections have been amended to incorporate some narrative and additional data (included in the appendices p. 278), which review the differences between sub-groups in the different conditions. Although, the data shows there to be no real difference due to an improved design in future research could usefully explore effects at this level further including individual variations within sub-groups.

Another significant factor to note here is that not all groups were able to reach a consensus score. The original design of the study while primarily focused on the effect of the group on the individual score also requested that groups reach a consensus to test for this collective effect. In total 4 groups in the high cohesion group and 4 groups in low cohesion visual failed to agree a consensus. All other conditions had one group that did not reach a consensus. This data is included in the appendices (p. 278) but observations during the simulations identified that in several

cases the consensus was not unanimous. On one hand, this in itself could be regarded as evidence of control by some group members and coalescence by others in so far as this type of behaviour occurs regularly in group settings. However, participants here focussed more on their own scoring and seemed to largely disregard the instruction to reach consensus.

Further to this, the design of the group simulation could be improved to more clearly delineate the types of conditions and variables being tested, which could be more effectively isolated. The design, developed with the difficulties of sampling in mind, uses 159 participants to test the overall effect of three key variables. In this way, for example, participants tested in the authority condition are compared overall with mean score from high cohesion group although the variable measured is separate. In practice, the mean score comparisons are still based on *between* participants analysis i.e. each participant is only tested under a single condition which is then compared to another single condition, but this could have unquestionably been made clearer with each group isolated more effectively. Some of these issues and limitations could be addressed going forward.

5.5 Possible future research

Importantly, this approach has allowed me to draw specific conclusions around how these definitional issues and obstacles can be removed to leave hard facts about the conditions in which this type of behaviour manifests itself. The preceding chapter attempted to isolate key variables, identified from first principles in a series of simulations. The main emergent finding shows the effect and interdependence of

four conditions that facilitate a transition to violence, or a minimal basic framework for triggering, promoting and sustaining the radicalisation process.

By removing the alleged pre-dispositional factors, although this is not entirely possible, the effects of these four interconnecting variables returned a significant correlation with an increased propensity to violence. As Zimbardo (2006) maintains, the 'normal' participants in his Stanford prison experiment, were not (as far he could possibly know) pre-disposed to any form of violence or in-out group tendencies. Neither were they formed of pre-existing groups with any established rhetorical mechanisms. Other than the identities they were allocated, they were not influenced by authority figures. The environment in which they found themselves and the suggestion about their simulated roles however, created an in-group attachment, a collective identity which was able to quickly re-define their moral regulations and commit serious acts of violence. The findings from the previous chapter also provide evidence that interplay (similar to the one witnessed in Stanford) generated a statistically significant effect in a sample of 159 'normal' participants over a period of 1 hour. In each isolated condition, there was an effect which saw participants' individual propensity to violence increase from their original position, through their experience in a group, which although reduced, was sustained post simulation. There was a reported effect for authoritarian conformity (the most powerful mechanism), group cohesiveness, and moral disengagement stimulus. The overall mean score in each condition for all groups⁴ increased from $m=2.9$ prior to simulation to $m=4.2$ during the simulation. It fell to $m=3.8$ post simulation. This

⁴ The propensity to violence was scored using a 7 point inventory (Wray, 2006)

research considered the impact of these three key situational factors on individual propensity to violence. The design was to test the effect of these factors, combined or otherwise, on a 'normal' population to isolate the key variables and reduce the effect of any patterns of development that pre-dispose the individual to violence. However, the concept of the 'normal' is an aspirational one. All individuals taking part in these simulations have a history, some of which will (according to several schools of thought) make the individual more likely to engage in violence. A minority of participants indicated that they had had some previous exposure to violence and incitement through religious mechanisms but these were largely contained to the high cohesion groups (although not all of them). It is more likely that established high cohesion groups will have a shared history and experiences that potentially have an epidemic effect throughout that group structure. This type of discourse and ascriptive analysis forms part of the future research requirements identified outside the scope of this current thesis but is something I feel can be developed on a larger scale which may serve to address some of the limitations set out in the previous section and build on some of the positives of this research. As mentioned above in relation to policy, more weight is required in driving this field of research onward bringing together innovative more realistic research techniques to identify behaviour trends, the conditions which breed these trends and how they can be interrupted. To achieve this effectively, it is my contention that the focus of research should be on exploiting multiple experimental approaches to generate a holistically constructed view of political violence, terrorism and its drivers, players, and circumstances. The objective would be to utilise aspects of more realistic, larger scale simulation techniques, integrative complexity and observational analysis, which would also

account for pre-existing profile and personality characteristics. As far as ethics would allow, a Stanford prison experiment-style simulation would allow for several of these techniques to be applied simultaneously. Structured analysis could review weighted metrics to establish the relative contribution of several of these factors and critically, how they operate together in a variety of circumstances.

One of the greatest limitations of this and other research, as outlined above is when studies are necessarily confined to one specific dynamic either by design, or necessity. These confirmatory data that can be derived alongside main research project are invaluable in building up this picture. This study incorporated integrative complexity to provide some elements of this approach and in some cases, with some success. This was by far one of the most surprising and interesting aspects of developing this research project, and developing Integrative Complexity Analysis (ICA) further in this sense would be a priority of future research. ICA is a very powerful tool for exploring how the dialogue and differentiation in group and individual communication can be interpreted more precisely. ICA allows researchers to look at discourse, written or verbal to help predict how events might unfold in particular circumstances depending on the players involved. The findings from ICA in this study were informative and the potential for exploiting this further is substantial. One of the more interesting elements of this aspect, was the way in which ICA can be used under some circumstances to corroborate other analytical findings. For example, low integrative complexity scores correspond where group dynamics and discourse is well established and therefore less differentiation is needed, or in some more hierarchical groups, allowed. Identifying this type of discourse has the potential

to at least in part confirm, how pre-established discourse must be before it begins to significantly affect group decision making and how quickly this can change. The most interesting angle here would definitely include a study of how this discourse develops over time; in other words, how quickly can a low interrogative complexity discourse be routinely created and how can it affect group behaviour.

Additionally, at the very conclusion of this research project, I was alerted also to the benefits and potential of the concept of 'mortality salience' which is one of the more recent and exciting findings about potential drivers of support for, or engagement in, among other things, terrorist associated activities and violence.

Mortality Salience is regarded as creating a worldview defence, a psychological mechanism which strengthens individuals' connection with their in-group as a defence mechanism. This can lead to an intensification of feelings of nationalism and out-group hate. A specific study conducted by Pyszczynski et al. (2006, p. 525) found that mortality salience could cause an increase in support for martyrdom and military intervention. In the context of terrorism and political violence, Pyszczynski et al. found that students who had reflected on their mortality showed preference towards people who supported martyrdom, and indicated they might consider martyrdom themselves. They also found that, especially among students who were politically conservative, mortality salience increased support for military intervention but not among students who were politically liberal.

This exciting avenue of research opens up several possibilities around furthering the understanding about what motivates violence. The present research is of course concerned with violence in the context of terrorism. To investigate degrees of commonality with other forms of (also heavily researched) violence would entail separate research programmes. The study conducted by Pyszczynski et al. is particularly relevant in the context of how my research could be progressed in the future, firstly because it tests the effect of manipulated attitudinal variables in a similar simulated environment and secondly because it uses compatible statistical analysis approaches yielding similar results. Specifically, within the remit of terror management theory, Pyszczynski et al. found that “people who would not normally condone violent attacks on others can be motivated to support acts of aggression and sometimes even take up arms themselves when their need for protection from existential fear is heightened and they are confronted with an out-group that explicitly or implicitly challenges core aspects of their cultural worldview” (Pyszczynski et al., 2006, p. 525). The most significant finding in the work by Pyszczynski et al. which corresponds in part to some conclusions reached in this study relates to the universal effect or application of mortality salience i.e. thinking about death increases the likelihood of members of both sides of a conflict to inflict harm on the other or as Pyszczynski et al. puts it “the same psychological inclinations that make them want to kill us, make us want to kill them” (Pyszczynski et al., 2006, p. 353). Also in the findings is the conclusion that it is not fear of war *per se* that increases the conflict support, rather it is being primed with thoughts of death on a personal level. Pyszczynski et al. maintain that this research is fairly ground-breaking. The principles of Mortality Salience and its effect is an exciting concept that I would

like to incorporate into future studies in this area particularly if the findings from my research can help to support the assertion within Terror Management Theory that increased self-esteem in this area could diminish death concerns and the effects of Mortality Salience. The critical message coming from the literature, research and studies like these is the need for collaborative work which not only evolves with the demand for empirical data but takes steps to ensure a stable and productive future and is multi-disciplinary.

5.6 The real world

Collectively, these limitations and possibilities for expanding this study in the future must have some real world application and the potential at least to offer some operational value. The argument above for isolating the drivers using simulations and non-terrorists supports a case for mechanisms of short-term radicalisation and coercive persuasion and hopefully indicates that in understanding the effects of these tactics or processes, there is potential for interrupting them or addressing the core issues that make them effective. One major advantage of the research method described above is in its ability to track this process in its entirety. As described above, criticism is often levied against terrorism research because in the majority of cases it is *post-hoc*. Research and interview and transcripts have examined the accounts and recall by terrorists themselves and those engaged in the process retrospectively. Although useful and interesting, this has two main problems. Firstly, that most accounts are altered by time and self-perception. This problem might in part be amplified by the very nature of recruitment. If successful, it is likely that the fundamental rhetoric used will permeate the individual's memory and skew their

recall and perception of events. Secondly, it is difficult to measure empirically an individual's propensity to violence prior to the 'radicalisation' process. The data summarised above demonstrate that simulations of the kind designed for this research project, although not in the 'real world', do provide an indication of behaviour prior to 'radicalisation'. This hopefully lends some originality to the work. Logical future research in this context should also attempt to marry this simulated data with data and observations from the real world. This objective was outside of the original scope of this research, but as I have built up contacts in this field since 2005, there have been increasing possibilities to pursue this approach. Throughout the lifespan of this project to date, I have collected some qualitative data from real world case scenarios. In future research, I would like to incorporate these in the context of the findings presented here, the opportunities to explore new techniques further and strengthen the connection between the theoretical and real world scenarios.

From the research, literature and data reviewed here, it is clear that much more research is needed to further explore the factors that shape political violence and terrorism. The model presented compares with more traditional views of what drives the radicalisation process. The factors which drive terrorism today are less about traditional radicalisation from pre-existing characteristics and recruitment and more about modernised channels of self-recruitment. Suleaman (2005) sums this up well: "To become a radical Islamist and someone who hated the West, Khan never needed to go abroad. He didn't need a radical imam, or a separatist education because he

had neither. Some videos, a group of likeminded friends and a spare room in someone's house, was probably all it took" (Suleaman, 2005).

This assertion that also appears at the beginning of this thesis reflects an important theme of this research, that while the traditional mechanisms of radicalisation are less prolific or necessary, the components remain the same. "Videos" representing moral disengagement, likeminded friends providing collective identity and group cohesion and an individual sympathetic, accommodating and supportive of your cause is merely a replacement of training, imam or separatist education. There was a definite sense in some of the literature and data presented here and some that is in reserve for future work, that this is a process that will continue to evolve.

One of the outcomes of this experience including some contact with extremist groups and individual ideology and one of the (until now) private motivations for this research was the overwhelming sense that I began to feel increasingly sympathetic towards some of the causes (though not the methods) supported by terrorism – the extent to which this would lead to acting as a confederate is unclear, but there was a sense that not only the cause seemed, unfortunate and justified, but also that I felt emotions which I recognised from my own political activity in Cuba in the 90s, which was largely anti-American and non-violent, but nonetheless had a profound effect on my psychology the sentiment of which has remained with me throughout my life.

There is a clear call in this field of research, which I hope this work echoes, that further empirical analysis of real case studies and international collaborative working could provide a significant advantage, not just in the operational understanding of

terrorism and political violence but in understanding the factors that can lead to long or short term radicalisation. If the aim of this type of research is peace, and I believe that it is, then merely interrupting the radicalisation process or the subsequent execution of violence is not enough. If the rhetoric justifying violence can be effectively applied to anyone, anywhere, then it must be convincing. Understanding how this works to promote violence, will unlock our ability to offer an alternative. As Dr Herbert Blumberg told me – “there’s always a better way” (Blumberg , 2006).

RW 19.07.2012

References

- Anderson, Benedict R. O'G. (1991). *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism* (Revised and extended ed.). London: Verso. pp. 224. ISBN 9780860915461. <http://books.google.co.in/books?id=4mmoZFtCpuoC>. Retrieved 5 September 2010.
- Ansari, A. (2002). *The role of religious fundamentalism in terrorist violence: A social psychological analysis* 2007, Vol. 19, No. 3, Pages 253-262
- Appleby, S. R. (1997). *Spokesman for the despised: Fundamentalist leaders of the Middle East.*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Arendt, H. (1963). *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil.* (Rev. ed. New York: Viking, 1968).
- Aronoff, M. (2006). *Contested Visions of Israeli Collective Identity,*” Workshop on “Contentious Politics in Israel: Past and Present,” Antwerp University, October 19-20, Antwerp, Belgium.
- Aronson, E. et al. (1978). *The jigsaw classroom.* Oxford, England: Sage.
- Aronson, J. (2002). *Contending with group image: The psychology of stereotype and social identity threat.* *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 34, 379-440.
- Asch, S.E. (1952). ‘Effects of group pressure upon the modification and distortion judgements’. In G.E. Swanson, T.M. Newcomb, and E.L. Hartley, (Eds), *Readings in Social Psychology*, (2nd ed. pp. 2-11) New York, Holt, Rineheart and Winston.
- Asch, S. E. (1955). Opinions and social pressure. *Scientific American*, 193, 3-35.
- Bandura, A. (1990). Mechanisms of moral disengagement. In W. Reich (Ed.), *Origins of terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind* (pp. 161-191). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bandura, A. (1999). Moral disengagement in the perpetration of humanities, *Personality and Social Psychology Review*. [Special Issue of *Evil and Violence*], 3 193-20
- Bandura, A. (2004). Role of selective moral disengagement in terrorism and counterterrorism. In F. M. Moghaddam & A. J. Marsella (Eds.), *Understanding terrorism: Psychological roots, consequences and interventions* (pp. 121-150). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association Press.

- Bandura, A. (2004). The role of selective moral disengagement in terrorism and counterterrorism. In Moghaddam, F (Eds.) *Understanding Terrorism: Psychological roots, consequences and intentions* (pp. 121-150) Washington DC: American Psychological Society
- Bergensen and Hann, (2005). *New direction for terrorism research, International Journal of Comparative Psychology*, Sage Publication
- Berlet (2004). "*Christian identity: the apocalyptic style, political religion, palingenesis and neo-fascism*", *Totalitarian movements and political religions*, Vol. 5 (3), Winter, pp.469-506.
- Berlet, C. (2004). *Dehumanization and demonization*. Somerville, MA: Political Research Associates. Accessed online August 1, 2004:
http://www.publiceye.org/tooclose/scapegoating-01.html#P15_2407
- Bica, C.C (2004). *Terrorism and Response: A moral enquiry into the killing of non-combatants*, presented at the Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics., School of Visual Arts, New York.
- Bion, W.R. (1961). *Experiences in groups and other papers*, London Tavistock Publications.
- Blumberg, H. H. Hare A.P. and Costin, A. (2006). *Peace psychology: A comprehensive introduction*. Cambridge University Press.
- Bongar, B.M., L.M Beutler, L.E. Breckenridge, J.N., & Zimbardo, P. G. (Eds), (2006). *Psychology of Terrorism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Borum, R. & Pynchon, M. R. (1999). *Assessing threats of targeted group violence: contributions from social psychology, Behavioural Sciences and the Law.*, 17 339-355.
- Bowyer-Bell, J. (1977). Trends on terror: The analysis of political violence, *World Politics*, 29, pp. 176-7. In Schulze, F., *Breaking the Cycle: Empirical Research and Postgraduate Studies on Terrorism*. In Silke, A. (ed.) *Research on Terrorism Trend Achievements and Failures*, Krank Cass, (2004).
- Bouhana, N. (2008). *Theorising Terrorism: Terrorism as a Moral Action, A scoping study*, London, University College London
- Breakwell, G.M. (1993). *Social Representations and Social Identity: Papers on Social Representations* 2(3), 1-21

- Brewer, M. B. (1991). The social self: On being the same and different at the same time. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 17: 475-482.
- Brown, J.A.C. (1963). *Techniques of Persuasion*, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books.
- Brown, G.B., Ballard, E.J., Bluck, S., de Vries, B., Suefeld, P., & Tetlock, P.E. (1987). Coding manual for conceptual/integrative complexity, retrieved pscy UBC.
- Brown & Gaertner (2001). *Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Intergroup Processes*, John Wiley & Sons Lacqueur.
- Browning, C.R. (1992). *The Path to Genocide: Essays on Launching the Final Solution* (Canto)
- Bulliet, R. (2007). *CIAO Responds to the Terrorist Attacks against the United States A Recruiting Tape of Osama bin Laden: Excerpts and Analyses The Osama bin Laden Videotape as Propaganda*
http://www.ciaonet.org/cbr/cbr00/video/cbr_v/cbr_v_2a.html
- Burke, J. (2008). Dispatches, *The Observer Magazine*, 20 January, pp. 14-24
- Burke, J. (2004). *Al Qaeda, The true story of radical Islam*, Penguin Books,
- Campbell, A. (2007). Human Nature Abhors a Vacuum – A review of James Waller, *Becoming Evil: How ordinary people commit genocide, mass killing* (2nd ed.) Oxford University Press, Durham University www.epjournal.net – 2009.7(1):6-10
- Cavalli, L. (1987). *Charisma and Twentieth-Century Politics*. pp. 317-33 in Max Weber, *Rationality and Modernity*, edited by S. Lash and S. Whimster. London, UK: Allen and Unwin. Tetlock et al.
- Chomsky, N. (1991). in Alexander George (ed.), *Western State Terrorism*, Routledge.
- Chomsky, N. (2001). *9-11*, Seven Stories Press, New York
- Cialdini, R. B., Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1981). Attitude and attitude change. In M. R. Rosenzweig & L. W. Porter (Eds.), *Annual Review of Psychology* (Volume 32, pp. 357-404). Palo Alto, CA: Annual Review Press.
- Cialdini, R. B., & Trost, M. R. (1998). Social influence: Social norms, conformity and compliance. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, et al.. (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology*, Vol. 2 (4th ed., pp. 151-192). New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Cialdini, R.B.- N.J. Goldstein, (2004). Social influence: compliance and conformity *Annu. Rev. Psychol.*, 55 pp. 591–621,

- Coady, C.A.J. (2001). – Defining Terrorism, in Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte B. Becker (Eds), *Encyclopaedia of Ethnics, second edition* New York and London: Routledge, vol. 3
- Cohn, C. (1987). Slick'ems, glick'ems, Christmas trees and cookie cutters: Nuclear language and how we learned to pat the bomb, *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, 43 12-24
- Coogan, T. (2002). *The IRA*, Palgrave
- Cole, J & Cole B. (2008). *Martyrdom: Radicalisation and terrorist violence among British Muslims.*, Pennant Books
- Coleman, H.C. (2009). Discussions on group violence and other things: *FM Press* Vol 3. 326-367
- Couch A.S. and Bales, (1960). In Kritzer, Herbert M.; Hare, A. Paul; & Blumberg, Herbert H. (1974). The General Survey: A short measure of five personality dimensions. *Journal of Psychology*, 86, 165-172.
- Crenshaw, M. (1990). Questions to be answered, research to be done, knowledge to be applied in Walter Reich (eds.) *Origins of terrorism: Psychologies, Theologies, States of mind* (Cambridge University Press
- Crenshaw, M. (2004). *Attacking Terrorism, elements of the grand strategy.*, In Cronin, A.K. & Ludes J.M. (Eds), Georgetown University Press, Washington D.C.
- Crenshaw. M (1992). Current research on terrorism: The academic perspective, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 15 p1 In Ranstrop, M. (2007), *Mapping Terrorism Research, State of the Art, and Future Direction.*, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, Swedish National Defence College, Sweden
- Crenshaw, M. (1992). Decisions to use terrorism: Psychological constraints on instrumental reasoning. *International Social Movements Research*, 4, 29-42.
- Crenshaw, M. (2003). Explaining Suicide Terrorism: A Review Essay", *Security Studies*, Volume 16, Issue 1.
- Davis, J. (2003). Martyrs: Innocence, vengeance, and despair in the Middle East. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. In Moghaddam, Fathali M. (2005) The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration. *American Psychologist*, Vol 60(2), Feb-Mar, 161-169

- Dollard, J. et al. (1939). *Frustration and Aggression*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Downs, A. (1957). *Economic theory of democracy*, New York Harper
- Fein, R. A., Vossekuil, B., & Holden, G. A. (1995). Threat assessment: An approach to prevent targeted violence. *National Institute of Justice: Research in Action*, 1–7.
- Festinger, L.A. (2009). A theory of cognitive dissonance, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press (1957). In Shu et al. – Dishonest Deed, *Clear conscience: self preservation through moral disengagement and motivated forgetting*, Working Paper
- Flanagan, R. (1999). In Mulcahy, A (1999). *Visions of Normality: Peace and the Reconstruction of Policing in Northern Ireland*, Department of Criminology, Keele University, UK.
- Flesher, J. (1995). *Michigan militia founder splits with group, says it's overrun with "moderates."*. Associated Press. Weinberg.
- Franks, J. (2005). *Rethinking the roots of terrorism: Beyond orthodox terrorism theory – a new research agenda*, University of St Andrews
- Fromm, E. (1969). *Escape from freedom*. New York: Avon Books
- Gabor, T. (1994). *Everybody does it: Crime by the public*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Miller.
- Gambetta, D. (2005). "Can We Make Sense of Suicide Missions?". In G. Gambetta (ed.), *Making Sense of Suicide Missions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 259-299.HM Government.
- Gambino, R. (1999). Watergate lingo: A Language of non-responsibility. *Freedom at Issue* (No. 22), 9-9, 15-17. In Bandura A – *Moral disengagement in the perpetration of humanities*, Stanford University
- Galanter, M. (1982). Charismatic religious cults and psychiatry: An overview *American Journal of Psychiatry* groups. In C. Hendrick (Ed.), *Review of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 9 (pp. 231-256). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Goldstein (2003). *Operations: Principles and Case Studies*, ed. Goldstein, FL Air University Press, Maxwell Airforce, Base, Alabama,
- Gosling, S.D; Rentfrow, P. Swann Jr.,B. (1992). *A very brief measure of the Big-Five personality domains*, Department of Psychology, University of Texas

- Gove, M. (2006). *Celsius 7/7*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson
- Griffiths, M. (2006). *Londinistan*, Encounter Books, New York
- Gupta, D. (1990). *Towards an integrated behavioural framework for analysing terrorism: Individual motivations to group dynamics*, Department of Political Science, San Diego University.
- Gurr, T. (1972). Why men rebel (1970). In Gurr, (1972), *The Calculus of Civil Conflict*, in *Journal of Social Issues*, 29.
- Gurr, T.R. (1998). Political research on political terrorism: The State of the art and how it might be improved in Robert Slater and Michael Stohl (Eds), *Current perspectives in international terrorism*, New York, St Martin's Press
- Hanle, D.J (1989). *Terrorism: The Newest Face of Warfare.*, Pergramm-Bassey's New York
- Hardman, (1934). *The Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 14, New York Reaper
- Hoffman, B. (2008). – The myth of grass-roots terrorism – Why Osama bin Laden still matters., *Foreign Affairs*, Council for Foreign relations.,
- Horgan, J., (2008) *The social and psychological characteristics of terrorism and terrorists*, Routledge).
- Horgan and M. Taylor, (1997). *The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Command and Functional Structure*, *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9 1–32.
- Huesmann Rowell, L (2010). *How to grow a terrorist without really trying: The psychological development of terrorists from childhood to adulthood, Interdisciplinary analyses of terrorism and political aggression.*, Antonius et al.. Cambridge Scholars Publishing
- Humayun A. (2002). *Muslims in Britain* (London: Minority Rights Group International
- Huntington, S. (2011). *The Clash of Civilisations and Remaking of World Order*, Touchstone, New York
- Isenberg, D.J. (1986). Group polarization: A critical review and meta-analysis. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 50(6), Jun 1986, 1141-1151.
- Janis, I. (1977). *Decision Making*, New York, Free Press.
- Janis, I. (1982),

- . Groupthink (2nd edn. In R.G. Eccles and N. Nohria Eds., *Networks and organizations: structure, form and action*).
- Jenkins, (2001), Lesser et al. (1999). In Bergensen and Hann, (2005) New direction for terrorism research, *International Journal of Comparative Psychology*, Sage Publications.
- Klein, M. (1968). *Contributions to psycho-analysis, 1921-1945* Hogarth Press, 4th edition.
- Kramer, M. (1990). The moral logic of Hezbollah, in *Origins of terrorism: psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of Mind*, ed. Walter Reich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Krebs, V. (2001). *Unlocking Terrorist Networks.*, First Monday, (2001) <http://www.orgnet.com/hijackers.html> Bodansky, 2001.
- Kruger, A. & Maleckova, J. (2002). Education, poverty, political violence and terrorism: Is there a causal connection? *National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. w9074*. Retrieved July 9, 2002, from <http://papers.nber.org/papers/W9074>.
- Laqueur, W. (1977). *Terrorism*, Boston : Little, Brown
- Laqueur,W. (1999). *The New Terrorism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lee, F. & Peterson, C (1997). Content analysis of archival data. *Journal of consulting and clinical psychology*, 65, 959-969
- Lenin, V., In Schmid, A. (2005). *Terrorism as psychological warfare, Democracy and security*, 1: 137-146, Taylor and Routledge,
- Lewin, K. (1948). *Resolving Social Conflicts: Selected Papers on Group Dynamics*, New York, Harper Brothers.
- Levine, J. M., & Moreland, R. L. (1998). Small groups. In D. Gilbert, S. Fiske & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology* (4th ed., pp. 415±469). Boston: McGraw-Hill.. Grossman (1995).
- Lifton, R.J. (1961). *Thought reform and the Psychology of Totalism: A study of Brainwashing in China*, London, Gollancz
- Loftland, J., Stark, R., (1965). Becoming a world saver: A theory of conversation to a decent perspective, *American Sociological Review*, 30 (6) (1965).

- Lorenz (1966). *On Aggression*, (Das sogenannte Böse. Zur Naturgeschichte der Aggression, 1963.
- Maass, A., & Clark, RD, III. (1984). Hidden impact of minorities: Fifteen years of minority influence research. *Psychological Bulletin*, 95, 428-450
- Mazar, N., Amir, O., & Ariely, D. (2008). The dishonesty of honest people: A theory of self-concept maintenance. *Journal of Marketing Research*, 45, 633-644.
- McCauley, C., & Segal, M. (1987). Social psychology of terrorist groups. In C. Hendrick (Ed.), *Review of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 9 (pp. 231-256). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- McCauley, C., & Moskalenko, S. (2010). Individual and group mechanisms of radicalization. In L. Fenstermacher, L. Kuznar, T. Rieger, & A. Speckhard (Eds), *Protecting the homeland from international and domestic security threats: Current multidisciplinary perspectives on root causes, the role of ideology, and programs for counter-radicalization and disengagement*. Washington, D.C.: Topical multi-layer assessment (SMA) multi-agency and Air Force research laboratory multi-disciplinary white papers in support of counter-terrorism and counter-WMD.
- Merari, A. (2001). *Driven to death*, Psychological & social aspects of suicide terrorism, Oxford University Press
- Milgram, S. (1963). Behavioral study of obedience. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 67, 371-378.
- Milgram, S. (1974). *Obedience to authority*. New York: Harper & Row
- Moghaddam, F. M. (2005). The staircase to terrorism, A psychological explanation (Georgetown University, February – March 2005, *American Psychologist* Vol. 60 No. 2, 161-169.
- Moody, J. & White, D. R. (2003). Social cohesion and embeddedness: a hierarchical conception of social group, *Sante Fe Institute Working Papers* 00-08-049 In Fellman, P. and Wright, R. (2003). – *Modelling Terrorist Networks: Complex systems at the mid-range*.

- Mosaddeq, N. (2009). Towards a Holistic Strategy to Counter Violent Radicalisation in the United Kingdom, *Submission to the Parliamentary Committee on Communities and Local Government*, Institute for Policy Research & Development
- Author unknown: MSNBC.com May 2, 2011.
- McDoom, O. (2011). Who kills?: social influence, spatial opportunity, and participation in inter-group violence. *PSPE working papers*, 4, 2011. London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK. Lombroso, (1896), *Les Anarchistes*, Paris, 184.
- Neumann (2009). *Old and New Terrorism, Late Modernity, Globalisation and the Transformation of Political Violence*, Polity Press.
- Nozick, R. (1974). *Anarchy, the State, and Utopia*, New York: Basic Books
- Olson, M. Jr., (1965). *The Logic of Collective Action*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Pape, R. (2003). 'The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism', *American Political Science Review*, 97 (3), 343–61.
- Pareto, V. (1935). *The Mind and Society*, New York: Harcourt, Brace, edited by Livingston, A. (1935).
- Perlinger, A. And Pedhazur, A. (2010). Social Network Analysis in the study of terrorism and political violence, *Political Network Paper Archive*, Southern Illinois.
- Poole, Patrick (2009). *Jihadist recruitment Techniques are Changing: New Terrorism Trends Prompt a dramatic shift in British Government Policy*, Oxford University Press.
- Pynchon, M. R and Borum, R. (1999). Assessing threats of targeted group violence: contributions from social psychology, *Behavioral Sciences and the Law* 17: 339-355
- Pyszczynski, T. et al. (2006), Mortality Saliency, Martyrdom and Military Might: The Great Satan Versus the Axis of Evil, *PSPB*, Vol. 32 No. 4.
- Rai, M. (2006) *7/7 The London Bombings, Islam and the Iraq War*, Pluto Press
- Ramsey, P.(1961). *War and the Christian Conscience*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press).
- Ranstrop, (2006). *Mapping Terrorism Research: State of Art, Gaps and Future Direction*, Routledge Rotella.

- Ranstrop, M. (2007). *Mapping Terrorism Research, State of the Art, and Future Direction.*, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, Swedish National Defence College, Sweden
- Rapoport, D. C., & Alexander, Y. (Eds.), (1982). *The morality of terrorism: Religious and secular justification.* Elmsford, NY: Pergamon Press.
- Rawls, J, [1971] (1999). *A Theory of Justice*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
- Reid, E.O. (1993) Terrorism Research and the Diffusion of Ideas, *Knowledge and Policy*, 6.
- Ressler, S. (2006). Social Network Analysis as an approach to combat terrorism: Past present, and future research, *Homeland Security affairs*, Vol II, No2.
<https://www.hsaj.org>,
- Rotella, S. (1993). Main News, *Los Angeles Times*, Sept 23.
- Ameli, S.R. et al.. (2004). *Social discrimination: Across the Muslim Divide* (London: Islamic Human Rights Commission.
- Sageman, M. (2004). *Understanding Terror Networks*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia Press.
- Samuelson, P. A., (1954). 'The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure', *Review of Economics and Statistics* 36: 387-389 .
- Schelling, T. C. (1982). 'Thinking about Nuclear Terrorism', *International Security*, 6 (4), 61–77.
- Schelling, T In Pape, R. A. (2003). *The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, *American Political Science Review*, Vol.97, No 3 The University of Chicago, August.
- Schmid, A. P. and Jongman, A. J. (1988). *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature* (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1988).
- Senemeaud, C. & Somat, (2009). *A Dissonance arousal and persistence in attitude change*, *Swiss Journal of Psychology*, 68(1), 25-31 In Shu et al. *ibid* no.3
- Sales, L., (2007) ABC News, Posted Sept 19.
- Sherif, Muzafer W (1969). *Social Psychology*. New York: Harper & Row, Dollard (1969)

- Shu, L., Gino, F and Bazerman, M.H. (2009). *Dishonest Deed, Clear Conscience: Self-Preservation Through Moral Disengagement and Motivated Forgetting* (April 27, 2009). Harvard Business School NOM Unit Working Paper No. 09-078.
- Schulze, F. (2004). Breaking the cycle: Empirical Research and Postgraduate Studies on Terrorism. In Silke, A. (Ed.) 2004, *Research on Terrorism, Trends Achievements and Failures*, Frank Cass. London.
- Sprinzak, E (1960)., *The Process of Deligitimation: Towards a linkage theory of political terrorism in McCauley, C. (Ed.) (1990). Terrorism: Research and public policy*
- Sprinzak, E. (1988). The psycho-political formation of extreme left terrorism in a democracy: The case of the Weathermen. In Reich (ed.), *Origins of terrorism: psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind* (pp65-85). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Stein, A.
- Sprinzak, E. (1990). The psychopolitical formation of extemem left terrorism in a democracy: The case of the Weathermen. In W. Reich (Ed.), *Origins of terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind* (pp. 65-85). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Stein, A. (1988). Quiet heroes. Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys. Haslam.
- Sprinzak, E. (2001). 'The Lone Gunmen', *Foreign Policy*, Nov/Dec (127), 72–3.
- Smith, M. R. (1992). Milgram and Zimbardo Revisited: *The Capacity for Cruelty in Normal Populations*, Ninth International Conference on Multiple Personality/Dissociative States, November 13, 1992
- Silke, A. (2001). *Terrorism and Political Violence*, - Taylor & Francis
- Silke, A. (Ed). (2004). *Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures*, Routledge 2004.
- Stern, J. (2008), *The Ultimate Terrorists* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
- Suedfeld, P. & Tetlock, P. (1977) Integrative Complexity of communication in international crisis, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 21, 169 – 184.
- Suleaman, N. (2005). Biography of a bomber, *BBC Radio 4*, 16 November

- Tajfel, H. and Turner, J. (1979). A integrative theory of inetrgroup conflict in Autin, G.W. and Worchel, S. (Eds) *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, Monterey, California, Brooks/Cole.
- Tambiah, S. (1996). *Levelling Crowds: Ethno-nationalist Conflicts and. Collective Violence in South Asia*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Travis, A. (2008). MI5 report challenges views on terrorism in Britain, *Guardian*, 20 August.
- Tullock, G. (1971). The Paradox of Revolution, '*Public Choice*' 11:85-99
- Turner, J.C. (1991). *Social Influence*, Milton Keynes, Open University Press.
- Turner, J.C. Hogg. M., Oakes. P.,Reicher, S. and Wetherall, M. (1987) *Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-categorisation Theory*, Oxford, Blackwell .
- Tyler, (1994). The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration In Moghaddam, Fathali M. *The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration. American Psychologist, Vol 60(2), Feb-Mar 2005, 161-169. doi: 10.1037/0003-*
- Vikram, D. (2005). Former Grammar School boy gets 13 years for shoe bomb plot, *Guardian* 23 April p.6 2005 <<http://tinyurl.com/>>.
- Voll, J. (2007). Bin Laden and the New Age of Global Terrorism, *Middle East Policy*, Volume 8, Issue 4, pages 1–5, December 2001
- Waller (2007). *Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing*. (Oxford University Press 2007) 2nd Edition
- Watson P. (1980) *War on the mind: the Military Uses and Abuses of Psychology*, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books.
- Weber, T (1949). *The Methodology of Social Sciences*, New York: The Free Press
- Weisbach, J. (2006) *The Psychology of the Terrorist Mind*
<http://psyenglish.blogspot.co.uk/2006/01/psychology-of-terrorist-mind.html>.
- Weiviorka, M (2007). In Terrorism in Context of Academic Research, 2007 in Crenshaw, M (ed.) – *Terrorism in Context*, Pennsylvania University Press.
- Wilkstroem, P. O. H. (2009). *Situational Action Theory*, New York, Oxford University Press

- Zimbardo, P.G., Banks, W.C. Craig, H. and Jaffe, D. (1973). 'A Pirandellian prison: The mind is a formidable jailer' *The New York Times Magazine*, * April 1973, 34
- Zenker, (1895). *Anarchism* London 1895, 262.
- Zimbardo, P., (2007). *The Lucifer Effect: Understanding how good people turn evil*, Random House.

Appendices

Appendices – SPSS data output table

```
GET FILE='E:\Data\Jul 2011 data v1.sav'. SAVE OUTFILE='E:\CONFEDERATES REMOVED\no confederates Feb 12.sav' /COMPRESSED. ONEWAY presimind simscore postsimind BY grouptype /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES HOMOGENEITY BROWNFORSYTHE WELCH /PLOT MEANS /MISSING ANALYSIS /POSTHOC=TUKEY ALPHA(0.05).
```

1.0 - SPSS Output notes

Notes

	Output Created	10-Feb-2012 14:08:18
	Comments	
Input	Data	E:\CONFEDERATES REMOVED no confederates Feb 12.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	151
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing.
	Cases Used	Statistics for each analysis are based on cases with no missing data for any variable in the analysis.

	Syntax	ONEWAY presimind simscore postsimind BY grouptype /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES HOMOGENEITY BROWNFORSYTHE WELCH /PLOT MEANS /MISSING ANALYSIS /POSTHOC=TUKEY ALPHA(0.05).
Resources	Processor Time	0:00:01.297
	Elapsed Time	0:00:01.844

[DataSet1] E:\CONFEDERATES REMOVED\no confederates Feb 12.sav

2.0 All group types descriptives (confederates removed)

Descriptives

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Pre-simulation individual PTV High cohesion score	40	3.9750	1.45862
Experience cohesion	39	2.7179	1.31687
Low-cohesion (visual)	20	2.4000	1.53554
Low-cohesion (proxy)	20	2.9000	1.37267
Authoritarian (non-violent)	16	2.6250	1.36015
Authoritarian (violent)	16	2.2500	1.06458

	Total	151	2.9735	1.49197
Simulation PTV score	High cohesion	40	5.4000	1.15025
	Experience cohesion	39	3.9231	.92863
	Low-cohesion (visual)	20	4.8000	1.00525
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	20	2.4000	1.31389
	Authoritarian (non-violent)	16	2.0000	.73030
	Authoritarian (violent)	16	6.0000	.89443
	Total	151	4.2450	1.66920
Post-simulation individual PTV score	High cohesion	40	4.5000	1.66410
	Experience cohesion	39	3.5641	1.58604
	Low-cohesion (visual)	20	4.0000	1.37649
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	20	3.1000	1.25237
	Authoritarian (non-violent)	16	1.7500	.93095
	Authoritarian (violent)	16	5.8125	.91059
	Total	151	3.8543	1.74889

Descriptives

		95% Confidence Interval for Mean		
		Std. Error	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Pre-simulation individual PTV score	High cohesion	.23063	3.5085	4.4415
	Experience cohesion	.21087	2.2911	3.1448
	Low-cohesion (visual)	.34336	1.6813	3.1187
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	.30694	2.2576	3.5424

	Authoritarian (non-violent)	.34004	1.9002	3.3498
	Authoritarian (violent)	.26615	1.6827	2.8173
	Total	.12141	2.7336	3.2134
Simulation PTV score	High cohesion	.18187	5.0321	5.7679
	Experience cohesion	.14870	3.6221	4.2241
	Low-cohesion (visual)	.22478	4.3295	5.2705
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	.29380	1.7851	3.0149
	Authoritarian (non-violent)	.18257	1.6109	2.3891
	Authoritarian (violent)	.22361	5.5234	6.4766
	Total	.13584	3.9766	4.5134
Post-simulation individual PTV score	High cohesion	.26312	3.9678	5.0322
	Experience cohesion	.25397	3.0500	4.0782
	Low-cohesion (visual)	.30779	3.3558	4.6442
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	.28004	2.5139	3.6861
	Authoritarian (non-violent)	.23274	1.2539	2.2461
	Authoritarian (violent)	.22765	5.3273	6.2977
	Total	.14232	3.5731	4.1355

Descriptives

		Minimum	Maximum
Pre-simulation individual PTV score	High cohesion	2.00	7.00
	Experience cohesion	1.00	6.00

	Low-cohesion (visual)	1.00	6.00
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	1.00	5.00
	Authoritarian (non-violent)	1.00	5.00
	Authoritarian (violent)	1.00	4.00
	Total	1.00	7.00
Simulation PTV score	High cohesion	3.00	7.00
	Experience cohesion	2.00	6.00
	Low-cohesion (visual)	3.00	6.00
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	1.00	5.00
	Authoritarian (non-violent)	1.00	3.00
	Authoritarian (violent)	5.00	7.00
	Total	1.00	7.00
Post-simulation individual PTV score	High cohesion	1.00	7.00
	Experience cohesion	1.00	7.00
	Low-cohesion (visual)	1.00	6.00
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	1.00	6.00
	Authoritarian (non-violent)	1.00	4.00
	Authoritarian (violent)	4.00	7.00
	Total	1.00	7.00

3.0 Test of Homogeneity of Variances

	Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
Pre-simulation individual PTV score	.873	5	145	.501
Simulation PTV score	2.885	5	145	.016
Post-simulation individual PTV score	2.528	5	145	.032

4.0 ANOVA output at three stages of simulation

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square
Pre-simulation individual PTV score	Between Groups	59.672	5	11.934
	Within Groups	274.222	145	1.891
	Total	333.894	150	
Simulation PTV score	Between Groups	261.565	5	52.313
	Within Groups	156.369	145	1.078
	Total	417.934	150	
Post-simulation individual PTV score	Between Groups	163.967	5	32.793
	Within Groups	294.827	145	2.033
	Total	458.795	150	

ANOVA

		F	Sig.
Pre-simulation individual PTV score	Between Groups	6.310	.000
Simulation PTV score	Between Groups	48.509	.000
Post-simulation individual PTV score	Between Groups	16.128	.000

5.0 - Robust Tests of Equality of Means

		Statistic ^a	df1	df2	Sig.
Pre-simulation individual PTV score	Welch	5.954	5	55.206	.000
	Brown-Forsythe	6.488	5	117.833	.000
Simulation PTV score	Welch	57.291	5	55.631	.000
	Brown-Forsythe	50.509	5	110.460	.000
Post-simulation individual PTV score	Welch	32.579	5	58.314	.000
	Brown-Forsythe	19.469	5	137.950	.000

a. Asymptotically F distributed.

6.0 Post Hoc Tests Multiple Comparisons

Tukey HSD

Dependent Variable	(I) Group type cohesion	(J) Group type cohesion				95% Confidence Interval	
			Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Pre-simulation individual PTV score	High cohesion	Experience cohesion	1.25705 [*]	.30947	.001	.3632	2.1509
		Low-cohesion (visual)	1.57500 [*]	.37662	.001	.4873	2.6627
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	1.07500	.37662	.055	-.0127	2.1627
		Authoritarian (non-violent)	1.35000 [*]	.40679	.014	.1751	2.5249
		Authoritarian (violent)	1.72500 [*]	.40679	.001	.5501	2.8999
	Experience cohesion	High cohesion	-1.25705 [*]	.30947	.001	-2.1509	-.3632
		Low-cohesion (visual)	.31795	.37822	.959	-.7744	1.4103
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	-.18205	.37822	.997	-1.2744	.9103
		Authoritarian (non-violent)	.09295	.40828	1.000	-1.0862	1.2721
		Authoritarian (violent)	.46795	.40828	.861	-.7112	1.6471
Low-cohesion	High cohesion	-1.57500 [*]	.37662	.001	-2.6627	-.4873	

(visual)	Experience cohesion	-.31795	.37822	.959	-1.4103	.7744
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	-.50000	.43488	.860	-1.7560	.7560
	Authoritarian (non-violent)	-.22500	.46126	.997	-1.5572	1.1072
	Authoritarian (violent)	.15000	.46126	1.000	-1.1822	1.4822
Low-cohesion (proxy)	High cohesion	-1.07500	.37662	.055	-2.1627	.0127
	Experience cohesion	.18205	.37822	.997	-.9103	1.2744
	Low-cohesion (visual)	.50000	.43488	.860	-.7560	1.7560
	Authoritarian (non-violent)	.27500	.46126	.991	-1.0572	1.6072
	Authoritarian (violent)	.65000	.46126	.721	-.6822	1.9822
Authoritarian (non-violent)	High cohesion	-1.35000 ⁺	.40679	.014	-2.5249	-.1751
	Experience cohesion	-.09295	.40828	1.000	-1.2721	1.0862
	Low-cohesion (visual)	.22500	.46126	.997	-1.1072	1.5572
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	-.27500	.46126	.991	-1.6072	1.0572
	Authoritarian (violent)	.37500	.48621	.972	-1.0293	1.7793
Authoritarian	High cohesion	-1.72500 ⁺	.40679	.001	-2.8999	-.5501

	(violent)	Experience cohesion	-.46795	.40828	.861	-1.6471	.7112
		Low-cohesion (visual)	-.15000	.46126	1.000	-1.4822	1.1822
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	-.65000	.46126	.721	-1.9822	.6822
		Authoritarian (non-violent)	-.37500	.48621	.972	-1.7793	1.0293
Simulation PTV score	High cohesion	Experience cohesion	1.47692 ⁺	.23369	.000	.8020	2.1519
		Low-cohesion (visual)	.60000	.28440	.288	-.2214	1.4214
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	3.00000 ⁺	.28440	.000	2.1786	3.8214
		Authoritarian (non-violent)	3.40000 ⁺	.30718	.000	2.5128	4.2872
		Authoritarian (violent)	-.60000	.30718	.374	-1.4872	.2872
	Experience cohesion	High cohesion	-1.47692 ⁺	.23369	.000	-2.1519	-.8020
		Low-cohesion (visual)	-.87692 ⁺	.28561	.030	-1.7018	-.0520
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	1.52308 ⁺	.28561	.000	.6982	2.3480
		Authoritarian (non-violent)	1.92308 ⁺	.30831	.000	1.0326	2.8135
		Authoritarian (violent)	-2.07692 ⁺	.30831	.000	-2.9674	-1.1865
	Low-cohesion	High cohesion	-.60000	.28440	.288	-1.4214	.2214

(visual)	Experience cohesion	.87692 ⁺	.28561	.030	.0520	1.7018
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	2.40000 ⁺	.32839	.000	1.4515	3.3485
	Authoritarian (non-violent)	2.80000 ⁺	.34831	.000	1.7940	3.8060
	Authoritarian (violent)	-1.20000 ⁺	.34831	.010	-2.2060	-.1940
Low-cohesion (proxy)	High cohesion	-3.00000 ⁺	.28440	.000	-3.8214	-2.1786
	Experience cohesion	-1.52308 ⁺	.28561	.000	-2.3480	-.6982
	Low-cohesion (visual)	-2.40000 ⁺	.32839	.000	-3.3485	-1.4515
	Authoritarian (non-violent)	.40000	.34831	.860	-.6060	1.4060
	Authoritarian (violent)	-3.60000 ⁺	.34831	.000	-4.6060	-2.5940
Authoritarian (non-violent)	High cohesion	-3.40000 ⁺	.30718	.000	-4.2872	-2.5128
	Experience cohesion	-1.92308 ⁺	.30831	.000	-2.8135	-1.0326
	Low-cohesion (visual)	-2.80000 ⁺	.34831	.000	-3.8060	-1.7940
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	-.40000	.34831	.860	-1.4060	.6060
	Authoritarian (violent)	-4.00000 ⁺	.36715	.000	-5.0604	-2.9396
Authoritarian (violent)	High cohesion	.60000	.30718	.374	-.2872	1.4872
	Experience cohesion	2.07692 ⁺	.30831	.000	1.1865	2.9674

		Low-cohesion (visual)	1.20000 ⁺	.34831	.010	.1940	2.2060
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	3.60000 ⁺	.34831	.000	2.5940	4.6060
		Authoritarian (non-violent)	4.00000 ⁺	.36715	.000	2.9396	5.0604
Post-simulation individual PTV score	High cohesion	Experience cohesion	.93590 ⁺	.32089	.046	.0091	1.8627
		Low-cohesion (visual)	.50000	.39051	.795	-.6279	1.6279
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	1.40000 ⁺	.39051	.006	.2721	2.5279
		Authoritarian (non-violent)	2.75000 ⁺	.42180	.000	1.5318	3.9682
		Authoritarian (violent)	-1.31250 ⁺	.42180	.027	-2.5307	-.0943
	Experience cohesion	High cohesion	-.93590 ⁺	.32089	.046	-1.8627	-.0091
		Low-cohesion (visual)	-.43590	.39217	.876	-1.5686	.6968
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	.46410	.39217	.844	-.6686	1.5968
		Authoritarian (non-violent)	1.81410 ⁺	.42334	.000	.5914	3.0368
		Authoritarian (violent)	-2.24840 ⁺	.42334	.000	-3.4711	-1.0257
	Low-cohesion (visual)	High cohesion	-.50000	.39051	.795	-1.6279	.6279
		Experience cohesion	.43590	.39217	.876	-.6968	1.5686

	Low-cohesion (proxy)	.90000	.45092	.350	-.4023	2.2023
	Authoritarian (non-violent)	2.25000 ⁺	.47827	.000	.8687	3.6313
	Authoritarian (violent)	-1.81250 ⁺	.47827	.003	-3.1938	-.4312
Low-cohesion (proxy)	High cohesion	-1.40000 ⁺	.39051	.006	-2.5279	-.2721
	Experience cohesion	-.46410	.39217	.844	-1.5968	.6686
	Low-cohesion (visual)	-.90000	.45092	.350	-2.2023	.4023
	Authoritarian (non-violent)	1.35000	.47827	.060	-.0313	2.7313
	Authoritarian (violent)	-2.71250 ⁺	.47827	.000	-4.0938	-1.3312
Authoritarian (non-violent)	High cohesion	-2.75000 ⁺	.42180	.000	-3.9682	-1.5318
	Experience cohesion	-1.81410 ⁺	.42334	.000	-3.0368	-.5914
	Low-cohesion (visual)	-2.25000 ⁺	.47827	.000	-3.6313	-.8687
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	-1.35000	.47827	.060	-2.7313	.0313
	Authoritarian (violent)	-4.06250 ⁺	.50414	.000	-5.5186	-2.6064
Authoritarian (violent)	High cohesion	1.31250 ⁺	.42180	.027	.0943	2.5307
	Experience cohesion	2.24840 ⁺	.42334	.000	1.0257	3.4711
	Low-cohesion (visual)	1.81250 ⁺	.47827	.003	.4312	3.1938

Low-cohesion (proxy)	2.71250*	.47827	.000	1.3312	4.0938
Authoritarian (non- violent)	4.06250*	.50414	.000	2.6064	5.5186

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

7.0 Homogeneous Subsets Pre-simulation individual PTV score

Tukey HSD^{a,b}

Group type cohesion	N	Subset for alpha = 0.05	
		1	2
Authoritarian (violent)	16	2.2500	
Low-cohesion (visual)	20	2.4000	
Authoritarian (non-violent)	16	2.6250	
Experience cohesion	39	2.7179	
Low-cohesion (proxy)	20	2.9000	2.9000
High cohesion	40		3.9750
Sig.		.627	.109

Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.

a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 21.767.

b. The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean of the group sizes is used. Type I error levels are not guaranteed.

8.0 Homogeneous Subsets During-simulation individual PTV score

Tukey HSD^{a,b}

Group type cohesion	N	Subset for alpha = 0.05			
		1	2	3	4
Authoritarian (non-violent)	16	2.0000			
Low-cohesion (proxy)	20	2.4000			
Experience cohesion	39		3.9231		
Low-cohesion (visual)	20		4.8000	4.8000	
High cohesion	40			5.4000	5.4000
Authoritarian (violent)	16				6.0000
Sig.		.800	.065	.403	.403

Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.

a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 21.767.

b. The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean of the group sizes is used. Type I error levels are not guaranteed.

9.0 Homogeneous Subsets Post-simulation individual PTV score

Tukey HSD^{a,b}


Group type cohesion	N	Subset for alpha = 0.05			
		1	2	3	4
Authoritarian (non-violent)	16	1.7500			
Low-cohesion (proxy)	20		3.1000		
Experience cohesion	39		3.5641	3.5641	
Low-cohesion (visual)	20		4.0000	4.0000	
High cohesion	40			4.5000	
Authoritarian (violent)	16				5.8125
Sig.		1.000	.302	.261	1.000


Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.


a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 21.767.

b. The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean of the group sizes is used. Type I error levels are not guaranteed.

10.0 Means Plots







11.0 Sub group comparison ANOVA ouput

ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Pre-simulation individual PTV score	Between Groups	139.244	31	4.492	2.746	.000
	Within Groups	194.650	119	1.636		
	Total	333.894	150			
Simulation PTV score	Between Groups	295.434	31	9.530	9.258	.000
	Within Groups	122.500	119	1.029		
	Total	417.934	150			
Post-simulation individual PTV score	Between Groups	249.078	31	8.035	4.559	.000
	Within Groups	209.717	119	1.762		
	Total	458.795	150			
Intergrative complexity score	Between Groups	227.530	31	7.340	6.152	.000
	Within Groups	141.967	119	1.193		
	Total	369.497	150			

12.0 ANOVA analysis (cohesion condition only)

```
GET FILE='C:\Rob\PhD BACKUP\All data July 12 rerun NO Confederates.sav'. SAVE OUTFILE='C:\Rob\PhD
BACKUP\Group cohesion only.sav' /COMPRESSED. ONEWAY presimind simscore postsimind BY grouptype
/STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES EFFECTS HOMOGENEITY BROWNFORSYTHE WELCH /MISSING ANALYSIS
/POSTHOC=LSD ALPHA(0.05)
```

13.0 Notes

	Output Created	23-Jul-2012 14:53:55
	Comments	
Input	Data	C:\Rob\PhD BACKUP\Group cohesion only.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	99
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing.
	Cases Used	Statistics for each analysis are based on cases with no missing data for any variable in the analysis.

	Syntax	ONEWAY presimind simscore postsimind BY grouptype /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES EFFECTS HOMOGENEITY BROWNFORSYTHE WELCH /MISSING ANALYSIS /POSTHOC=LSD ALPHA(0.05).
Resources	Processor Time	0:00:00.015
	Elapsed Time	0:00:00.046

[DataSet1] C:\Rob\PhD BACKUP\Group cohesion only.sav

Descriptives

		N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Pre-simulation individual PTV score	High cohesion	40	3.9750	1.45862
	Experience cohesion	39	2.7179	1.31687
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	20	2.9000	1.37267
	Total	99	3.2626	1.49548
Model	Fixed Effects			1.38696
Simulation PTV score	High cohesion	40	5.4000	1.15025
	Experience cohesion	39	3.9231	.92863

	Low-cohesion (proxy)	20	2.4000	1.31389
	Total	99	4.2121	1.57320
Model	Fixed Effects			1.10477
Post-simulation individual PTV score	High cohesion	40	4.5000	1.66410
	Experience cohesion	39	3.5641	1.58604
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	20	3.1000	1.25237
	Total	99	3.8485	1.64356
Model	Fixed Effects			1.55921

Descriptives

			95% Confidence Interval for Mean	
		Std. Error	Lower Bound	
Pre-simulation individual PTV score	High cohesion	.23063	3.5085	
	Experience cohesion	.21087	2.2911	
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	.30694	2.2576	
	Total	.15030	2.9644	
	Model	Fixed Effects	.13940	2.9859
		Random Effects	.43934	1.3723
Simulation PTV score	High cohesion	.18187	5.0321	
	Experience cohesion	.14870	3.6221	
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	.29380	1.7851	
	Total	.15811	3.8984	

	Model	Fixed Effects	.11103	3.9917
		Random Effects	.84175	.5903
Post-simulation individual PTV score		High cohesion	.26312	3.9678
		Experience cohesion	.25397	3.0500
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	.28004	2.5139
		Total	.16518	3.5207
	Model	Fixed Effects	.15671	3.5374
		Random Effects	.41773	2.0512

Descriptives

		95% Confidence Interval for Mean	
		Upper Bound	Minimum
Pre-simulation individual PTV score	High cohesion	4.4415	2.00
	Experience cohesion	3.1448	1.00
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	3.5424	1.00
	Total	3.5609	1.00
	Model	Fixed Effects	3.5393
		Random Effects	5.1530
Simulation PTV score	High cohesion	5.7679	3.00
	Experience cohesion	4.2241	2.00
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	3.0149	1.00
	Total	4.5259	1.00

	Model	Fixed Effects	4.4325	
		Random Effects	7.8339	
Post-simulation individual PTV score		High cohesion	5.0322	1.00
		Experience cohesion	4.0782	1.00
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	3.6861	1.00
		Total	4.1763	1.00
	Model	Fixed Effects	4.1595	
		Random Effects	5.6458	

Descriptives

			Maximum	Between-Component Variance
Pre-simulation individual PTV score		High cohesion	7.00	
		Experience cohesion	6.00	
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	5.00	
		Total	7.00	
	Model	Random Effects		.48321
Simulation PTV score		High cohesion	7.00	
		Experience cohesion	6.00	
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	5.00	
		Total	7.00	
	Model	Random Effects		1.93799

Post-simulation individual PTV score	High cohesion	7.00	
	Experience cohesion	7.00	
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	6.00	
	Total	7.00	
Model	Random Effects		.41736

Test of Homogeneity of Variances

	Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
Pre-simulation individual PTV score	.313	2	96	.732
Simulation PTV score	3.686	2	96	.029
Post-simulation individual PTV score	1.494	2	96	.230

ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square
Pre-simulation individual PTV score	Between Groups	34.499	2	17.250
	Within Groups	184.672	96	1.924
	Total	219.172	98	
Simulation PTV score	Between Groups	125.376	2	62.688
	Within Groups	117.169	96	1.221

	Total	242.545	98	
Post-simulation individual PTV score	Between Groups	31.338	2	15.669
	Within Groups	233.390	96	2.431
	Total	264.727	98	

ANOVA

	F	Sig.
Pre-simulation individual PTV score	8.967	.000
Simulation PTV score	51.362	.000
Post-simulation individual PTV score	6.445	.002

Robust Tests of Equality of Means

	Statistic ^a	df1	df2	Sig.
Pre-simulation individual PTV score	Welch	2	51.097	.001
	Brown-Forsythe	2	77.197	.000
Simulation PTV score	Welch	2	47.156	.000
	Brown-Forsythe	2	58.769	.000
Post-simulation individual PTV score	Welch	2	55.796	.002
	Brown-Forsythe	2	91.797	.001

a. Asymptotically F distributed.

Post Hoc Tests

Multiple Comparisons

LSD

Dependent Variable	(I) Group type cohesion	(J) Group type cohesion	Mean Difference	
			(I-J)	
Pre-simulation individual PTV score	High cohesion	Experience cohesion	1.25705*	
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	1.07500*	
	Experience cohesion	High cohesion	-1.25705*	
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	-.18205	
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	High cohesion	-1.07500*	
		Experience cohesion	.18205	
	Simulation PTV score	High cohesion	Experience cohesion	1.47692*
			Low-cohesion (proxy)	3.00000*
Experience cohesion		High cohesion	-1.47692*	
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	1.52308*	
Low-cohesion (proxy)		High cohesion	-3.00000*	
		Experience cohesion	-1.52308*	
Post-simulation individual PTV score		High cohesion	Experience cohesion	.93590*
			Low-cohesion (proxy)	1.40000*

Experience cohesion	High cohesion	-.93590*
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	.46410
Low-cohesion (proxy)	High cohesion	-1.40000*
	Experience cohesion	-.46410

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Multiple Comparisons

LSD

Dependent Variable	(I) Group type cohesion	(J) Group type cohesion		
			Std. Error	Sig.
Pre-simulation individual PTV score	High cohesion	Experience cohesion	.31212	.000
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	.37984	.006
	Experience cohesion	High cohesion	.31212	.000
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	.38146	.634
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	High cohesion	.37984	.006
		Experience cohesion	.38146	.634
Simulation PTV score	High cohesion	Experience cohesion	.24861	.000
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	.30255	.000
	Experience cohesion	High cohesion	.24861	.000
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	.30384	.000
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	High cohesion	.30255	.000
		Experience cohesion	.30384	.000
Post-simulation individual	High cohesion	Experience cohesion	.35088	.009

PTV score		Low-cohesion (proxy)	.42701	.001
	Experience cohesion	High cohesion	.35088	.009
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	.42883	.282
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	High cohesion	.42701	.001
		Experience cohesion	.42883	.282

Multiple Comparisons

LSD

Dependent Variable	(I) Group type cohesion	(J) Group type cohesion	95% Confidence Interval
			Lower Bound
Pre-simulation individual PTV score	High cohesion	Experience cohesion	.6375
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	.3210
	Experience cohesion	High cohesion	-1.8766
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	-.9392
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	High cohesion	-1.8290
Experience cohesion		-.5751	
Simulation PTV score	High cohesion	Experience cohesion	.9834
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	2.3994
	Experience cohesion	High cohesion	-1.9704
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	.9200
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	High cohesion	-3.6006

		Experience cohesion	-2.1262
Post-simulation individual PTV score	High cohesion	Experience cohesion	.2394
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	.5524
	Experience cohesion	High cohesion	-1.6324
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	-.3871
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	High cohesion	-2.2476
		Experience cohesion	-1.3153

Multiple Comparisons

LSD

Dependent Variable	(I) Group type cohesion	(J) Group type cohesion	95% Confidence Interval
			Upper Bound
Pre-simulation individual PTV score	High cohesion	Experience cohesion	1.8766
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	1.8290
	Experience cohesion	High cohesion	-.6375
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	.5751
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	High cohesion	-.3210
		Experience cohesion	.9392
Simulation PTV score	High cohesion	Experience cohesion	1.9704
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	3.6006
	Experience cohesion	High cohesion	-.9834

		Low-cohesion (proxy)	2.1262
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	High cohesion	-2.3994
		Experience cohesion	-.9200
Post-simulation individual PTV score	High cohesion	Experience cohesion	1.6324
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	2.2476
	Experience cohesion	High cohesion	-.2394
		Low-cohesion (proxy)	1.3153
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	High cohesion	-.5524
		Experience cohesion	.3871

13.0 Integrative complexity outputs

ONEWAY icscore BY grouptype /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES EFFECTS HOMOGENEITY BROWNFORSYTHE
WELCH /PLOT MEANS /MISSING ANALYSIS /POSTHOC=LSD ALPHA(0.05).

Oneway

Notes

	Output Created	26-Jul-2012 10:31:11
	Comments	
Input	Data	C:\Rob\PhD BACKUP\All data July 12 rerun NO Confederates.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	151
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing.
	Cases Used	Statistics for each analysis are based on cases with no missing data for any variable in the analysis.
	Syntax	ONEWAY icscore BY grouptype /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES EFFECTS HOMOGENEITY BROWNFORSYTHE WELCH /PLOT MEANS /MISSING ANALYSIS /POSTHOC=LSD ALPHA(0.05).

Resources	Processor Time	0:00:00.375
	Elapsed Time	0:00:00.407

[DataSet1] C:\Rob\PhD BACKUP\All data July 12 rerun NO Confederates.sav

Descriptives

Integrative complexity score

		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error
	High cohesion	40	3.9500	1.08486	.17153
	Experience cohesion	39	4.5641	1.31379	.21037
	Low-cohesion (visual)	20	5.2500	.91047	.20359
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	20	5.6000	1.31389	.29380
	Authoritarian (non-violent)	16	2.4375	1.09354	.27339
	Authoritarian (violent)	16	2.1875	.75000	.18750
	Total	151	4.1523	1.56949	.12772
Model	Fixed Effects			1.13385	.09227
	Random Effects				.53931

Descriptives

Integrative complexity score

		95% Confidence Interval for Mean			
		Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Minimum	Maximum
	High cohesion	3.6030	4.2970	1.00	6.00
	Experience cohesion	4.1382	4.9900	2.00	7.00
	Low-cohesion (visual)	4.8239	5.6761	4.00	7.00
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	4.9851	6.2149	3.00	7.00
	Authoritarian (non-violent)	1.8548	3.0202	1.00	4.00
	Authoritarian (violent)	1.7879	2.5871	1.00	4.00
	Total	3.8999	4.4047	1.00	7.00
Model	Fixed Effects	3.9699	4.3347		
	Random Effects	2.7660	5.5387		

Descriptives

Integrative complexity score

		Between-Component Variance
		1.45224
Model	Random Effects	

Test of Homogeneity of Variances

Integrative complexity score

Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
2.680	5	145	.024

ANOVA

Integrative complexity score

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	183.082	5	36.616	28.482	.000
Within Groups	186.415	145	1.286		
Total	369.497	150			

Robust Tests of Equality of Means

Integrative complexity score

	Statistic ^a	df1	df2	Sig.
Welch	38.102	5	56.297	.000
Brown-Forsythe	30.852	5	117.127	.000

a. Asymptotically F distributed.

Post Hoc Tests

Multiple Comparisons

Integrative complexity score

LSD

		Mean Difference	Std. Error	Sig.
(I) Group type cohesion	(J) Group type cohesion	(I-J)		
High cohesion	Experience cohesion	-.61410 [*]	.25516	.017
	Low-cohesion (visual)	-1.30000 [*]	.31052	.000
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	-1.65000 [*]	.31052	.000
	Authoritarian (non-violent)	1.51250 [*]	.33540	.000
	Authoritarian (violent)	1.76250 [*]	.33540	.000
Experience cohesion	High cohesion	.61410 [*]	.25516	.017
	Low-cohesion (visual)	-.68590 [*]	.31184	.029
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	-1.03590 [*]	.31184	.001
	Authoritarian (non-violent)	2.12660 [*]	.33662	.000
	Authoritarian (violent)	2.37660 [*]	.33662	.000
Low-cohesion (visual)	High cohesion	1.30000 [*]	.31052	.000
	Experience cohesion	.68590 [*]	.31184	.029
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	-.35000	.35856	.331
	Authoritarian (non-violent)	2.81250 [*]	.38031	.000

	Authoritarian (violent)	3.06250*	.38031	.000
Low-cohesion (proxy)	High cohesion	1.65000*	.31052	.000
	Experience cohesion	1.03590*	.31184	.001
	Low-cohesion (visual)	.35000	.35856	.331
	Authoritarian (non-violent)	3.16250*	.38031	.000
	Authoritarian (violent)	3.41250*	.38031	.000
Authoritarian (non-violent)	High cohesion	-1.51250*	.33540	.000
	Experience cohesion	-2.12660*	.33662	.000
	Low-cohesion (visual)	-2.81250*	.38031	.000
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	-3.16250*	.38031	.000
	Authoritarian (violent)	.25000	.40088	.534
Authoritarian (violent)	High cohesion	-1.76250*	.33540	.000
	Experience cohesion	-2.37660*	.33662	.000
	Low-cohesion (visual)	-3.06250*	.38031	.000
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	-3.41250*	.38031	.000
	Authoritarian (non-violent)	-.25000	.40088	.534

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Multiple Comparisons

Integrative complexity score

LSD

		95% Confidence Interval	
(I) Group type cohesion	(J) Group type cohesion	Lower Bound	Upper Bound

High cohesion	Experience cohesion	-1.1184	-.1098
	Low-cohesion (visual)	-1.9137	-.6863
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	-2.2637	-1.0363
	Authoritarian (non-violent)	.8496	2.1754
	Authoritarian (violent)	1.0996	2.4254
Experience cohesion	High cohesion	.1098	1.1184
	Low-cohesion (visual)	-1.3022	-.0696
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	-1.6522	-.4196
	Authoritarian (non-violent)	1.4613	2.7919
	Authoritarian (violent)	1.7113	3.0419
Low-cohesion (visual)	High cohesion	.6863	1.9137
	Experience cohesion	.0696	1.3022
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	-1.0587	.3587
	Authoritarian (non-violent)	2.0608	3.5642
	Authoritarian (violent)	2.3108	3.8142
Low-cohesion (proxy)	High cohesion	1.0363	2.2637
	Experience cohesion	.4196	1.6522
	Low-cohesion (visual)	-.3587	1.0587
	Authoritarian (non-violent)	2.4108	3.9142
	Authoritarian (violent)	2.6608	4.1642
Authoritarian (non-violent)	High cohesion	-2.1754	-.8496
	Experience cohesion	-2.7919	-1.4613
	Low-cohesion (visual)	-3.5642	-2.0608

	Low-cohesion (proxy)	-3.9142	-2.4108
	Authoritarian (violent)	-.5423	1.0423
Authoritarian (violent)	High cohesion	-2.4254	-1.0996
	Experience cohesion	-3.0419	-1.7113
	Low-cohesion (visual)	-3.8142	-2.3108
	Low-cohesion (proxy)	-4.1642	-2.6608
	Authoritarian (non-violent)	-1.0423	.5423

Means Plots




Table 4.2.4 – Participants Demographics Extract

The names of the participants have been obscured in line with the confidentiality aspects of this research and in accordance with BPS regulations.

**BME = Black and minority ethnic group*

Participant ID	Surname	Forename	Age	Gender	Ethnicity
1	██████	████	35	M	
2	██████	██████	37	M	
3	██████	██████	38	M	
4	██████	██████	REFUSED	M	
5	██████	██████	34	M	
6	██████	████	39	M	
7	██████	██████	31	F	
8	██████	██████	45	M	
9	██████	██████	23	F	
10	██████	██████	23	F	
11	██████	██████	25	M	
12	██████	██████	26	M	
13	██████	██████	53	M	
14	██████	██████	40	F	
15	██████	████	56	M	
16	██████	██████	33	M	
17	██████	████	35	M	
18	██████	██████	36	F	
19	██████	████	25	F	
20	██████	██████	24	M	
21	██████	████	25	M	
22	██████	████	26	M	
23	██████	██████	33	M	
24	██████	██████	REFUSED	M	
25	██████	██████	45	M	
26	██████	██████	23	M	
27	██████	██████	45	M	
28	██████	██████	35	F	
29	██████	██████	36	M	

30	████	████	44	F
31	████	████	24	M
32	██████	████	19	M
33	████	██	55	M
34	████	████	34	F
35	██████	██████	39	F
36	████	████	33	F
37	████	████	34	M
38	████	██	36	M
39	████	████	36	M
40	████	████	34	M
41	████	████	35	M
42	████	████	50	M
43	████	██	51	M
44	██████	████	46	M
45	████	██	35	M
46	██████	████	36	M
47	████	████	67	M
48	██████	██████	48	M
49	████	██	46	M
50	██████	████	50	M
51	██████	██████	REFUSED	M
52	████	████	34	M
53	████	██	33	M
54	████	██████	33	M
55	██████	█	33	M
56	████	██████	21	M
57	████	██	17	M
58	████	█	17	M
59	████	████	23	M
60	████	████	54	M
61	██████	██	33	M
62	██████	████	18	M
63	████	████	21	M
64	████	████	20	F
65	██████	████	44	M
66	██████	██	32	M
67	████	████	36	M
68	██████	████	REFUSED	M
69	██████	████	41	M
70	████	██	40	F

71	████	████	20	M
72	██████	██	19	M
73	██████	██	REFUSED	M
74	██████	██████	44	M
75	██████	████	23	M
76	██████	██	26	M
77	██████	██	30	M
78	████	██████	REFUSED	M
79	██████	██	REFUSED	M
80	██████	████	33	M
81	██████	████	25	M
82	██████	██████	22	M
83	██████	██████	REFUSED	M
84	██████	██████	REFUSED	M
85	██████	██████	REFUSED	F
86	██████	██	41	M
87	██████	██████	41	F
88	██████	██████	36	F
89	██████	██████	REFUSED	M
90	██████	██████	REFUSED	M
91	██████	██████	REFUSED	M
92	██████	████	47	F
93	█	████	42	F
94	██████	██████	33	M
95	██████	████	22	M
96	██████	████	29	M
97	██████	█	22	F
98	██████	██████	REFUSED	F
99	██████	██████	REFUSED	M
100	██████	██	REFUSED	M
101	██████	██	21	M
102	████	██	20	M
103	██████	██	19	M
104	██████	██████	21	M
105	██████	████	39	M
106	██████	████	39	M
107	██████	██████	35	M
108	██████	██	33	M
109	██████	██████	REFUSED	M
110	██████	██	62	F
111	██████	██	33	M

112	████	██████	REFUSED	M
113	██████	████	REFUSED	M
114	██████	████	21	F
115	████	██████	44	M
116	██████	██████	REFUSED	REFUSED
117	████	████	45	M
118	████	██████	23	M
119	████	████	33	F
120	██████	██████	REFUSED	M
121	████	██████	19	F
122	██████	██████	REFUSED	M
123	██████	██████	REFUSED	F
124	██████	██████	REFUSED	M
125	██████	████	19	M
126	████	█	66	F
127	████	██████	20	M
128	████	██████	23	M
129	████	████	43	M
130	████	██████	45	M
131	██████	██████	REFUSED	M
132	██████	████	21	M
133	████	██████	20	M
134	██████	██████	28	M
135	████	████	27	M
136	████	██████	REFUSED	M
137	████	████	33	M
138	████	████	REFUSED	M
139	████	████	40	M
140	████	██████	22	M
141	██████	████	29	M
142	██████	██████	29	M
143	██████	████	34	M
144	██████	████	28	M
145	██████	██████	35	M
146	████	████	34	M
147	████	████	33	M
148	██████	████	33	M
149	████	██████	39	M
150	██████	████	33	M
151	████	██████	50	M
152	██████	████	54	M

	153	████	██████	34	M
	154	██████	██████	23	M
	155	██████	██████	34	M
	156	████████	████████	44	M
	157	██████	██████	45	M
<i>*Parti</i>	158	████	█	REFUSED	M
	159	██████	██████	45	M
<i>cipan</i>	160	████████	█	33	M

t 116 withdrew from the study. They were not replaced. Some of the participant marked 'REFUSED' include the confederate participants from the simulation on authoritarian conformity.

Chart 3.1- Partial Regression Scatter (Propensity to Violence

Score/ Group association




Chart 3.2- Partial Regression Scatterplot (Propensity to Violence Score/
Authoritarian Conformity





Chart 3.3- Partial Regression Scatterplot (Propensity to Violence Score/
Transnational support for violence)



15.0 Pilot Questionnaire (complete)



violence, authority and aggression

a study of attitudes towards violence
in Britain

**COUNTER
RESEARCH**
international



This study is designed to explore people's attitudes to violence in a political and non-political context. The findings are designed to inform a wider research programme which assesses the causes of violent behaviour.

Please try to answer all the questions as honestly as possible.

All responses are anonymised and will be treated in the strictest confidence. Participation is voluntary and you may withdraw from this study at any time. If you would like to find out more about this research, please tick the box at the end of this questionnaire.

Thank you for taking time to complete this questionnaire

Below are a number of statements about violence, authority and aggression with which you may or may not agree. Please tick the number next to each statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. Try to answer as honestly as you can.

This study is conducted in accordance with the ethical guidelines set out by the British Psychological Society.

Instructions

Please indicate your responses in each case by clicking on the numbered boxes next to each question. Once you have completed the survey, please click the submit button. Your responses will then be automatically attached into an email and returned.

Adobe Acrobat Reader version 6.0 or higher is required to complete this form. Click here to download a free version.



<http://www.adobe.com/products/acrobat/readstep2.html>

Here are a number of statements about authority with which you may or may not agree. Please write a number next to each statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. Try to answer as honestly as you can.

Disagree strongly	Disagree moderately	Disagree a little	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree a little	Agree moderately	Agree strongly
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

aggression

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Most people you meet are friendly and obliging, more disposed to aid you than to refuse aid.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
People will be honest with you as long as you are honest with them.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Trust others to the limit and they will trust you to the limit.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If you have faith in your friends they will seldom disappoint you.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Most people are generous in their judgements of your actions and are inclined to give you the benefit of the doubt.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Believe that a person will keep their promise and they will keep it.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Only once in a great while, if at all, does one run into a dishonest and deceitful person	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Please answer the following questions about yourself on the next page

general information

Age (years) 15-17 18-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40
 41-45 46-50 51-55 56-60 61-65 65+

Gender male female

Educated to collage age O-Levels GSCE A-Level
 College University Postgraduate

First person in family to attend college/university Yes No

Income (per annum) £0 - £10,000 £10,000 - £20,000 £20,000 - £30,000 £30,000 - £40,000
 £40,000 - £50,000 £50,000 - £60,000 £60,000+

Job title

data protection

The information you give here will be kept completely confidential and will not be passed to a third party.

equal opportunities

For equal opportunities monitoring purposes only, it would be helpful if you would give the following information.

To which of these groups do you consider you belong...?(Please tick one box only)

white

- British 1
Irish 2
Any other white background 3

asian or asian british

- Indian 4
Bangladeshi 5
Pakistani 6
Any other Asian background 7

mixed

- White and Black Caribbean 8
White and Asian 9
White and Black African 10
Any other mixed background 11

black or black british

- Caribbean 12
Any other Black background 13
African 14

chinese or other ethnic group

- Chinese 15
Other 16

Refused 17

What is your religion?

Are you a member of a political group?

Please tick here if you would like more information about this study

Thank you for taking part in this study.

